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PERFORMANCE TRACK’S POSTMORTEM:
LESSONS FROM THE RISE AND FALL OF EPA’S
“FLAGSHIP” VOLUNTARY PROGRAM†
Cary Coglianese* and Jennifer Nash**
For nearly a decade, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) considered its National Environmental Performance Track to be its “flagship” voluntary
program — even a model for transforming the conventional system of environmental
regulation. Since Performance Track’s founding during the Clinton Administration, EPA
officials repeatedly claimed that the program’s rewards attracted hundreds of the nation’s “top” environmental performers and induced these businesses to make significant
environmental gains beyond legal requirements. Although EPA eventually disbanded
Performance Track early in the Obama Administration, the program has been subsequently emulated by a variety of state and federal regulatory authorities. To discern
lessons useful for similar voluntary programs, we report here the findings from a multipronged, multi-year research effort assessing business participation in Performance
Track. We find no evidence to support the sweeping assertions EPA made about the
program’s achievements. Facilities participating in Performance Track simply could not
be shown to be top performers. Rather, what most distinguished these participants was a
factor distinct from environmental quality, namely their propensity to engage in outreach with government and community groups. Furthermore, drawing on an extensive
analysis of business participation in Performance Track and other EPA voluntary programs, we show how Performance Track faced inherent limitations in its ability to induce any dramatic environmental gains, making its model more of a poor substitute for
the conventional regulatory system than a plausible means for the system’s
transformation.
†EPA’s Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation partly supported the research underlying this
Article through a cooperative agreement (Grant No. R-83056701). Support was also provided by
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. For research assistance, we thank James Gignac and Gopal Raman, as well as a team
from Booz Allen Hamilton consisting of Elizabeth Kytle, Dana Minerva, Sarah Scudder, and
Donald Trees. We appreciate the cooperation of Allison Barasz, Laurie Finne, Angela Helman, and
Eric Ruder from Industrial Economics, Inc., and Lisa Grogan-McCulloch of EPA in responding to
numerous requests for information. Lori Snyder Bennear, Stephen Quinlan, and Gopal Raman
offered much helpful input at early stages, and Silvana Burgese, Anna Gavin, Nesha Patel, Tim
von Dulm, and Damien Leri assisted in the later stages. Jordi Sabaté formatted our figures, and
Matthew McCabe and the team of editors at the Harvard Environmental Law Review gave the
entire manuscript a careful and much-appreciated review. We owe special thanks to Jonathan
Borck, Jennifer Howard-Grenville, and Fei Yu, collaborators and co-authors on some of the
research discussed in this article. Their collaborations formed the basis of a much larger report to
EPA upon which portions of this article draw, available at http://perma.cc/L8EP-754M. We
received many helpful comments on the earlier report, contributions acknowledged in the report
and gratefully reaffirmed here. We also express gratitude for an additional round of helpful
comments and conversations from James Conrad, E. Donald Elliott, Ira Feldman, Dan Fiorino,
John Foster, David Guest, Angela Helman, Richard Kashmanian, Chuck Kent, Ira Leighton, Orly
Lobel, Eric Ruder, John Walke, and Richard Wells, as well as participants in workshops at the
Georgetown University Law Center, the University of Akron Law School, the University of
Michigan Stephen M. Ross School of Business, the University of Minnesota Law School, the
University of Pennsylvania’s Initiative for Global Environmental Leadership, the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, and the University of San Diego School of Law. Of course, we alone
bear responsibility for our findings and interpretations.
* Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; Director, Penn Program on Regulation.
** Executive Director, Regulatory Policy Program, and Associate Director, Mossavar-Rahmani
Center for Business and Government, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of
Government.
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INTRODUCTION
Following environmental law’s dramatic launch in the 1970s, the adoption
of new environmental legislation has ground to a virtual standstill for decades
— a logjam predating, but most recently exemplified by, the failure to pass
climate change legislation during President Obama’s first term.1 In the absence
of significant statutory change, much environmental policy innovation at the
federal level has occurred through administrative action by EPA. Of the various
innovations initiated by EPA over the last twenty years, the development of
voluntary environmental programs has been among the most distinctive.2
By the mid-2000s, EPA had created more than sixty different voluntary
programs.3 These programs range from well-known efforts such as Energy Star,
which offers special product labels to manufacturers of consumer products that
meet voluntary energy efficiency standards, to more obscure initiatives such as
Burn Wise, which provides consumers with financial incentives to replace
older, more polluting wood-burning stoves.4 EPA’s voluntary programs vary in
1

See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 97–98 (2001) (“From the signing of NEPA in 1970
to the adoption of the Superfund law in 1980, the 1970s saw the enactment of what became, and
still remains, virtually the entire environmental regulatory system in the United States.”); see
generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004); ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft
eds., 6th ed. 2006); DAVID SHOENBROD ET AL., BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT WILL WORK (2010). For a discussion of the “watershed” failure to pass a cap-andtrade bill in 2009–2010, see THEDA SKOCPOL, NAMING THE PROBLEM: WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO
COUNTER EXTREMISM AND ENGAGE AMERICANS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING
(2013), available at http://perma.cc/A68Q-NP8D.
2
For a review of recent voluntary efforts in the United States as part of a next generation of
environmental policy, see generally Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001). The development of voluntary programs has emerged as a
global environmental innovation as well. See generally REALITY CHECK: THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND
JAPAN (Richard D. Morgenstern & William A. Pizer eds., 2007); DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2006); INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Theo de Bruijn & Vicki Norberg-Bohm eds.,
2005); VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN CLIMATE POLICY (Andrea Baranzini & Philippe Thalmann
eds., 2004).
3
Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Government Clubs: Theory and Evidence from Voluntary
Environmental Programs, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE 304 n.10
(Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., 2009) (noting that EPA listed sixty-two voluntary programs on its website in October 2005). Today, EPA claims to run somewhat fewer voluntary
programs, but the actual number of such programs at EPA is surprisingly difficult to determine
with accuracy. EPA’s Inspector General has criticized the agency for failing to define voluntary
programs consistently. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT
FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH: AT A GLANCE
(2007), available at http://perma.cc/QD6E-XNSV (“Depending on the source, the number of EPA
voluntary programs varies between 54 and 133.”). In response to this criticism, EPA tried to
clarify its definition of voluntary programs, and for a time it assigned a staff member within the
Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation (now Office of Policy) to maintain a list of programs
that fit its definition. However, the agency has since assigned that staff member to other responsibilities, and the agency’s list of voluntary programs is no longer maintained.
4
EPA has also initiated new programs and modified existing ones without always changing its
online list. Partnership Programs List, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0pMzeeTEQyq.
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their details but share a common approach that seeks to encourage individuals,
businesses, and other organizations to take environmentally beneficial actions
not otherwise required by law.5
Lacking new environmental legislation, EPA officials through the years
have come to view voluntary programs as a promising way to deliver improved
environmental outcomes for society without the investment of government resources needed to engage in rulemaking and enforcement.6 Moreover, since
participation in these programs is by definition voluntary, businesses only incur
additional costs when they perceive countervailing private benefits, thus largely
avoiding the common complaint about the undue costs of traditional regulation.7 For these reasons, voluntary programs have garnered considerable support from a variety of scholars and public officials who have advocated their
prominent role in the U.S. environmental protection system.8
Among its many voluntary programs, EPA long viewed its National Environmental Performance Track program as its “flagship” initiative.9 Established
For information on the examples we mention in the text, see About Energy Star, ENERGYSTAR.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/05NBZwBjbqo, and Burn Wise, EPA.GOV, http://perma.
law.harvard.edu/0sUuVbUWS8t. In 2006, about 2% of the agency’s workforce was dedicated to
administering all the agency’s voluntary programs, at an annual cost to the government of about
$350 million. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS MAY EXPAND EPA’S
INFLUENCE 5 (2006), available at http://permcc/JS9V-H5JK (“Partnership program managers said
their annual budgets total an estimated $352 million . . . [and] reported that a total of 365 FTEs
run these programs.”). The EPA budget for fiscal year 2008 states that the agency employs a
workforce of 17,324 “full-time equivalent” (“FTE”) employees. See EPA, FY 2008: BUDGET IN
BRIEF iii (2007), available at http://perma.cc/TJY5-SMJS.
5
EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH 4 (2007), available at http://perma.
cc/C7KA-VHRF (noting voluntary programs are “designed to motivate people and organizations
to take actions, not required by regulation, that benefit the environment”).
6
These programs have also enabled a regulatory agency often criticized for regulatory unreasonableness to claim credit for taking more cost-effective action. The EPA’s Inspector General has also
observed that voluntary programs “expand EPA’s environmental influence” by “broadening EPA’s
potential participant base and addressing environmental problems not governed by regulations.”
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS MAY EXPAND EPA’S INFLUENCE, supra note 4.
7
See EPA OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 174 (2001) [hereinafter ECONOMIC INCENTIVES], available at http://perma.cc/TM8G-TWHS (noting that voluntary programs “give
companies the flexibility to improve their environmental performance at less cost”).
8
See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 2; Stewart, supra note 2; E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological
Law and Policy, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 174 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); Madhu Khanna, Non-Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 291 (2001); Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger
K.W. Wurzel & Anthony R. Zito, “New” Instruments of Environmental Governance: Patterns and
Pathways of Change, in “N EW” INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE? NATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 3 (Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel & Anthony R. Zito eds.,
2003); Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective, in GOVERNANCE
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 56 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009).
9
See EPA OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION, FY2006 NATIONAL PROGRAM GUIDANCE:
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM 1–2 [hereinafter FY2006 NATIONAL
PROGRAM GUIDANCE] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“Launched in 2000, Performance Track . . . is the Agency’s flagship innovation program for recognizing facilities that
consistently exceed regulatory requirements, address unregulated environmental issues, and produce measurable environmental results.”) (emphasis added). Five years later, the “Performance
Track program [was] occupying center stage in regulatory reinvention.” Nicholas A. Ashford &

R
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in 2000, Performance Track attracted throughout its existence some 783 facilities to participate as “members” — those facilities that applied to and were
accepted by EPA as meeting Performance Track’s standards.10 Through Performance Track, EPA sought to recognize and reward environmentally responsible businesses in various ways.11 EPA publicly lauded Performance Track
members,12 designated members as low priority for routine inspections and encouraged states to do the same,13 and reduced certain regulatory and administrative requirements for Performance Track members.14 In exchange for these
benefits, members needed to stay in substantial compliance with regulatory requirements and make progress toward self-created environmental improvement
goals that exceeded the requirements of existing regulation.15
Charles C. Caldart, Government Regulation, in OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 39,
70 (Barry S. Levy & David H. Wegman eds., 2005).
10
Indus. Econ., Inc., PTrack Member Data (Mar. 22, 2011) (obtained from Angela Helman, Industrial Economics, Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Industrial Economics is a
third-party independent consulting firm that was retained by EPA to support the implementation
and monitoring of the Performance Track Program. See Jennifer Nash & Cary Coglianese, EPA’s
Performance Track: Origins, Objectives, and Operating Practices, in BEYOND COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS DECISION MAKING AND THE EPA’S PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM 25 (Cary Coglianese &
Jennifer Nash eds., 2006) [hereinafter BEYOND COMPLIANCE] , available at http://perma.cc/LSQ3E7VE. When the program ended in March 2009, it had 547 members. Five organizations accounted for 142 of its members: 3M (twenty facilities), Covanta Energy (twenty-one facilities),
Forever Resorts (twenty-eight facilities), Johnson & Johnson (thirty-six facilities), and the U.S.
Postal Service (thirty-seven facilities). PTrack Member Data, supra. Performance Track facilities
organized a separate Performance Track Participants Association (“PTPA”) that held an annual
conference with EPA and sought other ways to support EPA’s program. See Performance Track
Participants Ass’n, Membership (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). The PTPA was
modeled after the Voluntary Protection Programs Participants’ Association (“VPPPA”), an organization of facilities that are members of an Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) initiative similar to Performance Track. See infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
11
See National Environmental Performance Track: History, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.
edu/0MTfTeb3CBJ (stating that EPA sought to encourage participation by offering “exclusive
regulatory and administrative benefits, . . . public recognition, networking opportunities, and other
benefits” to Performance Track members); see also EPA INNOVATIONS TASK FORCE, AIMING FOR
EXCELLENCE: ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE STEWARDSHIP AND ACCELERATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS 9 (1999) [hereinafter AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE], available at http://perma.cc/Q6A6-H4VH
(stating that EPA had “waived or reduced penalties for companies that voluntarily audit[ed],
disclose[d], and correct[ed] environmental violations” and that took preventative action).
12
See National Environmental Performance Track: Recognition, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/QQ2SDLTH (“Performance Track recognize[d] member facilities locally and nationally through a
membership certificate, listing on [its] website, and inclusion in trade journal feature articles.”);
see also Performance Track: History, supra note 11.
13
National Environmental Performance Track: Low Priority for Routine Inspections, EPA.GOV,
http://perma.cc/5UEY-EGE9.
14
See EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BENEFITS FACT SHEET 1–2
(2009) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (noting that some of the benefits available
were “reduced reporting frequency for minor air sources, flexible air permits, an expedited
NPDES permit renewal process, more favorable terms for Clean Water State Revolving Fund
loans, . . . reduced self-inspections for certain hazardous waste facilities, [and] an extended accumulation time for large quantity generators of hazardous waste”).
15
See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Adm’r, EPA Office of Enforcement &
Compliance Assurance and Richard T. Farrell, Assoc. Adm’r, EPA Office of Pol’y, Econ. & Innovation to EPA Adm’rs and Reg’l Counsels (Jan. 19, 2001) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library) (noting that in order to receive the program benefits, “[p]articipants [had to] satisfy
specific performance criteria designed to ensure that they exceed regulatory requirements”); Na-
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Performance Track has been one of EPA’s best efforts at voluntary environmental protection.16 After its high-profile launch by then-EPA Administrator
Carol Browner of the Clinton Administration, Performance Track continued to
be treated as a cornerstone program within the Bush Administration’s EPA. The
program won consistent internal support from Browner’s three immediate successors.17 Former EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson — appointed by President Bush — declared that Performance Track succeeded in “delivering
impressive environmental results” and had “proven to be an important catalyst
for helping EPA change the way businesses look at their role in environmental
protection.”18 In terms of membership, the program ranked among EPA’s largest facility-based voluntary programs,19 and observers viewed its entry criteria
and programmatic requirements as ambitious.20 According to EPA, Performance Track members realized substantial environmental benefits in terms of energy and water conversation, habitat preservation, use of recycled materials,
and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants.21

tional Environmental Performance Track: Criteria, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/W95G-F73Q (further explaining that Performance Track members also needed to demonstrate “continuous
improvement” by commit[ting] to four quantitative goals . . . for improving their environmental
performance”).
16
See Three EPA Programs Nominated for Government “Oscars,” EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.
harvard.edu/0QvxM5zZwN4 (indicating that Performance Track was recognized as a semi-finalist
for its “uniqueness, effectiveness, significance and potential for replication” in a 2006 awards
program administered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University).
Although both of the authors of this Article were affiliated with the Harvard Kennedy School at
the time of this award, neither was involved in any way in the process of screening or reviewing
Performance Track’s application to this award program.
17
See Memorandum from EPA Adm’r to Assistant Adm’rs, Gen. Counsel, Inspector Gen., Chief
Fin. Officer, Associate Adm’r, Reg’l Adm’rs, Deputy Assistant Adm’rs, Deputy Reg’l Adm’rs, &
Staff Office Dirs. (Jan. 26, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); FIORINO, supra
note 2, at 149.
18
Stephen Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, Remarks at the National Environmental Performance Track
Awards Dinner (May 9, 2006), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0o43TU6KYRM. Other
high-level EPA leaders praised Performance Track as well. For example, Rick Otis, former Deputy
Associate Administrator for Policy, Economics, and Innovation, stated in an interview that Performance Track takes a more “holistic” look at regulating the environment: “[The program is]
[c]omprehensive . . . [and] take[s] advantage of creating peer groups, creating a world in which
somebody is doing it for, in a sense, their own interest.” Green Scene: The Performance Track
Program, EPA (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Former EPA Deputy
Administrator Marcus Peacock noted that Performance Track was “getting results” because it
“tap[s] into the natural desire many companies have to protect Mother Nature. . . . [and] encourages businesses to be good environmental stewards by recognizing facilities that go beyond minimum legal requirements.” Marcus Peacock, Deputy Adm’r, EPA, On the Right Track, FLOW OF
THE RIVER (Dec. 18, 2007), http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0BroES4PbyB.
19
See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 3, at 255 (reporting that the average number of members in
EPA voluntary partnership programs is 157).
20
See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 2, at 145–46, 148; ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE
VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS 56,
63–64 (2006). Prakash and Potoski offer a typology of voluntary programs based on the stringency
of entry criteria and requirements for ongoing membership, and they characterize Performance
Track as a program of the most stringent type. Id.
21
EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL PROGRESS REPORT 1–2 (2009) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE
TRACK FINAL PROGRESS REPORT] .

R
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To administer Performance Track, EPA dedicated substantial resources in
terms of agency staff and funding. EPA’s Office of Policy, Economics, and
Innovation administered Performance Track through an office run by a director
and about eighteen headquarters staff members.22 In addition, each of EPA’s ten
regional offices designated a Performance Track coordinator who assisted with
recruiting members, reviewing applications, delivering incentives, and developing memoranda of agreement with states, among other activities.23 Nearly all
states designated environmental agency staff members as state Performance
Track representatives, who helped promote the program at a local level and
coordinated Performance Track with related state activities.24 If imitation is the
sincerest form of flattery, then Performance Track’s model status as a voluntary
program was demonstrated by the existence of separate but very similar programs in over twenty states.25
Yet, as much acclaim as Performance Track won both inside and outside
government circles, it also generated its share of controversy and criticism.26
Environmental groups criticized the program and opposed its expansion.27
Members of Congress questioned whether Performance Track deserved continued or increased appropriations.28 Even the EPA’s own Inspector General inves22
EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 1-2–1-3 (2005) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) [hereinafter OPERATIONS HANDBOOK].
23
Id. at 1-3–1-4; see also RAND CORP., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM 25 (2010) (noting
that EPA regional offices dedicated fifteen “full-time equivalent” staff to the program from FY
2005 to FY 2009) [hereinafter RAND CORP. ASSESSMENT].
24
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 1-5.
25
See Jonathan C. Borck, Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Leadership Programs: Toward an Empirical Assessment of Their Performance, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 771, 776
(2008) (listing more than twenty states with voluntary environmental programs similar to Performance Track). Of course, a few of these state programs were started before EPA’s Performance
Track and actually served as models for the federal program. FIORINO, supra note 2, at 172.
26
Performance Track even became the subject of nightly network news like NBC, which aired a
report in 2008 chronicling criticisms that EPA had used the program to reward undeserving facilities. Feds Giving Suspect ‘Green’ Rewards (NBC television broadcast Apr. 20, 2008).
27
In 2005, an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) submitted a fourteen-page letter to EPA urging the agency to pull back from its stated aspirations to make Performance Track a “core element of [its] public health and environmental protection systems.” Letter
from John Walke, Clean Air Dir., NRDC, to EPA, Office of Adm’r Docket 3–4 (Nov. 3, 2005) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (characterizing Performance Track as “a poker tournament,” which trades away regulatory enforcement and public health protection in an “illegitimate” gamble to improve the environment). In early 2006, some thirty-one environmental
organizations wrote to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson in support of NRDC’s criticisms of the
program. Letter from Eric Schaeffer, President, Envtl. Integrity Project, et al., to Stephen Johnson,
Adm’r, EPA (Jan. 25, 2006) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (expressing concern
that Performance Track “may eventually be dismissed as little more than a public relations front
for some of the country’s biggest polluters”).
28
See, e.g., Debra Kahn, EPA: Two House Dems Question Performance Track Spending, Results,
E&E NEWS PM, Apr. 17, 2007 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (noting requests
from Representatives Albert Wynn (D-Md.) and Bart Stupak (D-Mich.) to EPA regarding Performance Track expenditure reports); Anthony Lacey, EPA Performance Track Spending Renews
Criticism of Ad Campaign, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Oct. 19, 2007 (naming specific projects that
funds could have supported); Anthony Lacey, Democrats May Ignore Bush’s Request for Steep
Cuts to EPA FY09 Budget, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Feb. 8, 2008 (noting Democrats’ likely opposition to proposed increased funding for Performance Track); see also Letter from Hon. Albert R.
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tigated Performance Track and concluded that the agency had failed to
demonstrate achievement of the program’s goals.29
EPA’s leadership initially disputed these criticisms and continued to back
the program,30 but once President Obama’s first EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson, took office in January 2009, she quickly took steps to dismantle the program.31 Although the program’s swift demise came as a shock to Performance
Track’s supporters, the agency’s abrupt about-face really should have come as
little surprise to anyone who closely followed the program. On December 9,
2008, just six days before then President-elect Obama announced he would
nominate Jackson to serve as EPA Administrator, the Philadelphia Inquirer
quoted Jackson in a front-page investigative story about Performance Track as
characterizing the program as “just one of those window-dressing programs
that has little value.”32 On May 14, 2009, EPA published a Federal Register
notice officially terminating Performance Track.33
Although Performance Track is now dead, similar voluntary programs
continue to attract attention and consume resources at both the state and federal
levels of government. At least fifteen states still maintain environmental leadership programs nearly identical to Performance Track.34 EPA itself still operates
Wynn, Chair, House Subcomm. on Env’t and Hazardous Materials and Hon. Bart Stupak, Chair,
House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, to Hon. Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, at 2
(Apr. 13, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (noting that legislators “are concerned about taxpayer dollars being wisely used at a time when EPA’s core environmental and
public health programs, ones that are specifically authorized by Congress, are severely
underfunded”).
29
In 2007, EPA’s Office of Inspector General examined Performance Track’s goals, activities, and
performance measures and concluded that the program failed to offer “a new model for achieving
environmental protection goals.” EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 2007-P-00013, PERFORMANCE TRACK COULD IMPROVE PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE VALUE 4, 15
(2007) [hereinafter P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT], available at http://perma.cc/
85K-YZNM. The Inspector General also concluded that “EPA cannot show how its program can
lead to the desired outcomes” it sought to achieve. Id. at 13.
30
In response to a draft of the Inspector General’s report, EPA took issue with some of the report’s
methods and data sources. Memorandum from Brian Mannix, Assoc. Adm’r, EPA, to Jeffrey Harris, Dir. Program Evaluation, Cross-Media Issues (2007), reprinted in P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 29. Mannix stated that the agency was “proud that after
five years of securing environmental results, we can undergo this level of scrutiny and confirm
what we knew to be true — Performance Track members lead their peers in environmental performance.” Id.
31
Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, to Performance Track Members, Corporate
Leaders, and State Envtl. Comm’rs at 1 (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library); Letter from Charles W. Kent, Dir., EPA Office of Cross-Media Programs, to Performance Track Members et al. at 1 (Mar. 25, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
32
John Sullivan & John Shiffman, Green Club an EPA Charade, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0rcu3YPomYv. One of the authors of this Article (Cary Coglianese)
was also quoted in the same story as indicating that EPA had thus far been unable to demonstrate
that Performance Track had caused any substantial difference in the environmental performance of
member facilities.
33
74 Fed. Reg. 22,741, 22,741–42 (May 14, 2009).
34
As of this writing, the active state programs similar to Performance Track include: Arizona
Environmental Performance Track, http://perma.cc/ML8M-4WGD; Colorado Environmental
Leadership Program, http://perma.cc/ZQZ2-NUZZ; Indiana Environmental Stewardship Program,
http://perma.cc/5JJR-2W76; Kentucky Excellence In Environmental Leadership (“KY EXCEL”),
http://perma.cc/XV2S-VQ57; Louisiana Environmental Leadership Program, http://perma.cc/
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dozens of other voluntary programs — just one of these, Energy Star, costs the
agency about $50 million annually.35 EPA recently initiated a new voluntary
program to recognize the “climate leadership” of those companies that are
working to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.36 In addition, after Performance Track’s demise, the U.S. Department of Energy established a program,
Save Energy Now LEADER, designed along very similar lines to Performance
Track.37 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) continues to operate its Voluntary Protection Programs (“VPP”), upon which EPA
modeled Performance Track.38 In addition, former Performance Track members
and representatives of state environmental agencies with Performance Tracklike programs recently formed the non-governmental Stewardship Action
Council to continue some of the activities of the now-defunct EPA program.39
The U.S. Council for Energy-Efficient Manufacturing, a public-private partnership that includes representation from the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and EPA, has launched a certification program called Superior
Energy Performance that offers benefits to companies that operate energy management systems.40
NAM-3YM4; Michigan Clean Corporate Citizen Program, http://perma.cc/5SFH-ATPF; New
Mexico Green Zia Environmental Excellence Program, http://perma.cc/XB57-8HN6; North Carolina Environmental Stewardship Initiative, http://perma.cc/8ENS-KZRE; South Carolina Environmental Excellence Program, http://perma.cc/8RBE-W292; Tennessee Green Star Partnership,
http://perma.cc/867A-SCZ8; Clean Texas, http://perma.cc/C3G5-BDGE; Clean Utah, http://perma.
cc/45CX-Q3ZH; Virginia Environmental Excellence Program, http://perma.cc/9S24-NC24; Vermont Business Environmental Partnership, http://perma.cc/WV8B-T85F; Wisconsin Green Tier,
http://perma.cc/793C-LC8H. See also U.S. ARMY ENVTL. COMMAND, INCENTIVE PROGRAMS FOR
IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 9, 11, 16, 21–23, 28, 32, 36–40, 43
(2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
35
Sonja Ryst, U.S. Agencies Try to Restore Faith in Energy Star Appliance Testing, WASH. POST
(Jul. 10, 2010), http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0zmKHrHt3sH; List of Programs, EPA.GOV, http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0Yv3RtG7hzV (listing some of EPA’s voluntary programs).
36
See Center for Corporate Climate Leadership, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
09sEBkGvRH3 (announcing Corporate Climate Leadership pilot program to continue through
2013).
37
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SAVE ENERGY NOW: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2011), available at http://perma.cc/9V5Z-WKNC. In addition, the Better Buildings, Better Plants program,
run by the Department of Energy’s Advanced Manufacturing Office, recognizes companies that
pledge to reduce their energy intensity; the Superior Environmental Performance program certifies
facilities that adopt energy management systems based on the ISO 50001 system standard. See
Better Plants, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0nbyAWCxrrv; see also ISO
50001 Energy Management Standard, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0Wd1rF22ySH.
38
Current Federal and State-Plan Sites as of 10/31/2013, OSHA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.
edu/0c7brrLwbwU/ (showing that eighty-three facilities joined VPP from January–October 2013,
bringing total membership in federal and state VPPs to 2,339 facilities).
39
The Stewardship Action Council currently has more than one hundred members. Three founding
members are companies that had a large number of facilities join Performance Track: Covanta,
Forever Resorts, and Johnson & Johnson. Council members set environmental performance goals
and share best practices. See Creating a Sustainable World, STEWARDSHIP ACTION COUNCIL, http:/
/perma.law.harvard.edu/0mad4ShN8yb/.
40
See 2012, U.S. COUNCIL FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT MFG., http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0bF2K5TY5Px/; see also U.S. COUNCIL FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT MFG., SUPERIOR ENERGY PERFORMANCE: A ROADMAP FOR ACHIEVING CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENTS IN ENERGY PERFORMANCE
(2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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It is hardly surprising that interest in voluntary programs like Performance
Track continues unabated. With only remote prospects for statutory and regulatory solutions to environmental concerns about global warming and exposure to
toxic substances, among other things, voluntary approaches are one of the few
means through which government is currently able to respond. Continued interest in such an alternative path to environmental protection only makes it all the
more important to undertake serious research to discern lessons that can be
learned from EPA’s flagship voluntary program. Admittedly, in its heyday, Performance Track generated considerable attention — both laudatory and critical
— from political and business leaders as well as legal practitioners and environmental activists. Yet thus far, the program has managed to escape significant
attention from the research community. Earlier voluntary EPA initiatives, such
as the 33/50 Program41 and Project XL,42 never matched Performance Track in
terms of longevity,43 yet they have received — and continue to receive — substantial attention in the legal and policy literature.44 Strikingly, to date, Perform41

EPA created the 33/50 Program in 1989 to encourage voluntary reductions of releases of seventeen targeted chemicals. For further discussion of 33/50, see infra notes 43–45, 465–70 and accompanying text.
42
Project XL allowed individual facilities to negotiate for exemptions from existing regulatory
requirements, provided the facility could demonstrate superior environmental performance. For
further discussion of Project XL, see infra notes 43–45, 471–77 and accompanying text.
43
Performance Track lasted eight years (2001–2009), while the 33/50 Program lasted about five
years (1991–1996) and Project XL lost almost all steam within a few years of operation and
closed up shop officially in its ninth year (1995–2003). See Madhu Khanna, The U.S. 33/50 Voluntary Program: Its Design and Effectiveness, in REALITY CHECK: THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE
OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN, supra
note 2, at 15, 38; Lisa C. Lund, Project XL: Good for the Environment, Good for Business, Good
for Communities, ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS, 10,140 (2000) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library); Project XL, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0TUFVYM33xJ/.
44
At least seven research studies have examined the origins and impacts of the 33/50 Program.
See Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation:
Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 271 (1995) [hereinafter
Arora & Cason, 33/50 Experiment]; Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, Why Do Firms Volunteer
to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 72
LAND ECON. 413 (1996); TERRY DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, INDUSTRY INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: EVALUATION OF U.S. FEDERAL INITIATIVES (1996) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library); Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, Did the EPA’s Voluntary Industrial Toxics Program Reduce Emissions? A GIS Analysis of Distributional Impacts and By-Media Analysis
of Substitution, 52 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 391 (2006); Madhu Khanna & Lisa A. Damon,
EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms,
37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1999); Abdoul G. Sam & Robert Innes, Voluntary Pollution
Reductions and the Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of the 33/50 Program
(Univ. of Ariz., Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ. Working Paper, 2004), available at http://perma.cc/
U4HR-KSEZ; Khanna, supra note 43, at 15. A similar number of studies have been conducted
about Project XL, including an entire book. See DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra; JAMES BOYD ET AL.,
INTEL’S XL PERMIT: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION, DISCUSSION PAPER 98-11 (1998), available
at http://perma.cc/39ZC-PMPT; Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It
Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 399 (1998); JANICE MAZUREK, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., ENV/EPOC/GEEI(98)27, THE USE OF VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN INITIAL SURVEY (1998); Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al’s XL-ent Adventure: An Analysis of the
EPA’s Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration’s Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
129 (1998); Magali Delmas & Alfred Marcus, Firms’ Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce
Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach (Stanford Research Paper No. 1806, 2003), available at
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ance Track has escaped all but the most passing mention in the literature and, as
of yet, any independent, systematic academic study.45
Given the paucity of scholarly literature on Performance Track, we begin
in Part I by providing an overview of how the program operated: its goals,
entry criteria, and membership requirements, including the information EPA
collected about Performance Track members through applications, annual performance reports, and site visits. We also discuss the benefits EPA offered to
facilities that joined Performance Track. We then focus on a vital question
about the basis on which Performance Track classified — or “tracked” — facilities: Did Performance Track facilities exemplify the type of demonstrable
and significant environmental leadership that EPA conceived the program to
recognize?
We address this question in Part II using four discrete approaches: (1) a
descriptive presentation of data on Performance Track’s membership rolls; (2) a
close examination of EPA’s process for screening program applicants; (3) case
studies of five sets of matching pairs of Performance Track facilities and other
facilities; and (4) findings from a large-scale survey of Performance Track and
other facilities.46 Although we find no evidence to suggest that, in general, Performance Track facilities were anything but decent environmental actors, we
also find little evidence that participating facilities outperformed similar facilities in their sectors. We find instead that what most distinguished Performance
Track facilities was the value they placed on government recognition and the
propensity they had for seeking out and engaging with the broader community.
This “extroverted” quality stands out more clearly as the distinguishing characteristic of participating facilities than any performance-based indicia of environmental leadership.47 If those that advance to the “top” of a voluntary
program exhibit extroverted qualities but not necessarily distinctive achievement in terms of environmental performance, this fact in itself should lead us to
question whether voluntary programs like Performance Track can induce major
change in environmental practices throughout the entire economy.
We turn squarely to this issue in Part III. Specifically, we draw on empirical research examining the relationship between the way agencies design voluntary programs and the rates of participation in those programs. We show that,
even if it could credibly be said that Performance Track caused some environmental improvements in some facilities, an inherent tension in its design meant
that it was unlikely ever to engage a large proportion of the industrial facilities
http://perma.cc/6UV3-Q8Y7; ALFRED A. MARCUS ET AL., REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM PROJECT XL (2002).
45
For a comprehensive treatment of other voluntary environmental programs, see Jonathan C.
Borck & Cary Coglianese, Voluntary Environmental Programs: Assessing Their Effectiveness, 34
ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 305 (2009).
46
An earlier report of these four studies, all partly funded by EPA, is available as COGLIANESE &
NASH, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 10.
47
As we explain further at the end of Part II, in characterizing Performance Track facilities as
“extroverts,” we do not intend to denigrate them or their efforts to improve their environmental
performance. Rather, we use the term clinically to refer to facilities that exhibit “outward” tendencies — something that is different from environmental performance itself. The name of EPA’s
program was, after all, “Performance Track,” not “Cooperative Track.”
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in the United States. The more that government agencies like EPA offer inducements for facilities to participate in voluntary programs, the more they demand,
substantively and procedurally, of their prospective and existing members, a
tendency which only dampens participation in the program. For this reason,
programs like Performance Track are extremely unlikely to effectuate largescale change in industry environmental performance. We develop a model of
participation in voluntary programs and offer empirical evidence to support it,
revealing the inherent constraints in EPA’s ability both to offer significant rewards for voluntary participation and set low-cost entry and programmatic requirements.48 Due to these constraints, we conclude that, contrary to advocates’
claims, programs like Performance Track are unlikely ever to serve as meaningful substitutes for more traditional forms of environmental governance.49
I. PERFORMANCE TRACK’S RISE

AND

DEMISE

In creating Performance Track and other voluntary programs, EPA blazed
what has come to be known as the “alternative path” 50 or “next generation”51
approach to environmental policy, a vision that has gained widespread support
in the United States at both the federal and state levels over the past two decades.52 This new vision of environmental protection grows in part from the
48

See infra Part III.
The notion of Performance Track serving as a substitute for traditional regulation is not just a
straw position. Serious scholars and public officials conceived the program as leading to an alternative path for environmental governance. See infra Part I. Indeed, the idea that Performance
Track could be part of a “new environmental regulation” was a theme articulated best by one of
the most serious and prolific scholar–public servants in environmental policy we have ever
known, Dan Fiorino, who claimed that “performance tracks are designed to change the regulatory
system.” FIORINO, supra note 2, at 173. Fiorino was the former director of EPA’s Performance
Track program.
50
See ASPEN INST., THE ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER WAY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE ENVIRONMENT (1996) (outlining the “alternative path” policy method); see generally
George B. Wyeth, “Standard” and “Alternative” Environmental Protection: The Changing Role
of Environmental Agencies, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 5, 41 (2006) (referring to
Performance Track as part of an “alternative path”).
51
See generally THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: A REPORT ON
THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Donald F. Kettl ed., 2002).
52
See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (1997) (endorsing EPA’s use of performance-based programs); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR . . . PROSPER[ I] TY, OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FUTURE (1996) (incorporating alternativepath and next-generation principles into policy guidance and goals); NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1995) (advocating a more collaborative and clear approach); CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE 1 (1998). Cf. AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE, supra note 11, at 55, 60–65
(highlighting alternative approaches to environmental problems, including performance tracking);
Dennis D. Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmental Law and Policy and the Flexible Production
Economy, 79 IND. L.J. 611, 646 (2004) (claiming that performance recognition programs could
serve as a “bridge” to “a new form of industrial production”); Alfred R. Light, Environmental
Federalism in the United States and the European Union: A Harmonic Convergence?, 15 ST.
49
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observation that different regulated facilities exhibit different postures toward
environmental performance: some are superior performers, others are laggards,
while most facilities’ performance lies somewhere between the extremes.53 In
an influential report that would provide the intellectual foundation for the
agency’s efforts to establish Performance Track in 2000, EPA described facilities’ variation as a “bell curve along a performance spectrum,”54 noting:
At one end, we have companies acting as environmental leaders, adding business value and gaining competitive advantages along the
way; they are setting standards of excellence that will define future
business practices for themselves and their peers. In the middle, we
have the “main streamers” — businesses, industries, and other regulated parties that typically meet requirements, but do little else. And
then there are those that have been left behind, who do not meet the
most basic environmental standards.55
Recognizing these differences, EPA created Performance Track as a means to
identify and treat favorably facilities that are environmental leaders.56 EPA
touted these facilities’ names and accomplishments through press releases and
on the agency’s website, invited their managers to meet with high-ranking EPA
officials, and provided qualifying facilities with plaques to hang in their offices
and flags to fly outside their plants.57 Moreover, EPA relieved these facilities
from specific regulatory requirements.58
THOMAS L. REV. 321, 341 (2002) (“A symbol of the new ‘second generation’ approach is EPA’s
National Environmental Performance Track.”).
53
See generally NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2002); NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN:
BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT (2003).
54
AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE, supra note 11, at 5.
55
Id. EPA’s assumptions about compliance possess a longer lineage in the field of regulation.
Chester Bowles, a former Administrator of the Office of Price Administration during the
Roosevelt Administration, once remarked that “a very small percentage of the public — perhaps 2
or 3 percent — are inherently dishonest; while something like 20 percent can be trusted to obey
the law regardless of what others do. The remaining 75 percent or so genuinely want to be honest,
but they are also determined not to confirm P.T. Barnum’s assertion that ‘a sucker is born every
minute’; breaking a law or two is a small price to pay to escape the unpleasant sense of being
had.” See CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1941–1969, at 25
(1971); see also Robert A. Kagan, Environmental Management Style and Corporate Environmental Performance, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 31, 36 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006)
(distinguishing between businesses as “laggards,” “reluctant compliers,” “committed compliers,”
“environmental strategists,” and “true believers”).
56
EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE 2 (2005); see also PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra
note 20, at 64 (describing Performance Track as an example of a program that restricts “membership to only a small cadre of top performers”).
57
For a description of Performance Track benefits, see OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at
3-1–3-5 (2005). EPA provided similar benefits under other “alternative path” programs, such as
its 33/50 Program and Project XL. For a description of the benefits EPA provided members of the
33/50 Program, see Arora & Cason, 33/50 Experiment, supra note 44, at 273–74. For a description
of Project XL benefits, see generally MARCUS ET AL., supra note 44.
58
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 4-1–4-5. EPA did not offer any regulatory relief
under 33/50, but such relief was integral to Project XL. In Project XL, a facility would commit to
achieving superior environmental performance in exchange for EPA developing a facility-specific
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In exchange for these incentives, EPA also expected Performance Track
members to continue setting goals to improve their environmental performance.59 Under such a system, EPA sought to advance its mission of environmental protection by better deploying its resources.60 Agency officials believed
Performance Track could help economize on traditional enforcement resources,
allowing inspectors to focus less attention on facilities identified as top performers and more attention on truly laggard facilities.61 By rewarding top performers and targeting laggards, EPA also sought to encourage more firms to
strengthen their environmental practices. Figure 1, below, provides a graphic
depiction of EPA’s theory of how Performance Track and other innovative programs would improve overall environmental quality. Adapted from EPA’s 1999
Aiming for Excellence report, the Figure illustrates the agency’s general assumptions about business compliance and the government’s strategy for motivating firms to do more than required by law.62
FIGURE 1. ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE AMONG REGULATED FACILITIES63

In order to join Performance Track, facilities needed to exhibit what EPA
considered to be indicia of top environmental performance.64 Once admitted,
top performers were then required to meet EPA’s programmatic requirements
rulemaking, which modified regulatory requirements for the facility. See MARCUS ET AL., supra
note 44, at 1–2. Under Performance Track, EPA offered more limited incentives that applied to all
members, such as reductions in some recordkeeping and reporting requirements. OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 4-3–4-5.
59
PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 6.
60
Id. at 2.
61
See OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 4-1–4-5.
62
AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE, supra note 11, at 4–5. We have added the two arrows and text to
elaborate EPA’s theory of how programs like Performance Track could advance environmental
goals.
63
Id. at 5.
64
For EPA’s characterization of Performance Track as a program for “top performers,” see infra
text accompanying notes 140–142. For an elaboration of the entry criteria, see infra Part I.C.
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and continue to improve their environmental performance, extending the environmental performance curve still further to the right.65 But EPA intended Performance Track and its other next generation programs not merely to improve
the performance of top facilities, it also hoped these programs would more
generally “shift . . . the curve toward better performance.”66 Facilities that did
not yet meet program-entry criteria would likely face greater enforcement scrutiny. Moreover, as the managers of average facilities observed the benefits that
Performance Track members enjoyed, they could be expected to improve their
facilities’ performance too. In theory, then, the entire performance distribution
would shift in the direction of environmental excellence.67
A. Performance Track’s Predecessors
In creating Performance Track, EPA did not draw on a blank slate. OSHA
had created a similar initiative — the Voluntary Protection Programs (“VPP”)
— as early as 1982.68 Like Performance Track, OSHA’s VPP (which still exists
today) sought to encourage facilities to go beyond compliance with existing
regulations. To become a member of VPP, facilities must implement a health
and safety management system, make a commitment to continuous improvements in workplace safety, and pass an on-site OSHA inspection.69 In exchange, members receive public recognition from OSHA and are removed from
the agency’s routine inspection list.70 VPP’s admissions process has been described as “rigorous”71 and “arduous.”72 For the program’s first decade, its
membership level was even more modest than Performance Track’s. By the

65

See infra Part I.B.
AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE, supra note 11, at 6.
Although originally articulated in a nearly fifteen-year-old EPA report, the performance-shifting
theory continued to find expression in more recent discussions of programs like Performance
Track. See, e.g., Wyeth, supra note 50, at 63 n.321 (“It can be argued, of course, that such [environmental incentive] programs affect the behavior not only of enrolled participants, but also of
those tempted to join, or more indirectly, those who are not interested in joining but do not want to
have visibly worse records than their most prominent competitors.”); GALE BOYD & GANG
ZHANG, MEASURING IMPROVEMENT IN THE ENERGY PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. CEMENT INDUSTRy
(May 2011), available at http://perma.cc/AMB5-XGSV; see generally Borck & Coglianese, supra
note 45, at 305–06.
68
AL IANNUZZI, JR., INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE 68 (2002).
69
For a more complete description of VPP’s requirements, see Voluntary Protection Programs,
OSHA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/06PEdnmd2gs/. VPP has three distinct membership
“levels” — Demonstration, Merit, and Star — each with its own requirements. See IANNUZZI,
supra note 68, at 70–71; Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State,
32 TULSA L.J. 325, 330 (1996). Despite the existence of these three levels, almost all VPP members fall within the Star level. Current VPP Participants, OSHA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.
edu/031bxsjr928/.
70
See also IANNUZZI, supra note 68, at 71.
71
Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. REG. 535,
559 (1996) (“OSHA completes a rigorous ‘pre-approval review’ of a worksite before it is admitted
into the VPP . . . .”).
72
See IANNUZZI, supra note 68, at 71 (“The process for becoming a VPP company is
arduous . . . .”).
66
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time EPA launched Performance Track in 2000, OSHA’s VPP was nearly two
decades old and counted 542 facilities as members.73
The idea of EPA implementing a program like VPP first took hold in the
early 1990s. At that time, EPA proposed the creation of an Environmental
Leadership Program (“ELP”) to “recognize and reward . . . only the very best
companies.”74 EPA hoped that ELP would “motivate many companies to apply
for participation, so that the Program will result in widespread improvements.”75 Members of ELP would need to comply with environmental regulations and demonstrate a strong commitment to pollution prevention and
sustainability.76 In announcing its proposal for ELP in the Federal Register in
January 1993, EPA also suggested it would ask members to demonstrate that
they had in place effective management processes, including environmental
goal setting, compliance auditing, and performance monitoring.77
EPA received over 130 public comments on its ELP proposal, indicating to
the agency a strong degree of “interest in a voluntary program to recognize
environmental excellence.”78 Not all the opinions expressed in the public comments were enthusiastic, however, so the agency decided to implement ELP on
just a short-term, pilot basis.79 To be admitted into the pilot phase, EPA expected facilities to exhibit “leadership” qualities, including “a commitment to
[regulatory] compliance.”80 EPA said that it wanted ELP facilities to share
information about environmental performance with the agency and in particular
to “demonstrate a willingness to disclose in some manner” their audit results.81
EPA instructed facilities to describe their environmental management and auditing programs in their applications to the program. According to EPA, “the
greatest potential” for facilities to demonstrate leadership was to put in place a
“state-of-the-art” environmental management system (“EMS”).82
An EMS consists of a series of internal processes and procedures adopted
by business managers to help their organizations comply with applicable laws

73

As of the end of October 2013, there were 1,588 members in VPP. Current Federal and StatePlan Sites as of 10/31/2013, supra note 38. If members of state VPPs are included, membership
numbers were higher, with the number of members in both federal and state VPPs totaling 2,335.
Id. For a discussion of VPP’s membership growth, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04378, OSHA’S VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES SHOW PROMISING RESULTS, BUT SHOULD BE
FULLY EVALUATED BEFORE THEY ARE EXPANDED 19 (2004). As with Performance Track, VPP
has its own affiliated participants’ association. See VPP Participants’ Association, VOLUNTARY
PROT. PROGRAMS PARTICIPANTS’ ASS’N, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0PpCdmttGpz/.
74
Environmental Leadership Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 4,802, 4,803 (Jan. 15, 1993).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Environmental Leadership Program: Request for Pilot Project Proposals, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,062,
32,062 (June 21, 1994) [hereinafter Environmental Leadership Program]; see also Ira R. Feldman
& Michael C. Schiavo, Developing New Environmental Excellence Programs: Lessons from
EPA’s Environmental Leadership Program, 5 TOTAL QUALITY ENVTL. MGMT. 15, 16 (1995).
79
Environmental Leadership Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 32,062.
80
Id. at 32,063.
81
Id.
82
Id.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\38-1\HLE107.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 17

Performance Track’s Postmortem

26-MAR-14

14:28

17

and reduce their environmental impacts.83 These organizational systems generally contain four components: planning, implementation, monitoring, and corrective action.84 When developing an EMS, managers begin by drafting a set of
priorities, determining the most significant environmental impacts of their organizations’ activities and setting goals for reducing these impacts.85 They assign
responsibility within their organization for implementing procedures and practices designed to meet these goals, and then they establish auditing mechanisms
to assess compliance with internal procedures and progress toward the organizations’ goals.86 In establishing internal monitoring procedures, managers create
a mechanism for obtaining feedback so that they can adjust their organizations’
practices when needed to meet their goals.87
Interest in the use of EMSs grew throughout the United States in the
1990s, especially after the International Organization for Standardization
(“ISO”) established a set of voluntary EMS standards called ISO 14001.88 ISO
also created a process by which organizations could certify that their EMSs met
ISO’s standards. Beginning with the creation of EPA’s ELP pilot projects, EPA
consistently emphasized that EMSs, whether conforming to ISO standards or
not, have a key role to play in helping facilities improve their environmental
performance.89
In addition to establishing an EMS, facilities seeking admission into ELP
were required to implement pollution prevention activities, help other businesses learn from their activities, and propose measures to track their results.90
EPA hoped ELP would generate information on facilities’ environmental management that would “improve the public’s confidence in and acceptance of industry’s self-monitoring efforts.”91 To help promote public acceptance, ELP
83

See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy
Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 1 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001).
84
See Jennifer Nash & John R. Ehrenfeld, Factors that Shape EMS Outcomes in Firms, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra note 83, at 61, 77. These four components are often described as
“plan-do-check-act.” Planning sets broad policies, specific targets, and strategic allocations of
authority and resources. Doing puts the strategies and plans into play. Checking is stopping the
process and examining how well the targets are being met on the basis of carefully collected
information. If performance is meeting targets, then the organization continues to repeat the doing
and checking. If deviations exist, then acting involves going back to revise the plans to achieve
satisfactory progress. Id.
85
Id. at 67.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
For helpful background on ISO 14001 and external auditing and certification, see PRAKASH &
POTOSKI, supra note 20, at 81–101. ISO’s standards govern the processes by which organizations
manage the environmental aspects of their operations; they do not impose any substantive environmental goals. Id. at 89–90.
89
Environmental Leadership Program, supra note 78, at 32,063. For additional discussion of the
use of EMSs in environmental policy, see generally E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840 (1994) (discussing the
use of EMSs under the rubric of Total Quality Management); LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
supra note 55 (providing detailed background on EMSs).
90
59 Fed. Reg. at 32,064.
91
Id. at 32,063–64 (“As part of their proposals . . . facilities should suggest the type and extent of
information they would be willing to disclose, the mechanisms they would use to disclose the
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facilities also needed to demonstrate sensitivity to their surrounding communities and a readiness to respond to community concerns.92
After EPA solicited proposals for ELP pilot projects in June 1994,93 forty
facilities submitted applications. In April 1995, EPA accepted twelve of these
facilities into the ELP program: ten private sector facilities and two federal
government facilities.94 Each of these facilities agreed to experiment with innovative environmental projects in exchange for public recognition and a degree
of leniency as they corrected any environmental regulatory violations they
might discover during their audits.95 The selected facilities carried their pilot
projects forward, but within about two years, ELP wound down as EPA shifted
priorities to a series of other, higher-profile reinvention projects, such as the
agency’s better-known Common Sense Initiative and Project XL.96
Notwithstanding ELP’s short lifespan and limited number of participants,
the program provided a model within the agency for a facility-tracking program. EPA next implemented the ELP model through a program called StarTrack, initiated by EPA’s regional office located in Boston. Of the ten private
sector facilities in ELP, three had belonged to the Boston-based Gillette Company, which had agreed, as part of ELP, to test the use of third-party auditing of
regulatory compliance and management operations.97 John DeVillars, then Administrator of EPA’s Region 1 (New England), had an interest in innovative
approaches to environmental policy and sought to make his region a leading
force for change within the agency.98 DeVillars previously experimented with
new ways to focus inspection resources on facilities deemed to present the
highest risk of non-compliance.99 In particular, DeVillars wanted to explore the
feasibility of privatizing inspections using audits similar to those prepared by
certified public accountants and relied upon by financial regulators such as the

information, the parties to whom they would disclose the information, and finally, any conditions
they would seek from regulators in order to make the disclosure.”).
92
Id. at 32,064.
93
Id. at 32,062.
94
See ROBERT C. ANDERSON & ALAN CARLIN, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL § 10.5 (1997); Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a
New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL.
L. 457, 475 (1996). For a list of the twelve ELP projects, see id. at 475 n.129.
95
Fiorino, supra note 94, at 475.
96
For a discussion of the Common Sense Initiative and Project XL, see Cary Coglianese & Laurie
K. Allen, Does Consensus Make Common Sense? An Analysis of EPA’s Common Sense Initiative,
ENV’T, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 10; CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA & DAVID J. SOUSA, AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 1990–2006: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 223–28 (2008); MARCUS ET AL., supra
note 44, at 174–75.
97
See JENNIFER NASH ET AL., ISO 14001 AND EPA REGION I’S STARTRACK PROGRAM: ASSESSING
THEIR POTENTIAL AS TOOLS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 39 (2000) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (noting that as part of its ELP commitment, Gillette proposed to “develop[ ]
a system for using third parties to verify compliance and EMS audits.”); see also ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES, supra note 7, at 185.
98
JODI PERRAS, REINVENTING EPA NEW ENGLAND: AN EPA REGIONAL OFFICE TESTS INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 34 (2000).
99
Id. at 30.
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Securities and Exchange Commission.100 DeVillars saw the Gillette Company’s
ELP proposal for third-party verification of compliance as a vehicle for testing
his own ideas for regulatory innovation.101 Within a week of the announcement
by EPA headquarters that it had selected Gillette facilities for ELP, DeVillars
announced a regional program to identify more facilities interested in testing
the ideas contained in Gillette’s ELP proposal.102 He originally called the initiative the Third Party Certification Project but soon changed it to the more catchy
name, “StarTrack.”103
The criteria EPA’s Region 1 used for selecting facilities for the StarTrack
program were similar to those in ELP. To participate in StarTrack, facilities had
to demonstrate commitments to regulatory compliance and continuous improvement in environmental performance.104 Facilities that signed up for StarTrack agreed to undertake annual compliance and EMS audits, send audit
reports to Region 1 as well as to state and local regulatory agencies, and fix any
problems discovered through auditing.105 They also promised to prepare a public report about their environmental performance according to EPA specifications.106 Every third year, StarTrack facilities would engage a third party to
observe and certify their auditing practices.107 EPA provided detailed guidance
concerning the qualifications it expected auditors to meet, as well as the activities that should be undertaken as part of those audits, the content of audit reports, and how managers should correct problems discovered through
auditing.108 Finally, StarTrack facilities agreed to work with environmental regulators and other interested organizations to evaluate and improve StarTrack’s
compliance and EMS auditing, certification, and reporting guidance.109

100

NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 43 (2000).
101
See NASH ET AL., supra note 97, at 39.
102
See IANNUZZI, supra note 68, at 88 (“The Gillette ELP project audit guidance and the project
agreements were used as the basis for the [StarTrack] program.”).
103
NASH ET AL., supra note 97, at 40; see also Gregory J. Hale & Caroline G. Hemenway, Boon or
Bane? ISO 14001 Likely to Join Regulatory Framework, QUALITY DIG., http://perma.law.harvard.
edu/0mxi3M8eBQj/.
104
EPA REGION 1, STARTRACK PROGRAM GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION
3–4 (1998) [hereinafter STARTRACK PROGRAM GUIDANCE] (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). Facilities had to demonstrate a track record of compliance with existing environmental
regulations and cooperation with state and federal environmental regulators, creation of a compliance auditing program, commitment to implementing an EMS, and implementation of pollution
prevention activities with “measurable results.” Id.
105
Id. at 2.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See EPA REGION 1, DRAFT STARTRACK PROGRAM GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, app. II, III (1997)
(containing the 1997 Draft Guidance for EMS Audit, EMS Audit Report, and EMS Implementation Plan) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); EPA, REGION 1, STARTRACK PROGRAM
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (1997 Draft Certification and Facility EMS Improvement Guidance) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
109
STARTRACK PROGRAM GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 2.
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In return, EPA Region 1 recognized each StarTrack facility for its commitment to “excellence in environmental compliance.”110 The agency offered participants the promise of a “partnership,” by which the agency meant it would
provide “constructive feedback to help improve auditing programs, environmental management systems, and measures for improving overall environmental performance.”111 It also offered StarTrack participants the possibility of
being exempt from routine compliance inspections by federal, state, and local
environmental agencies,112 although it reserved the right to conduct inspections
“to aid in the development and implementation of the [StarTrack] project
rather than for enforcement purposes.”113 In addition, EPA promised not to initiate any enforcement actions for violations discovered at StarTrack plants as
long as the facility disclosed them in its audit reports and corrected them within
sixty days.114 StarTrack’s promotional materials also suggested that members
could receive “‘[e]xpress lane’ service for permits and other regulatory
actions.”115
In creating StarTrack, EPA’s Region 1 sought to strengthen the environmental performance of StarTrack facilities as well as facilities that had not yet
joined the program — in other words, to shift the environmental performance
curve.116 In addition to providing incentives for companies, StarTrack provided
EPA with an opportunity to learn from interacting with companies with strong
records of environmental performance.117 According to Ira Leighton, who in the
late 1990s served as director of Region 1’s Office of Environmental Stewardship and oversaw StarTrack, EPA hoped that experience with StarTrack would
help the agency learn how to define “top performance” as more than simply an
absence of compliance problems: “We know how to define bad, but [we] don’t
know what a good performer looks like. If we asked around the agency, we’d
get ten different views.”118
Perhaps not surprisingly, it took over a year for EPA to select members for
StarTrack. By the end of the program’s first year of full operation in 1997, the
program had attracted eight facilities.119 To solicit additional applications, Re110

Id. at 8.
Id.
EPA, STARTRACK PROJECT AGREEMENT, FIRST YEAR PARTICIPANTS 2 (1998) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library) (noting that federal, state, and local officials “may choose not to
conduct routine regulatory compliance inspections [even though] agency officials reserve the
right to observe audits conducted by the company [as well as] conduct random audits of [members’] performance as a ‘spot check’ for the program as a whole”).
113
STARTRACK PROGRAM GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 8.
114
Id. at 9. EPA reserved the right to take corrective action in cases of criminal violations, violations that resulted in “serious actual harm,” violations that resulted in economic benefit to facilities, and repeat violations.
115
EPA, STARTRACK: CERTIFIED ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 1 (program brochure) [hereinafter STARTRACK PROGRAM BROCHURE] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
116
NASH ET AL., supra note 97, at 39–41.
117
STARTRACK PROGRAM BROCHURE, supra note 115 (noting one of StarTrack’s goals was to “increase public [including agencies’] understanding of a company’s environmental performance”).
118
NASH ET AL., supra note 97, at 40–41.
119
EPA REGION 1, STARTRACK YEAR 1 SUMMARY 2, 4 (1998) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
111
112
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gion 1 sent letters to 1,300 potential members encouraging their participation;
however, by 1999, the number of participating facilities had only grown to
fifteen.120 Managers of facilities in the program raised concerns about the costs
of participation and about EPA’s failure to deliver promised benefits.121 From
EPA’s perspective, one of StarTrack’s chief limitations lay in its relatively small
number of program participants. In considering options for expanding StarTrack, DeVillars commissioned a study in 1998 to find out how many facilities
around the country likely met StarTrack’s entry criteria already.122 That study
claimed that more than 100,000 facilities nationwide could be eligible to
participate.123
Notwithstanding the small proportion of potential participants involved in
either StarTrack or ELP, officials within EPA still believed these programs provided a foundation for launching a national program.124 The agency’s experience
with StarTrack and ELP, along with its familiarity with OSHA’s VPP as well as
several environmental tracking programs that had begun to emerge in states
like New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin,125 generated interest in creating a
large-scale, national program that used a simpler design and imposed lower
transaction costs on potential members.126 In a major report issued in 1999, EPA
affirmed its support for the concept of giving “top performers more flexibility
in how they meet regulatory requirements if they do more to protect the environment and assure accountability.”127 Beginning in 2000, staff in EPA head-

120

RHEA HALE, THE NATIONAL EXPANSION OF STARTRACK: ISSUES REGARDING THE DELEGATION
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT 21 (1998) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). EPA sent many of its letters to the region’s largest emitters of toxic substances based on
data from the Toxics Release Inventory.
121
Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 84, at 78.
122
HALE, supra note 120, at 11.
123
Id. at 33.
124
See, e.g., EPA OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION, TOP PERFORMERS. SOLID RESULTS 3
(2003) [hereinafter TOP PERFORMERS] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“Performance Track builds on lessons that EPA has learned from state environmental leadership programs
and from its own efforts, such as the Common Sense Initiative, the Environmental Leadership
Program, and EPA Region 1’s StarTrack program.”). At least one other related regional effort
within EPA existed at the time: Region 9’s Merit Partnership for Pollution Prevention (“Merit”)
program. See John MacArthur & Gordon Bellen, ISO 14001 in State Regulatory Offices: A Survey
of Activities, ENVTL. QUALITY & MGMT., Summer 1998, at 19, 22; JOHN VOORHEES & ROBERT A.
WOELLNER, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT: ISO 14001 AND THE SYSTEMS
APPROACH 158–59 (1998). The Merit Partnership program included efforts by EPA to work “with
a number of industry partners to implement ISO 14001 environmental management systems.” Id.
at 158. But it was not nearly as ambitious or prominent a program as StarTrack.
125
FIORINO, supra note 2, at 172. (“In designing its own Performance Track in early 2000, EPA
studied the programs and experiences of states like Oregon, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.”).
126
See TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3–6.
127
AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE, supra note 11, at 13. According to EPA, “[t]he Performance Track
program is the outcome of the July, 1999 report, ‘Aiming for Excellence: Actions to Encourage
Stewardship and Accelerate Environmental Progress[,]’ [in which] the Agency committed to developing a Performance Track program to encourage good environmental performers to continue
striving to improve their environmental performance.” Agency Information Collection Activities:
Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Performance Track Program — Environmental Achievement Track, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,305, 11,305 (Mar. 2, 2000).
OF
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quarters took the first steps to launch the National Environmental Performance
Track.128
B. The Performance Track Vision
EPA publicly proposed Performance Track at a series of meetings held
around the country in the fall of 2000.129 At the first such meeting, held in
Washington, D.C. in October 2000, EPA officials cited the agency’s experience
with ELP, StarTrack, and similar state programs as evidence of a movement
toward what it termed a “performance-based system” of environmental protection.130 EPA initially proposed a two-tiered Performance Track program: a lessdemanding tier would be called the “Achievement Track,” while another,
more-demanding tier would be called the “Stewardship Track.”131
Although EPA did not publish its formal description of the Performance
Track program in the Federal Register until July 2000, the agency began accepting applications to the Achievement Track in June of that year. By December 2000, EPA had selected the first 227 members of the program — all
initially designated as members of the Achievement Track.132 The agency
planned to wait another year before beginning to consider applications for the
more rigorous Stewardship Track. During the course of that subsequent year,
however, agency officials came to realize that implementing the additional,
more demanding tier would prove more difficult than anticipated, as it was not
clear what EPA should expect of facilities in the Stewardship Track.133 In addition, agency officials found themselves busy implementing the Achievement
Track, a track the agency already touted as recognizing “top” performers. It
appeared to some within the agency that adding a higher track would suggest
that current members might actually be no longer at the “top.”134 Consequently,
128
See generally EPA, A SUMMARY OF EPA’S PERFORMANCE TRACK PROPOSAL 1 (2000) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE TRACK PROPOSAL] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (noting EPA sought to solicit initial applications for the first level of the Performance Track
in June of 2000). As EPA launched its National Environmental Performance Track in 2000, Region 1 dismantled StarTrack in that same year. See Jennifer Nash, Tiered Environmental Regulation: Lessons from the StarTrack Program, in INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 2, at
253–54.
129
Program Description of the National Environmental Achievement Track, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,655,
41,656 (Jul. 6, 2000) (“In March of this year, EPA released a draft program description and held
five public meetings across the country on this proposal.”).
130
See EPA, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM, FIRST PHASE PUBLIC MEETINGS ON THE
DESIGN OF THE STEWARDSHIP TRACK (2000) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF FIRST PHASE PUBLIC
MEETINGS] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
131
65 Fed. Reg. at 41,656, 41,662; RAND CORP. ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 26; see generally
Allison F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement Environmental
Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 662, 689–93 (2003) (discussing requirements for
participation in the Achievement and Stewardship Tracks); Dennis D. Hirsch, Second Generation
Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2001) (discussing qualifications for
Achievement Track status).
132
TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3.
133
See SUMMARY OF FIRST PHASE PUBLIC MEETINGS, supra note 130, at 1–2, 4–6, 10.
134
Telephone Interview with Richard Wells, Institutional Affiliation President, The Lexington
Group (Apr. 17, 2008) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).

R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\38-1\HLE107.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 23

Performance Track’s Postmortem

26-MAR-14

14:28

23

it took little time before EPA officials ceased referring to the Achievement
Track altogether; facilities simply joined Performance Track.135
As with StarTrack and ELP, the Performance Track program purported to
single out individual facilities for environmental excellence.136 Just as ELP
sought to engage “the very best companies”137 and StarTrack’s members were
by definition “stars,” Performance Track reached out to “superior” environmental performers.138 The agency sought “to recognize and encourage top environmental performers — those who go beyond compliance with regulatory
requirements to attain levels of environmental performance that benefit people,
communities, and the environment.”139 As then-EPA Administrator Carol
Browner put it, “Performance Track is targeted at the pace-setters, the environmental leaders in the corporate world.”140
EPA intended Performance Track to “deliver . . . measurable [environmental] results.”141 It would do so by offering to “recognize and reward facilities that consistently exceed regulatory requirements, work closely with their
communities, and excel in protecting the environment and public health.”142
After identifying the “top” performers,143 Performance Track would “spotlight
. . . such companies as models of a higher level of environmental achieve135
Notice to Terminate the National Environmental Performance Track Program, 74 Fed. Reg.
22,741, 22,742 (May 14, 2009). In an assessment of Performance Track commissioned by EPA
shortly before the program was shut down, researchers at the RAND Corporation concluded that
EPA’s failure to develop a second membership tier of higher-level performers undermined Performance Track. RAND CORP. ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 84 (“Once Performance Track
consisted of a single group of members, it was not possible to provide differentiated benefits
based on performance. As a result, members gained access to recognition and benefits by being
accepted into the program rather than by attaining a particular level of performance.”). It would
not be until 2004 that EPA would launch a separate “track” of sorts: its Corporate Leaders program. See infra Part I.E.
136
See SUMMARY OF FIRST PHASE PUBLIC MEETINGS, supra note 130, at 4.
137
See Environmental Leadership Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 4,802, 4,803 (Jan. 15, 1993).
138
EPA, EPA DOC. NO. 190-R-03-003, 2003–2008 STRATEGIC PLAN: DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE
118 (2003) [hereinafter 2003–2008 STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://perma.cc/Y2S8-4V5F;
see Carol Browner, Adm’r, EPA, Remarks Delivered at Performance Track Launch (June 26,
2000) (stating the program would recognize members for “their extraordinary environmental accomplishments”) [hereinafter Browner Remarks], available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0DDzWVRTrRQ/.
139
PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 2.
140
Browner Remarks, supra note 138.
141
BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 10, at 2; see also TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3;
EPA OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION, BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION: PERFORMANCE
TRACK SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 3 (2004) [hereinafter BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION]
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library); EPA OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION,
LEADING CHANGE: PERFORMANCE TRACK FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 24 (2006) [hereinafter LEADING CHANGE] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); 2003–2008 STRATEGIC
PLAN, supra note 138, at 115 (announcing that Performance Track would “achieve measurably
improved environmental performance”).
142
TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3; BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 3;
EPA OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION, GROWTH & RENEWAL: PERFORMANCE TRACK THIRD
ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 4 (2005) [hereinafter GROWTH & RENEWAL].
143
See Report on ECOS-EPA Performance-Based Environmental Programs: Proposed Initial Implementation Actions, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,026, 28,026 (May 15, 2006); see also PROGRAM GUIDE,
supra note 56, at 2; TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124; GROWTH & RENEWAL, supra note 142, at 3;
LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 24.
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ment.”144 Once admitted into the program and recognized as environmental
leaders, facilities would be expected to improve their performance still further.
Performance Track members would not be allowed to “rest on their laurels.”145
If they desired to remain members, they would need to demonstrate continuous
improvement in areas not governed by regulation.146 EPA expected that benefits
would not only reward the top performers but would also encourage other facilities to work harder to strive to meet the program’s standards. EPA viewed
Performance Track as establishing a “‘gold standard’ for environmental performance — a standard that facilities will strive to attain.”147
Even as EPA characterized Performance Track principally as a program to
improve environmental quality, the agency also articulated broader goals, such
as improving relationships between regulators and regulated facilities and between regulated facilities and their surrounding communities. EPA hoped to
help “transform”148 relationships with industry so that they could become more
“collaborative, cooperative, and focused on results.”149 Rather than solely punishing businesses when they broke the rules, EPA viewed Performance Track as
giving the agency an opportunity to praise and reward businesses that ranked as
top performers. In addition, by including community outreach as a membership
criterion, EPA hoped that those living near Performance Track plants would
also gain confidence and trust in these facilities.150
EPA sought to use Performance Track to encourage innovation in both
companies and government.151 The program aimed to contribute to a broader
problem-solving culture in which facility managers would openly share with
EPA their best practices as well as their challenges.152 Performance Track
sought to serve as a blueprint for a “new generation of programs” that would
encourage facilities to strive for environmental excellence instead of merely
complying with government rules.153
EPA predicted — and until the arrival of the Obama Administration, continued to maintain — that Performance Track would induce broader, systematic
changes in the U.S. environmental regulatory system. It “depart[ed] . . . from
traditional models of regulation”154 in order “to change business-as-usual ap144

Daniel J. Fiorino, Performance Track Places Trust in the Carrot over the Stick, ENVTL. QUALMGMT., Spring 2001, at 9.
145
GROWTH & RENEWAL, supra note 142, at 4.
146
BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 4; LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 15.
147
TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 15; BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 17.
148
TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3; BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 3.
149
BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 3.
150
As an employee of a Performance Track member would later explain, the program “establishes
a climate of respect and trust with the community. It keeps the people who live near you comfortable that you are not polluting.” LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 22.
151
See PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 2; TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3; BUILDING ON
THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 3; GROWTH & RENEWAL, supra note 142, at 3–4.
152
Performance Track annual reports frequently featured stories about members that had implemented innovative practices. See, e.g., EPA OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON., & INNOVATION, PERFORMANCE TRACK FIFTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT: TODAY’S COMMITMENTS. TOMORROW’S WORLD.
FIVE YEARS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP 21–28 (2007) [hereinafter TODAY’S COMMITMENTS] .
153
Id. at 3.
154
LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 5.
ITY
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proaches to environmental protection.”155 According to the agency, Performance Track would be “leading change” by promoting an incentive-based
approach that operated alongside traditional environmental regulation.156 In
2006, Dan Fiorino, the long-time Director of EPA’s Performance Incentives Division which ran Performance Track, wrote that changing members’ regulatory
treatment constituted Performance Track’s “core premise,” asserting that
“[f]acilities with a strong compliance record, a sound EMS, community outreach, and demonstrated performance beyond what the law specifies do not
require the same level of regulatory oversight as others.”157
C. Joining Performance Track
In an effort to induce broad participation in the program, EPA designed
Performance Track with the intention of keeping the costs of entry to a minimum.158 Membership in Performance Track was open to any facility in the U.S.
regardless of size or industrial sector; even non-profit and government-owned
facilities could apply. Yet the program’s entry requirements were still intended
to make membership somewhat selective, because “otherwise the value of differentiation [would be] lost.”159 To qualify for membership in Performance
Track, a facility needed to be able to demonstrate to EPA that it met the following four criteria:160
• Environmental Management System. The facility was required to
have in place an audited EMS. EPA Performance Track materials
defined an EMS as a “facility’s systematic efforts to meet environmental requirements and improve environmental performance.”161
In 2004, EPA added the requirement that facilities must have their
EMSs independently audited; prior to that time, EPA allowed facilities to self-audit.162 EPA also outlined qualifications for independent auditors and established a protocol for auditors to follow.163
• Regulatory Compliance. The facility was required to sustain a “record of compliance” with environmental standards.164 For instance,
a facility was not allowed to have had a conviction or guilty plea
155

Id.
Id. at 23.
157
FIORINO, supra note 2, at 147.
158
TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3.
159
Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Performance and Green Clubs: A New Tool for Governance?
4 (June 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see
also PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 20, at 56 (describing Performance Track as having
“[s]tringent club standards” and noting that an “advantage of stringent standards is that the club
brand [is] very credible and serve[s] as a low-cost tool for signaling club members’ commitment
to protect the natural environment”).
160
National Environmental Performance Track: Criteria, supra note 15.
161
EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS 3-1 (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
162
GROWTH & RENEWAL, supra note 142, at 6.
163
See Independent EMS Assessment, EPA.GOV (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
164
PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 8.
156

R
R
R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\38-1\HLE107.txt

26

unknown

Seq: 26

Harvard Environmental Law Review

26-MAR-14

14:28

[Vol. 38

for any criminal environmental offense within the previous five
years, nor was it allowed to have incurred significant civil environmental violations within the previous three years.165
• Beyond-Compliance Commitments. The facility was required to
show specific environmental achievements and make measurable
commitments to meet performance goals to a degree that would
exceed existing regulatory requirements.166 To show a record of
past achievements, a prospective applicant was required to show
improvements for at least two environmental indicators.167 Managers could choose their own indicators using agency-selected categories and measuring units.168 Such categories included improving
supply-chain environmental performance, as well as reducing energy use, air emissions, and noise levels, among others.169 Facilities
were also required to commit to future improvements based on at
least four agency-selected indicator categories.170
• Community Outreach. The facility needed to communicate with its
local community about its environmental activities. Potential members needed to describe how they would “identify and respond to
community concerns” and how they would “inform community
members of important matters that affect them.”171

165

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. Small facilities — that is, those with fewer than fifty employees — needed only to report
one improvement.
168
EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TABLE 1 (2008) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). It was also possible for facilities to propose goals from outside the specified categories.
National Environmental Performance Track: Instructions for Making Alternate Goals, EPA.GOV,
http://perma.cc/ZZ68-T9P9.
169
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TABLE, supra note 168, at 3. EPA described the complete set
of goal categories as follows: 1) “Upstream” goals, namely “Material Procurement” and “Suppliers’ Environmental Performance”; 2) “Inputs” goals, namely “Material Use,” “Water Use,” “Energy Use,” and “Land and Habitat”; 3) “Nonproduct Outputs” goals, namely “Air Emissions,”
“Discharges to Water,” “Waste,” “Noise,” and “Vibration”; and 4) “Downstream” goals,
namely “Products.” PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 5. In addition, the
agency specified that these goals had to be based on real improvements in business processes:
“Performance Track does not give credit . . . [for] environmental indicators that would improve
automatically as a result of core business expansion. . . . Examples include: a facility that recycles
electronics cannot commit to take back more electronics for recycling; [and] a MSW [municipal
solid waste] recycling center cannot commit to increase the volume of MSW recycled.” P-TRACK
APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 161, at 5-1.
170
Small facilities needed only make two commitments instead of four. Additionally, any facility,
large or small, that made a designated “challenge commitment” — a commitment in areas specified by EPA to be of “regional or national environmental priority” — was allowed to count one
challenge commitment as fulfilling two ordinary ones. EPA, CHALLENGE COMMITMENT POLICY
FOR THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
171
EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK SAMPLE FACILITY APPLICATION 20 [hereinafter SAMPLE FACILITY
APPLICATION] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also National Environmental
Performance Track: Criteria, supra note 15.
166
167
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To demonstrate that it met these four criteria, a facility needed to complete
a twenty-nine page application form.172 The form called for the facility to provide basic information about its size, industry, and environmental management
system.173 In addition, the facility was required to quantify its proposed improvements, specifying measurable units of performance.174 However, EPA did
not define how ambitious a facility’s commitments had to be, stating only that
they should be “significant” and should exceed performance dictated by environmental regulations.175 EPA encouraged each facility to “document and commit to a level of performance consistent with its own situation, capabilities, and
goals.”176
In addition to information about each facility’s environmental performance, EPA’s application form asked for information about the facility’s relationships with its local community, its relevant state and federal permit
identification numbers, and a signature of a senior facility manager who certified the accuracy of the application and declared that the facility was in full
compliance with environmental standards.177
EPA did not conduct site visits during the application process.178 Agency
officials simply reviewed each application to ensure that, on its face, the application showed that the applicant met the Performance Track criteria. Facilities
that cleared an internal screening on both regulatory compliance and application completeness were admitted into Performance Track and thereby singled
out by the program as top environmental performers. After facilities were admitted, EPA selected a small fraction of members to visit each year.179 Over the
life of the program, EPA conducted approximately 250 site visits, amounting to
less than one-third of all facilities admitted into Performance Track.180

172
Applicants submitted their information online, but EPA’s scan of a sample online submission
spans twenty-nine pages. SAMPLE FACILITY APPLICATION, supra note 171. The instructions for
completing the application, on the other hand, were over fifty pages. P-TRACK APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 161. In addition, EPA issued a twenty-five page guidance document explaining how facilities should normalize their environmental impacts on the application form and
in annual reports. EPA, GUIDANCE FOR NORMALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS
(Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
173
SAMPLE FACILITY APPLICATION, supra note 171, at 1, 3–4.
174
Id. at 8–10.
175
PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 6.
176
Id.
177
SAMPLE FACILITY APPLICATION, supra note 171, at 19–24.
178
PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 9.
179
P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 15.
180
Typically, site visit teams included a representative of EPA headquarters, the EPA regional
Performance Track coordinator, and someone from the state environmental agency. David W.
Guest & Andrew L. Teplitsky, High-Performance Environmental Management Systems: Lessons
Learned from 250 Visits at Leadership Facilities, ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT, Autumn 2010, at
25–26, 28. EPA conducted seventy-nine site visits in the first two years of the program, twentyfour in 2003, twenty-five in 2004, and thirty-one in 2005. TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 6;
BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 5; GROWTH & RENEWAL, supra note 142, at 6;
LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 14.
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EPA required all Performance Track members to submit Annual Performance Reports (“APRs”).181 In their APRs, members needed to describe progress
made toward their performance commitments and provide additional information to help EPA verify that they continued to meet all eligibility requirements.182 While EPA encouraged facilities to set ambitious commitments and
did not expect them to achieve every commitment within three years, the
agency purportedly did expect progress toward goal achievement. EPA told
members that “an inability to make any progress [toward goals], or a decline
in overall facility performance, may result in removal from the program.”183
In addition to filing annual reports, members needed to re-apply every
three years if they wished to stay in Performance Track.184 The renewal process
required that facilities again set a series of performance commitments, just as
they did when they first joined the program.
D. Membership Benefits
What benefits or privileges did facilities receive upon becoming members
of Performance Track? EPA offered three types of benefits: recognition,
networking opportunities, and regulatory and administrative incentives.
First, the agency gave members several forms of public recognition. EPA
issued press releases and listed members on its website.185 It sent letters to relevant elected officials announcing a facility’s acceptance to the program, submitted articles to trade journals, and regularly highlighted news coverage about
members’ environmental management on its website.186 EPA allowed members
to display a Performance Track flag at their worksites and to use the program’s
logo in promotional materials.187 The agency created five awards that only Performance Track members could receive.188 In addition, EPA eventually convinced some social investment advisory firms to use Performance Track
membership as a factor in calculating company ratings.189

181

EPA terminated the memberships of facilities that did not submit timely APRs. OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 6-4.
182
PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 10–11.
183
Id. at 11. The Operations Handbook stated: “Qualitative issues to note in the review [of the
APRs] include assessment and audit results, progress toward achieving commitment goals, and
extent of public outreach activities; these are typically issues to monitor but not necessarily to
follow up on.” OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 6-2.
184
PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 7-3.
185
National Environmental Performance Track: Recognition, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/3C8LC2WT.
186
See id. The agency also established a “Performance Track Endorser Network” that promoted
the program among NGOs, trade associations, and other organizations. National Environmental
Performance Track: Performance Track Endorser Network, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/6FY-CE4Y.
187
EPA, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK BROCHURE 4 (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
188
National Environmental Performance Track: Hall of Fame, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/G2VFHWA8 (listing five awards for 2006).
189
National Environmental Performance Track: Green Investment Firms Recognize Performance
Track, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/C2SY-B7NQ.
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Second, EPA provided networking opportunities for Performance Track
members. It held information sessions at which members could meet with senior EPA officials to share lessons, discuss membership incentives, and exchange ideas for improving the program.190 Working with a separate non-profit
entity called the Performance Track Participants Association, EPA organized an
annual members’ event, regional roundtables, and a mentoring program that
matched current Performance Track members with potential members to facilitate the sharing of information about the application process and methods to
improve environmental performance.191
Finally, EPA offered members various types of regulatory and administrative benefits.192 It deemed Performance Track facilities to be a low priority for
routine EPA inspections193 — those “majority of EPA inspections” that take
place “when there is no specific reason to believe that a violation exists at a
specific facility.”194 In addition to reducing routine inspection priority, EPA
allowed Performance Track members to submit less frequent and less detailed
reports under the Clean Air Act’s Maximum Achievable Control Technology
provisions.195 Member facilities that were large-quantity generators of hazardous waste were allowed to accumulate hazardous wastes on-site for as much as
two times — and in some cases even three times — the normally allowable
time periods.196 They could also apply for permission to inspect equipment and
operations susceptible to spills less frequently than otherwise required.197 In
addition, Performance Track members could receive expedited processing of
their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit renewals under the Clean Water Act.198
190
National Environmental Performance Track: Networking, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/W425UYGS.
191
Id.; Nash & Coglianese, supra note 10, at 18, 27.
192
See National Environmental Performance Track: Regulatory and Administrative Benefits,
EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/Q5XG-JCEJ.
193
See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, supra note 15; Memorandum from Sylvia K.
Lowrance, Acting Assistant Adm’r, EPA Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance and
Thomas J. Gibson, Assoc. Adm’r, EPA Office of Pol’y, Econ. & Innovation to EPA Reg’l Adm’rs
and Enforcement Coordinators (Apr. 23, 2002) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library);
Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, EPA Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance and Jessica L. Furey, Assoc. Adm’r, EPA Office of Pol’y, Econ. & Innovation to
EPA Reg’l Adm’rs and Enforcement Coordinators (Oct. 29, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
194
Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, supra note 193.
195
National Environmental Performance Track Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,745 (Apr. 22,
2004). The rule required major sources and area sources required to hold Title V permits to continue submitting semi-annual reports as required by the Clean Air Act. Id. at 21,742.
196
Id. at 21,746–49; see also 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(a) (2010); EPA, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE TRACK FACT SHEET: REDUCED SELF-INSPECTIONS FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF RCRA
UNITS (2004) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
197
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Burden Reduction Initiative, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,862,
16,881–83 (Apr. 4, 2006). EPA officials believed that Performance Track members, because of
their records of regulatory compliance and operating EMSs, would better avoid spills and other
waste problems. See, e.g., id. at 16,881 (“It is expected that Performance Track facilities would
have an EMS providing sufficient oversight to prevent and detect leaks and spills.”).
198
National Environmental Performance Track: Water Benefits, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/LS6FD3L8. EPA encouraged states to review Performance Track members’ National Pollutant Dis-
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Throughout the program’s history, EPA continued to formulate additional
benefits for Performance Track members.199 For example, in September 2007,
EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation issued a proposed rule to allow facilities to
make operational or structural changes without triggering the need to apply for
a new or modified air permit, potentially saving facilities significant time and
expense.200 In the preamble to its proposed flexible air permits rule, EPA stated
its intention to give Performance Track members priority in applying for these
flexible permits.201 In addition, EPA considered ways to streamline the hazardous waste permitting process and offer other “members-only” regulatory incentives under its Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)
program.202
Under most major environmental statutes, EPA is authorized to delegate
implementation responsibility to states.203 Consequently, the states rather than
the EPA are responsible on a day-to-day basis for granting regulatory and administrative flexibility to facilities. Recognizing states’ important role in environmental implementation, EPA made extensive efforts to encourage states to
offer their own regulatory and administrative incentives to Performance Track
members.204 States varied in their willingness to support EPA’s efforts to give
preferential treatment for Performance Track facilities. But by September 2006,
fifteen states had agreed to make such facilities a low priority for routine state
inspections, although three of those states provided that benefit only to facilities
that had joined a state-based program similar to Performance Track — and one

charge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits on an expedited basis as part of an EPA strategy
to reduce the backlog of state environmental permitting. See Report on ECOS-EPA PerformanceBased Environmental Programs: Proposed Initial Implementation Actions, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,026,
28,029 (May 15, 2006).
199
For a description of various proposed benefits, see National Environmental Performance
Track: Benefits, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/C6BE-M9LE.
200
Flexible Air Permitting Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,206, 52,208, 52,210 (Sept. 12, 2007). The EPA
published the final flexible air permits rule only after Performance Track had been dismantled.
Flexible Air Permitting Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,418 (Oct. 6, 2009).
201
Flexible Air Permitting Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,206, at 52,214; see also National Environmental
Performance Track: Air Benefits, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/Q3GL-AKQC.
202
RCRA Incentives for Performance Track Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 23,274 (Apr. 30, 2007) (indicating EPA consideration of “streamlined process for permit modifications,” “performance-based
standards for tanks,” “[a]lternative requirements for small-quantity generators that experience
episodic generation events,” and “reduced duplication between RCRA and [Clean Air Act]
standards”).
203
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006); see also LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICES: POLICY
RESPONSES TO GREEN DEMANDS 134 (2002) (noting that “much American environmental policy is
still conducted at least partially at the subnational level — alternatively labeled cooperative or
conjoint federalism — including the regulation of hazardous waste, industrially generated air pollution, and virtually all water pollution”).
204
See, e.g., National Environmental Performance Track: State Programs, EPA.GOV, http://perma.
law.harvard.edu/0ZktNsZwv3d (noting EPA’s efforts to “coordinate[ ] closely” with states in
“[d]eveloping and delivering a range of incentives that will reduce administrative burdens and
encourage current and prospective program participants to boost their environmental
performance”).
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state provided inspection relief only on a case-by-case basis.205 Similarly,
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia agreed to support giving hazardous air pollutant permit incentives to Performance Track facilities, while
sixteen states agreed to allow Performance Track plants to store hazardous
wastes on-site for extended periods.206 Another twelve states entered into memoranda of understanding with EPA to offer coordinated incentives to participating facilities, joint recruiting and recognition activities, and in some cases a
joint application process so that facilities could apply to Performance Track and
a relevant state environmental leadership program simultaneously.207
To put these varied forms of preferential regulatory and administrative
treatment in some perspective, consider that in 2004 EPA estimated that the
special treatment given to members would yield, in the aggregate, cost savings
of about $700,000 over three years from reduced monitoring costs and increased flexibility. This may seem like a large overall amount, but when divided by the number of Performance Track members at the time, the average
estimated cost savings per facility totaled only about $1,350 annually.208 In response to a November 2006 survey commissioned by EPA, Performance
Track’s regulatory incentives ranked as the least important of twelve possible
motivations for joining the program,209 suggesting that the preferential regulatory treatment available under the program was rather insignificant to many
businesses.
E. Corporate Leaders
From its founding, Performance Track was designed to attract and reward
individual facilities, not necessarily their corporate parents.210 In 2004, EPA
branched out in a different direction by announcing a related program: Per-

205
See National Environmental Performance Track: State By State Summary of Available Performance Track Incentives, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0HsmVnASnnr. One factor
that discouraged states from making Performance Track facility inspections a low priority was that
EPA evaluated state environmental agency performance based in part on the number of inspection
audits the state conducted. Id. By not inspecting Performance Track facilities, a state’s number
could go down, causing its inspection programs to fare worse in EPA evaluations. Id. For additional information on state efforts to support Performance Track, see ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE
STATES, SURVEY OF STATE SUPPORT FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS: FINAL REPORT 1, 15–16 (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
206
National Environmental Performance Track: State By State Summary of Available Performance Track Incentives, supra note 205.
207
See National Environmental Performance Track: Performance Track/State Memoranda of
Agreement (MOAs), EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0DVbD6WEB13.
208
National Environmental Performance Track Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,749 (Apr. 22,
2004).
209
ABT ASSOC. INC., RESULTS OF 2006 PERFORMANCE TRACK CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY
16, 24, 27 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 SURVEY] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
210
See SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE TRACK PROPOSAL, supra note 128, at 1. For example, in its
March 2000 proposal, EPA stated that the goal of Performance Track was “to recognize and
encourage facilities that achieve better environmental performance than is required under existing
regulations.” Id. (emphasis added).
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formance Track Corporate Leaders.211 The Corporate Leaders program sought
to recognize companies that had at least 25% of their U.S. operations, or at
least twenty-five of their U.S. facilities, in Performance Track or a similar state
environmental leadership program.212 Members of the Corporate Leaders program committed to increasing within five years their level of participation to
50% of their U.S. operations or to at least fifty U.S. facilities.213 EPA expected
members of Corporate Leaders to improve their own environmental performance as well as the environmental performance of their value chain.214 In 2005,
EPA admitted its first three members to the Corporate Leaders program: Baxter
Healthcare Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, and Rockwell Collins.215 It admitted its fourth and final Corporate Leader in 2006, Xanterra Parks and Resources.216 Although we note here the establishment of Performance Track’s
Corporate Leaders program, given its limited scope we focus throughout the
rest of this article on the core National Environmental Performance Track that
targeted facilities.
F. Performance Track’s Dissolution
When then-EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced her decision to
end Performance Track on March 16, 2009, she offered the simple explanation
that “Performance Track was developed in a different era and may not speak to
today’s challenges.”217 At the request of “[m]embers of Congress and stakeholders,” she said she decided “to halt the current Performance Track Program
with the intent of refining those concepts that can lead us to a stronger system
of environmental protection.”218
In the week following Jackson’s announcement, Chuck Kent, Director of
EPA’s Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation, sent a memorandum to
Performance Track members explaining how EPA would go about shutting
down the program.219 Performance Track facilities could continue to display
Performance Track membership certificates “in recognition of past achievement,” but could no longer refer to themselves as members.220 While EPA en211
See National Environmental Performance Track: Performance Track Corporate Leaders,
EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0XDBiuWSQWt.
212
Id. The Performance Track Corporate Leaders program can be traced to the agency’s earlier
iterations of the “alternative track” idea. Recall that EPA originally proposed a corporate-level
commitment as part of its Environmental Leadership Program. See Environmental Leadership
Program, supra note 74. Richard Wells, who convened discussions about the design of the “Stewardship Track” on behalf of EPA, recalled that this tier was envisioned as a corporate-level initiative. Wells, supra note 134.
213
National Environmental Performance Track: Performance Track Corporate Leaders, supra
note 211.
214
Id.
215
LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 11–12.
216
See Press Release, EPA, Xanterra Parks and Resorts Earns Designation as EPA Performance
Track Corporate Leader (May 9, 2006), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0PpFvJaRyQF.
217
Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, supra note 31.
218
Id.
219
Letter from Charles W. Kent, supra note 31.
220
Id.
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couraged those facilities to continue “to track . . . future efforts for continuous
improvement,” they did not need to submit a 2008 Annual Performance Report
to the agency.221 EPA also cancelled the memoranda of agreement it had established with state environmental agencies.222 The program’s official last day was
May 14, 2009, when the agency’s notice of termination appeared in the Federal
Register.223
A memorandum to EPA staff one month later explained that the agency
would immediately cease providing regulatory incentives.224 Performance Track
members would no longer be considered a low priority for routine inspections.225 They would no longer be allowed to store hazardous waste at their
facilities for extra time, self-inspect their hazardous waste storage and disposal
facilities less frequently, or file certain air pollution reports less frequently than
other facilities.226 Prior to ending the program, EPA had kept track of which
facilities were Performance Track members and thereby eligible for regulatory
benefits by flagging their names in its online regulatory compliance database.227
After the program ended, EPA removed those flags so enforcement personnel
would no longer give Performance Track plants any special treatment.228
Shortly after EPA announced the end of Performance Track, in May 2009,
the agency held its annual National Environmental Partnership Summit.229 In
the past, the summit had served as the annual meeting of Performance Track
members — a chance for facility environmental personnel involved in the program to meet face-to-face with EPA staff members.230 EPA used the May 2009
meeting instead to consider next steps for its environmental leadership programs. Two leaders of what had been the Performance Track Participants Association held a workshop on “Life After Performance Track,” proposing options
for how former Performance Track members might continue certain program
activities even without EPA involvement.231 One option was to focus on state
environmental leadership programs rather than a new national program. That
effort resulted in the establishment of the Stewardship Action Council, which

221

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
223
Notice to Terminate the National Environmental Performance Track Program, 74 Fed. Reg.
22,741 (May 14, 2009).
224
Memorandum from Catherine R. McCabe, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, EPA Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance and Marcia E. Mulkey, Acting Assoc. Adm’r, EPA Office of Pol’y,
Econ. & Innovation to Reg’l Adm’rs, Enforcement Coordinators, et al. (June 25, 2009) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
225
Id. at 2.
226
Id. at 2–4.
227
Id. at 4.
228
Id.
229
EPA, 2009 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
COLLABORATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT],
available at http://perma.cc/Y2WB-C347.
230
See Home, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT 2006, http://perma.law.harvard.
edu/07zygkd3LBM.
231
2009 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT, supra note 229, at 5.
222
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today includes among its membership a number of former Performance Track
members and about twenty state environmental agencies.232
Performance Track was not the only voluntary program then-Administrator Jackson decided to terminate. Shortly after ending Performance Track, EPA
ended Climate Leaders, another high-profile EPA voluntary program.233 EPA
established Climate Leaders in 2002 to provide private sector managers with
tools to inventory their emissions, set goals, and track reductions, and to recognize companies that met emissions reduction milestones.234 In a letter to program members announcing EPA’s decision to halt the program in September
2010, then-Assistant Administrator Gina McCarthy explained that the “context
in which Climate Leaders is operating is far different from when it was
launched.”235 She cited the agency’s Mandatory Reporting Rules for greenhouse
gases and climate programs run by states and environmental NGOs as examples of the new “context.”236
Concerns about agency resources probably provided an additional reason
for ending both Performance Track and Climate Leaders. Some staff throughout
the agency held the view that voluntary programs took scarce resources away
from EPA’s regulatory programs. For example, shortly before announcing the
termination of Climate Leaders, McCarthy told a group of EPA air advisers that
in order to regulate more effectively, “voluntary programs may no longer be
the priority . . . and we may want to shift resources [to regulatory programs].” 237 Officials in some of EPA’s regulatory offices raised similar concerns about Performance Track, questioning whether the staff time required to
create special regulatory benefits for Performance Track facilities was a wise
use of agency resources, especially given that the benefits applied to so few
plants.238 Attorney John Walke of the Natural Resources Defense Council
(“NRDC”) echoed this view, arguing that in times of tight resources, voluntary
initiatives inherently deprived regulatory programs of necessary funds.239
Yet despite having ended Performance Track and Climate Leaders, EPA
did not terminate other major voluntary programs. On the contrary, by 2012
EPA announced the launch of the Center for Corporate Climate Leadership to
“build on the successes and legacy of the former Climate Leaders program —
as well as EPA’s other voluntary partnership programs.”240 The Center’s main
activity is an awards program that “recognizes and incentivizes exemplary cor232

Stewardship Action Council, STEWARDSHIPACTIONCOUNCIL.ORG, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0NUV8EQWsoW (displaying a list of all members of the Stewardship Action Council under the
“SAC Members Map” link).
233
See Letter from Gina McCarthy, Assistant Adm’r, EPA, to Climate Leaders Program Members
(Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
234
See id.
235
Id.
236
See id.
237
Robin Bravender, EPA’s Voluntary Programs Under Scrutiny as Regulatory Obligations Rise,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2010), http://perma.cc/QUQ6-54ZD.
238
See RAND CORP. ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 58 & n.23.
239
Letter from John Walke, supra note 27, at 9; see Bravender, supra note 237.
240
Flyer from EPA, Ctr. for Corp. Climate Leadership (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
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porate, organizational, and individual leadership in response to climate
change.”241 Given the failure of Congress to enact climate change legislation,
interest in voluntary programs appears to be rising again. A recent report from
the National Research Council, for example, specifically directed EPA to “utilize partnerships”242 and “create incentives for sustainable behavior” through a
broad range of activities beyond regulation, including “sustainable best-practice and innovation awards that are high profile and well publicized” — activities that are common to many voluntary programs and were part and parcel of
Performance Track.243
II. WHAT WAS PERFORMANCE TRACK REALLY TRACKING?
The continued interest in programs like Performance Track makes it important to look back and gauge how well the program actually worked.244
Throughout Performance Track’s history, EPA repeatedly claimed that the program identified facilities that were among the nation’s finest performers and
that in so doing it induced significant environmental improvements. How well
did the program work? Did EPA actually identify and reward the true top environmental performers through Performance Track? What, if anything, distinguished those facilities that participated in Performance Track? Until now, the
scant empirical research on Performance Track, both inside and outside the
agency, has left the answers to these questions speculative at best.
A. Claims of Success . . . and Skepticism
Beginning with the agency’s first progress report on Performance Track in
2003 — entitled “Top Performers. Solid Results” — the EPA confidently proclaimed that the program worked as intended.245 EPA’s second annual report
declared, “One of Performance Track’s key environmental benefits is its ability
to promote voluntary progress on unregulated environmental issues.”246 Its
third annual report waxed glowingly about “the program’s ability to attract and
retain the nation’s top environmental performers.”247 In its fourth annual report,
241

Climate Leadership Awards, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0PPAtGw5x8J.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUSTAINABILITY AND THE U.S. EPA 107 (2011) (Finding 6.9).
243
Id. at 104.
244
See Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 UNIV. ILL. L. REV.
1111, 1114 (2002) (observing that “empirical analysis provides decision makers and scholars with
the means for making more informed choices”); Cary Coglianese & Lori D. Snyder Bennear,
Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES
246 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern eds., 2005) (“Obtaining systematic answers to the question
of whether environmental policies work is vital”); Cary Coglianese, Evaluating the Impact of
Regulation and Regulatory Policy, OECD EXPERT PAPER NO. 1 at 7 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://perma.cc/R2VU-EMFW (“To know how well regulation and regulatory policy actually
work in practice, governments [need] to conduct more ex post evaluation.”).
245
See TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 2.
246
BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 7.
247
GROWTH & RENEWAL, supra note 142, at 3.
242
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EPA proclaimed, “Performance Track motivates facilities to go beyond legal
requirements . . . [and] improves on the level of environmental protection
achievable by regulations alone.”248 Then-EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson
was quoted in a promotional flyer claiming that “Performance Track members
are at the forefront of innovation and environmental stewardship.”249 In EPA’s
sixth annual report, the agency claimed that Performance Track “drives environmental excellence,”250 with then-Administrator Johnson continuing to refer
to members as “leading companies.”251
Even in EPA’s final program report, released after Performance Track ended, EPA characterized the “core value” of the program as “[c]ontinuous improvement . . . for both members and the program itself.”252 The agency lauded
the cumulative results reported by member facilities, specifically:
• 2.87 billion gallons in water use reductions,
• 366,948 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions,
• 1.26 million tons of reduced non-hazardous waste generation,
• 68,146 tons of hazardous waste eliminated, and
• 24,864 acres of land conserved.
The final progress report noted that many of these achievements were in areas
“not covered by current regulations.”253
Against EPA’s claims that Performance Track recognized top performers
and helped spur major environmental results, voices within the environmental
community and within the agency itself began to raise questions at least as
early as five years into the program’s operation. In a November 2005 letter to
the agency, NRDC attorney John Walke cautioned that “EPA’s evaluation of
Performance Track accomplishments must be careful not to confuse correlation
with causation.”254 The mere fact that Performance Track members may have
achieved environmental improvements does not necessarily mean that they
248

LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 5.
EPA, REACHING FOR A BRIGHTER FUTURE 1 (2007) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). This same flyer also said that the program led “the way toward a cleaner, safer environment.” Id.
250
EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK SIXTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2008) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
251
Press Release, EPA, New EPA Report Shows Environmental Achievements of Performance
Track (May 14, 2008), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0GWNBvLuqi1. Similarly, the
EPA manager who oversaw the Performance Track program referred to its members as “highperforming facilities.” FIORINO, supra note 2, at 148. OSHA has used strikingly similar language
to describe worksites in its Voluntary Protection Programs. For example, in a statement to the U.S.
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, OSHA’s Deputy Assistant
Secretary called VPP participants “models for effective employee protection . . . the best of the
best.” Statement by Jordan Barab, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for U.S. Dep’t of Labor Occupational
Safety & Health Admin. Before the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Comm. on Education
and the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, June 28, 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0RmytqeHQhh.
252
PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 21, at 1.
253
Id. at 1–3.
254
Letter from John Walke, supra note 27, at 6.
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made their improvements because of Performance Track. As Walke urged in his
letter, “EPA should fairly and objectively evaluate the reductions, the reasons
for them, whether they would have occurred anyway, and whether they were
caused by performance incentives or program membership.”255
In January 2006, the non-profit advocacy group Environmental Integrity
Project (“EIP”) joined with about thirty local and regional environmental organizations to support Walke’s letter.256 EIP argued further that some Performance
Track members were delivering less than top performance — noting that fourteen members “appear to have violated one or more federal environmental
laws” at least six times in the previous twelve quarters.257 EIP also issued a
briefing paper that argued that “some of the manufacturers reaping Performance Track rewards are releasing more toxic pollution to the environment than
they were before signing up for the program.”258 EIP questioned the wisdom of
relaxing inspections and reporting requirements for facilities that were increasing their pollution levels.259
At about the same time, EPA’s Office of Inspector General (“IG”) opened
an investigation into Performance Track and, in a report issued in 2007, reached
conclusions similar to those expressed by the environmental groups. The IG
concluded that EPA could not demonstrate that the program led to significant
environmental improvements.260 It also found that most members failed to
achieve the commitments they made in their applications.261 Out of a random
sample of forty Performance Track facilities, the IG found that most of these
members had lower toxic releases than the average levels for facilities in the
same sectors.262 However, it called attention to its finding that some Performance Track members’ performance was worse than average for their sectors.263
The IG worried that, “while program criteria may deem an applicant a top
performer, this designation may not hold true when the facility is compared
with other facilities in its sector.”264 The IG feared that the existence of “underperforming” facilities in the program would undermine EPA’s credibility
and diminish the value of Performance Track’s “brand.”265
255

Id.
Letter from Eric Schaeffer, supra note 27, at 1.
Id.
258
ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, WRONG TRACK? SOME PERFORMANCE TRACK FACILITIES REPORT
INCREASED LEVELS OF TOXIC POLLUTION 1 (2006) (emphasis in original), available at http://
perma.cc/J3T6-PBF6.
259
Id. at 2.
260
P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 11–15.
261
Id. at 18 (noting just two of the thirty facilities assessed met all commitments in a three-year
commitment cycle).
262
Id.
263
Id. at 23 (“[S]ome facilities had more compliance problems or released more pounds of toxic
substances than the average for their peers.”).
264
Id. at 25.
265
Id. at 23 (“The presence of underperforming facilities [in this leadership program] reduces the
integrity and value of the Performance Track brand.”). The U.S Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has raised similar concerns about OSHA’s VPP, finding that “some sites that no
longer met the definition of an exemplary worksite remained in the VPP.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-395, OSHA’S VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS: IMPROVED OVER256
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EPA disputed the criticisms from both the environmentalists and the IG.
For example, in a letter EPA sent to EIP in March 2006, the agency questioned
EIP’s claims about increases in toxic emissions from Performance Track facilities.266 The agency asserted that some, though by no means all, of the pollution
increases at Performance Track facilities stemmed from production increases at
facilities as well as changes in estimation techniques267 — with the implication
being that at least some of these increases could not be said to stem from environmental irresponsibility. EPA also publicly disputed some of the more critical
aspects of the IG’s report, contending that parts of the IG’s analysis suffered
from poor data and methods.268 EPA did not dispute the IG’s finding that most
facilities did not meet their stated environmental commitments, but the agency
did characterize many facilities’ commitments as explicitly ambitious “stretch
goals” that could not reasonably be expected to be fully achieved.269 The
agency noted that, altogether, over half of the environmental commitments
made by the facilities studied by the IG had been met, something the agency
considered “an indication of significant success.”270
Regardless of the agency’s response, Performance Track’s critics forcefully
raised the question of whether Performance Track plants truly represented what
Administrator Browner had called “models of a higher level of environmental
achievement.”271 Performance Track’s critics gained widespread attention when,
in April 2008, NBC Nightly News aired a report on the program’s members,
focusing specifically on the question of “How green are these firms really?”272
The report quoted Representative Edward Markey as stating that “undeserving
companies are now being given a recognition which they did not earn.”273 In
the words of NBC reporter Lisa Meyers, the controversy over Performance
Track raised “questions about how carefully EPA screens members of the program.”274 In December 2008, the Philadelphia Inquirer ran a front-page story,

CONTROLS WOULD BETTER ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY 0 (2009). GAO found that “for
12 percent of the sites, at least one of their 3-year average injury and illness rates was higher than
the average industry and illness rates for their industries.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
266
Letter from Jay Benforado, Dir., Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Innovation, EPA, to Eric Schaeffer, President, Envtl. Integrity Project 3 (Mar. 3, 2006) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
267
Id.
268
See Memorandum from Brian F. Mannix, supra note 30, at 29–38. The EPA response asserted,
for example, that the initial IG draft report included incorrect compliance information for one
Performance Track facility and that another facility included in the IG’s analysis had reported its
toxic release data incorrectly. Id. at 36–37.
269
Id. at 30.
270
Id.
271
EPA Rewards Top Green Performers, GREENBIZ (Jul. 2, 2000), http://perma.cc/WU8H-VVK8.
Even an EPA-funded report on Performance Track conducted by the RAND Corporation after the
program’s termination noted that EPA failed to specify membership criteria adequately, making it
vulnerable to criticisms that some facilities in the program “[w]ere [u]ndeserving of
[m]embership.” See RAND CORP. ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 15, 55.
272
NBC Nightly News: Feds Giving Suspect Green Rewards (NBC television broadcast Apr. 20,
2008), available at http://perma.cc/L6VR-AEJT.
273
Id.
274
Id.
SIGHT AND
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under the headline “Green Club an EPA Charade,” that raised similar questions
about Performance Track’s credibility.275
B. Performance Track’s Screening: How Well Did EPA Track?
In order to understand what types of facilities Performance Track actually
tracked, we begin by considering what EPA was able to track through its application screening process. After all, if Performance Track sought to attract “top
environmental performers,” EPA needed a screening process that could distinguish between the strongest environmental performers and those facilities with
average or below-average performance. To assess the adequacy of EPA’s process, we consider both what EPA’s screening could determine as well as the
results it actually yielded. We report data comparing applicants accepted and
not accepted into the program, as well as data on the types of facilities that
called themselves Performance Track members. We find that the agency was
generally able to determine whether facilities had met the stated membership
criteria, but was never able to compare facilities with their in-sector peers. That
said, we do find that, based on Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”) measures, the
facilities admitted into the program tended to have lower toxic releases than
those applicants the agency turned away. However, once these TRI data are
weighted by the risk to the community based on the quantity and toxicity of the
pollutants discharged, Performance Track facilities actually tended to pose disproportionately higher risks to their communities than did non-members.
Performance Track members were a rather diverse lot. Altogether, member
facilities came from seventeen industrial sectors: thirteen manufacturing sectors
and four non-manufacturing sectors.276 EPA reported that, as of July 2007, over
60% of Performance Track’s membership came from seven manufacturing sectors: electronic and other electrical equipment (13%); chemical products (12%);
wood products, paper, and printing (8%); pharmaceutical products (8%); transportation equipment and supplies (7%); rubber and plastics products (7%); and

275

Sullivan & Shiffman, supra note 32. Similar media charges have been leveled against OSHA’s
VPP. In a series of articles entitled “Model Workplaces, Imperiled Workers,” the Center for Public Integrity, a nonpartisan investigative news organization, documented workers who had been
seriously injured while working at VPP sites. The Center found that eighty workers had been
killed in workplace accidents at VPP sites since 2000 and, during the period 2000–2008, approximately 13% of VPP sites had safety performance worse than comparable businesses in the same
industry. Chris Hamby, “Model Workplaces” Not Always So Safe, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jul.
7 2011), http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0v2P2gUQL7B; see also Mona Iskander, Safety Matters:
Injuries and Fatalities at ‘Model’ Workplaces, NEED TO KNOW ON PBS (July 8, 2011), http://
perma.cc/YJ6U-G28W (video feed starting at 02:34) (noting that “evidence suggests that once a
worksite achieves VPP designation, OSHA seldom takes it away, even after extremely serious
accidents have occurred”); Celeste Monforton, No Shortage of Ideas from OSHA Staff to Improve
Oversight of Agency’s Voluntary Protection Program, PUMP HANDLE (Aug. 22, 2012), http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/0T2ivZgZBpk (noting that “serious questions have been raised about the
integrity of the program and whether all VPP sites genuinely deserve a ‘model workplace’
designation.”).
276
National Environmental Performance Track: Members by Sector, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/
U98S-7MRR.
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medical equipment and supplies (6%).277 In some of the later application
rounds, a notable number of non-manufacturing facilities joined the program,
including: “miscellaneous” sites (e.g., corporate headquarters and government
facilities) (8%); arts, recreation, and entertainment sites (7%); and research and
educational facilities (5%).278 Strikingly, by the time the program ended, about
10% of Performance Track facilities were owned and operated by government
entities, the bulk of these being federal facilities including post offices.279
Performance Track facilities were geographically distributed throughout
the United States. As of July 2007, EPA Region 4 (Southeastern United States)
had the largest number of members (seventy-seven), while EPA Region 8
(Rocky Mountains) had the fewest (twenty-two).280 California was the state
with the largest number of facilities (thirty-nine), followed by Texas (thirtyfour), New York (twenty-four), Georgia (seventeen), Pennsylvania (seventeen),
Puerto Rico (seventeen), and New Jersey (sixteen).281 Performance Track facilities tended to be located in more densely populated communities with relatively
low poverty levels and relatively high levels of education.282 This demographic
distribution of Performance Track facilities was about the same as the demographic distribution of regulated entities generally.283 The only characteristic
that stood out from the norm was that a slightly higher proportion of rural
facilities could be found in Performance Track than in the broader universe of
facilities.284
Performance Track facilities were also fairly diverse in terms of size.
About 22% of all member facilities had fewer than 100 employees, and 14%
had fewer than 50.285 The remaining facilities were distributed as follows: firms
with 100–499 employees (32%); those with 500–1,000 employees (20%); and
those with over 1,000 employees (26%).286

277

Id.
Id. By comparison, the top five sectors participating in OSHA’s VPP are chemicals (22%),
utilities (13%), professional services (7%), couriers (U.S. Postal Service) (6%), and transportation
equipment (6%), which together make up 54% of VPP worksites. Top 15 Industries in the VPP,
OSHA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0jf5M4nwsc8 (reporting data on worksites in the federal VPP as of September 30, 2013).
279
PTrack Member Data, supra note 10. When Performance Track ended in 2009, its membership
included thirty-seven U.S. post offices (nearly 7% of total membership). Id. Similarly, 160 VPP
sites (or about 10% of the total membership in OSHA’s VPP) are federal facilities, including
seventy-five U.S. post offices. OSHA, Federal Government Active VPP Sites – as of 2/18/13 (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
280
National Environmental Performance Track: Members by EPA Region, EPA.GOV, http://perma.
cc/LBC5-ZLJT.
281
National Environmental Performance Track: Members by State, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/
BVZ8-W35Q.
282
See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON & HARVARD UNIV. CTR. FOR BUS. & GOV’T, PERFORMANCE
TRACK DATABASE OVERVIEW: FINDINGS REPORT 16–17 (2005) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE TRACK
DATABASE OVERVIEW] (data from this report came from Performance Track facility applications
through Round 7, or February 2004).
283
See id.
284
See id. at 16. EPA provided demographic data on about 740,000 facilities nationwide. Id.
285
See LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 24.
286
Id.
278
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Many, but by no means all, Performance Track facilities were highly regulated. As of May 2005, about half of all Performance Track facilities (47%)
held major environmental permits under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, or
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.287 About 30% had been designated
large quantity hazardous waste generators under RCRA; 25% had been designated major sources of air pollution; 9% were major sources of water pollution;
and 7% were hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities.288 This
still means, though, that half of all Performance Track facilities did not hold
any major environmental permits at all.289
At least for those facilities that were covered under major environmental
permits, Performance Track’s critics asked whether — instead of leading the
way toward ever-higher levels of environmental performance — EPA was offering regulatory relief to facilities that did not truly deserve it.290 Their questions and criticisms inevitably became more salient whenever EPA announced
plans to expand Performance Track by offering more substantial regulatory incentives,291 raising the question of whether the information EPA collected
through its application process allowed it to screen adequately for “top” performance.292 Was Performance Track just environmental “window-dressing” as
Lisa Jackson had claimed before she became EPA Administrator?293
Recall that for facilities to become members, EPA required them to have a
clean compliance record, adopt a comprehensive EMS, commit to beyond-compliance environmental goals, and engage with their communities about their
environmental activities.294 The agency screened applicants based on whether
they cleared a compliance check and whether they adequately completed a
twenty-nine page application form. The details of EPA’s application and review
process may seem rather trivial on first impression, but what EPA did to screen
applications is in fact crucial in how well it could identify top environmental
performers through the Performance Track program.
EPA accepted applications twice each year during designated application
periods. Once a facility submitted a completed application, the agency committed to passing judgment on it within ninety days.295 EPA retained an independent contractor, Industrial Economics, Inc. (“IEc”), to help with the application
287

See PERFORMANCE TRACK DATABASE OVERVIEW, supra note 282, at 15.
See id.
289
See id.
290
See Letter from John Walke, supra note 27, at 6, 9; ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, WRONG
TRACK? SOME PERFORMANCE TRACK FACILITIES REPORT INCREASED LEVELS OF TOXIC POLLUTION,
supra note 258; P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 11–15, 18.
291
See Report on ECOS-EPA Performance-Based Environmental Programs: Proposed Initial Implementation Actions, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,026, 28,026–30 (May 15, 2006) (describing the proposal to
improve implementation of Performance Track and similar programs at the state level).
292
See Fei Yu & Cary Coglianese, Recognizing and Encouraging Environmental Leaders: An
Assessment of Performance Track’s Selection Process, in BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 10, at
84.
293
See Sullivan & Shiffman, supra note 32.
294
See Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 85.
295
See National Environmental Performance Track: Implementation, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/
YD6X-96CS.
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review process. IEc reviewed applications for completeness and accuracy, identifying issues needing EPA’s attention.296 IEc frequently encountered application problems, large and small. For example, in its review of the seventh round
of applications in 2004, IEc discovered that some applicants included information that was incorrect or simply neglected to answer certain questions at all.297
EPA Performance Track officials and regional Performance Track coordinators,
with input from state environmental departments, determined the fate of all
applications.298 When deficiencies were identified in application information,
regional Performance Track coordinators were tasked with working with facilities to address the problems.299
Beyond reviewing applications, EPA also screened each applicant for
compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental regulations.300 As noted, to be eligible for Performance Track, a facility’s owner or
operator must not have had, within designated time periods prior to applying,
any conviction or guilty plea under criminal provisions of environmental laws
nor any major civil violation of environmental standards.301 EPA undertook
three steps to screen for regulatory compliance. First, agency officials undertook an initial screen for the facility within EPA’s enforcement databases.302
Second, Performance Track staff double-checked with staff at EPA program
offices and at the Department of Justice to make sure nothing was missed.303
Finally, EPA consulted with staff within its own Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance to confirm the applicant had no other outstanding compliance issues.304
For obvious reasons, we could not independently assess the adequacy of
EPA’s screening for regulatory compliance; the publicly available compliance
databases are less comprehensive than the agency’s internal (and not publicly
available) system and records. But we were able to access the agency’s Performance Track Approval Status Database to determine whether EPA’s screening succeeded in turning up deficiencies in applications based on the remaining
three membership requirements: EMSs, performance goals, and community engagement. We reviewed in detail the first four years of Performance Track’s
operation, August 2001 through February 2004, and we also examined summary data available on the agency’s screening through 2008.305

296

Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 85.
See id. at 85–86 (providing a summary table of errors contained in applications).
298
See National Environmental Performance Track: Implementation, supra note 295.
299
See generally Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, supra note 15 (discussing the EPA review process for Performance Track applications and how the agency addressed the problem of
incomplete compliance data for a particular applicant).
300
See National Environmental Performance Track: Sustained Compliance, EPA.GOV, http://
perma.cc/XY85-2YZM.
301
PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 8.
302
See LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 24.
303
Id.
304
Id.
305
See generally Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 84 (reviewing information gathered on
application rounds for membership in Performance Track from April 2001 to February 2004).
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One thing became apparent at the outset: it was relatively easy for facilities to gain acceptance into the program. Of those facilities that applied to Performance Track throughout its history, the agency admitted 75% (783 out of
1,044 applications).306 Of those facilities rejected or withdrawn even before being formally admitted, compliance problems were by far the most common
reason given by the agency for keeping these facilities out (31%).307 Only 6% of
applicants were turned away for problems with their environmental management systems, such as their failure to have an independent assessment.308 Another 7% failed to develop or specify adequate environmental commitments,
typically because they lacked sufficient measures of past performance to be
able to provide required baseline performance data or failed to provide an adequate basis for normalizing performance data over time.309 For about 3% of the
facilities that applied but were not admitted, the reason had nothing to do with
Performance Track’s entry criteria, but rather related to miscellaneous factors
ranging from the sale of the facility, the reorganization of the facility’s company, or even an application apparently submitted by mistake.310 For a substantial portion of facilities not accepted into the program (35%), EPA provided in
its Approval Status Database no reason whatsoever for the facility’s rejection.311
Although EPA’s screening process identified relatively few problems with
applicants’ EMSs, during Performance Track’s first eighteen months, EMS deficiencies were among the agency’s primary reasons for asking members to withdraw from the program.312 The application screening process only infrequently
revealed EMS problems, but they showed up with more regularity when EPA
visited Performance Track plants. Of the twenty-four facilities visited in 2003,
for example, EPA found fifteen had substandard EMSs.313 EPA responded by
asking facilities to withdraw and by establishing a new membership requirement that applicants obtain third-party certification that their EMS met Performance Track criteria. Once EPA imposed that certification requirement on
applicants, EMS problems declined.314
EPA worked extensively with facilities to ensure that their applications
would meet program standards. The application process became iterative, with
306

See PTrack Member Data, supra note 10. Gaining admission to OSHA’s VPP has also been
easy. OSHA regional offices track the number of facilities that apply to VPP and are approved as
members. Some regions have collected these data only sporadically, but four of OSHA’s ten regions have tracked the number of applications and approvals for most years since 1982, when
VPP began. These regions report approval rates of 83% to 99%. OSHA, Number of VPP Applications Received/Accepted by OSHA Regions - CY 1982 - CY 2013 (as of 2/28/13) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library). By comparison, consider that elite colleges can have acceptance
rates closer to 10%. Jenna Johnson, Colleges Announce 2013 Acceptance Rates, WASH. POST,
April 1, 2013, http://perma.cc/P63G-4DZU.
307
See PTrack Member Data, supra note 10.
308
See id.
309
See id.; see also Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 86.
310
See PTrack Member Data, supra note 10.
311
See id.; see also Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 86.
312
TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 6.
313
BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 5.
314
See PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 3; see also Yu & Coglianese,
supra note 292, at 85–86.
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IEc and EPA identifying problems, EPA informing facilities about application
deficiencies, and facilities responding to feedback. An application might initially have been submitted without, for instance, appropriate normalizing factors for measuring a facility’s environmental improvement over time. Absolute
improvements represented the actual changes in a facility’s environmental impact, measured in units such as pounds of toxic pollution, while normalized
improvements adjusted those changes to take into account increases or decreases in a facility’s production.315 Normalized improvements sought to measure the “eco-efficiency” of a facility’s operations (that is, its environmental
impact relative to its level of production).316 If an application was submitted
without suitable normalizing factors, EPA worked with the facility to determine
appropriate measures. When applications proved deficient in this way, or in
other ways, the agency worked with applicants to obtain missing data or correct
problems. Many applications received more than one round of iteration during
the screening process.317 In this way, the agency’s screening process provided a
reasonable basis for EPA to ensure that admitted facilities met the letter of
Performance Track’s entry requirements — albeit with the agency’s coaching.
Meeting Performance Track’s entry requirements did not necessarily mean
that a facility was a “leader” or “top performer” in the sense of having better
environmental performance than other similar facilities. Nothing in the application process called for anyone to make any comparison of the applicant facility
with other facilities in the same sector. However, after the fact, we can report
on just such a comparison made as part of our larger study of Performance
Track.
When the toxic releases from the facilities that applied to Performance
Track from June 2000 to February 2004 were analyzed, it appeared that EPA
succeeded in choosing the “better” facilities — at least from among those that
applied to the program.318 That is, the facilities admitted to the program released
fewer toxic chemicals than did facilities that the EPA rejected. Of course, the
agency never used toxic release data as a membership criterion. However, all
users of large quantities of toxic chemicals are required to report their releases
as part of TRI as mandated by the Emergency Planning and Community Rightto-Know Act;319 as a result, we can look to the TRI data as a readily available
proxy for environmental performance across different facilities, just as other
researchers have done in other contexts.320 Our results, shown in Table 1, below, suggest that EPA’s screening process appears to have effectively (even if
unintentionally) discriminated between applicants on the basis of absolute
315
See, e.g., EPA, GUIDANCE FOR NORMALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS 1, 3–4
(2004), available at http://perma.cc/N2N4-QM54.
316
Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 86.
317
See Nash & Coglianese, supra note 10, at 24–25 (discussing trends in Performance Track applications, including that “[p]roblems . . . ar[o]se in nearly every aspect of the application”).
318
Fei Yu conducted the data collection and analysis reported in this paragraph and Table 1. See
Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 94.
319
See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (2006).
320
Cf. Lori S. Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Measuring Progress: Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies, 47 ENV’T 22, 33 (2005).
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levels of toxic releases.321 As indicated by the negative sign on the coefficient
for “Admitted Status” in each of the three separate regression models summarized in Table 1, each of which used different sets of control variables,322 Performance Track members admitted during the program’s first several
application rounds had significantly lower overall TRI releases compared with
the facilities that applied to the program during the same period but were not
admitted.323 In two of the models, the average applicant admitted into Performance Track had three million pounds fewer TRI releases than the average applicant not admitted into the program.
TABLE 1. TRI RELEASES FROM ADMITTED VERSUS
NOT ADMITTED APPLICANTS

Admitted Status
Control variables I325
Control variables II326
R-squared
Number of Observations327
324

1
−851,801

0.0247
3022

Model
2
−3,043,971
Yes
Yes
0.1088
1574

3
−3,047,569
Yes
0.1071
1574

A comparison of admitted and non-admitted facilities cannot, however,
answer the question of whether Performance Track facilities out-performed
similar facilities that did not apply to the program. Are Performance Track
321

Yu & Coglianese, supra note 292, at 91 tbl.5.4.
The coefficient of “Admitted Status” reports the difference in TRI releases (in pounds) between Performance Track members and non-members, the latter defined as applicants who were
rejected or withdrew their application. A negative coefficient means that that applicants admitted
to the program had lower TRI releases. All the coefficients were significant at the 5% level. Id. at
90–91.
323
“Control Variables I” included each facility’s two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code,
the size of its parent company (that is, the number of U.S. facilities owned by the parent), the EPA
region in which the facility was located, and the percentage of the population within a five-mile
radius of the facility that lived below the poverty line. Id. at 89 n.6.
324
“Control Variables II” included the facility’s size (based on number of employees) and the
percentage of the population within a five-mile radius of the facility that held a college degree. Id.
325
Only about 200 facilities had TRI data for the period under analysis, but the analysis drew on a
fifteen-year panel dataset containing TRI emissions from 1988–2002. As such, each facility’s TRI
emissions for each year constituted a separate observation, thus explaining why there can be over
3,000 observations for a program that has fewer than 500 businesses as members. Id. at 88–89.
326
The regression analyses broke down the control variables into two classes: “Control Variables
I” and “Control Variables II.” Id. at 91 tbl. 5.4.
327
Id. Panel data for TRI releases were available for fifteen years from 1988 to 2002. Similar tests
using alternative environmental performance measures did not yield statistically significant
differences between admitted facilities and rejected or withdrawn facilities. The alternative
measures included risk-weighted TRI releases and water discharge measures. Id. at 89, 91.
322
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facilities truly the leaders in their fields? Perhaps surprisingly, given all the
agency’s rhetoric about recognizing “top performers,” the screening process
was entirely unable to answer this central question. The only facilities submitting data on environmental achievements and commitments were the applicants
to the program. Without comparable data on the environmental performance of
other similar firms that did not apply, the agency had no basis for claiming to
have identified and recognized “top” performers or environmental “leaders.”328
In its 2007 study, the EPA’s Office of Inspector General attempted to make
a “rough” comparison of the compliance records and toxic releases of randomly selected Performance Track facilities with the averages for each facility’s
corresponding industrial sector.329 The IG found that twenty-two out of twentyseven facilities it examined had lower toxic releases than the average facility in
their sector, and twenty-two out of thirty-five facilities outperformed the average firm in terms of compliance.330 EPA interpreted the IG’s results to “confirm
what [the agency] knew to be true — Performance Track members lead their
peers in environmental performance.”331 But merely being “better than average” is hardly the same as being a “top performer.” Unfortunately, the IG’s
report did not indicate how much better than average the Performance Track
facilities it examined were, so the IG’s report cannot confirm that such facilities
were top performers, or just slightly above the mean. The implications of the
IG’s results were more disconcerting if they generalize across the program, as
they would indicate that a non-trivial portion of Performance Track members
performed at levels worse than their sector’s average. The IG found that 37% of
the Performance Track facilities it examined had experienced more compliance
problems than the average firm within each applicable sector, while 19% of the
facilities released more toxic pollutants than their sector average.332
The ability to make a credible claim that Performance Track attracted top
performers becomes still harder once the health risks associated with toxic releases are taken into account. Not every release of toxic pollutants poses the
same level of risk to the public. For this reason, EPA has developed a RiskScreening Environmental Indicators (“RSEI”) model that estimates the health
risks associated with facilities’ TRI releases.333 RSEI takes into account the
amount of chemicals a facility releases, as well as the toxicity of those chemicals, their movement throughout the environment, the probable pathways to
individual exposure, and the number of individuals exposed.334 The RSEI model
328
Id. at 95 (“EPA is inherently unable to discern the true top performers with the information it
gathers during the Performance Track application process, since that information is not gathered
from similar facilities that have not applied to Performance Track.”).
329
P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 24.
330
Id.
331
Memorandum from Brian Mannix, supra note 30.
332
P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 24–25.
333
See PERFORMANCE TRACK DATABASE OVERVIEW, supra note 282, at 3. This database analysis
by Booz Allen Hamilton included Performance Track facilities through Round 7, February 2004.
The RSEI rankings were based on the 2000 release of TRI data.
334
Risk Screening Environmental Indicators, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/09JP1Do
8Agw.
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does not indicate a facility’s absolute risk level, but instead measures its relative
risk compared to other facilities by ranking facilities on the basis of the pounds
of chemicals they release and generating a score that takes into account such
factors as toxicity and population exposure estimates.335
TABLE 2. RELATIVE RISK
Quartile
1
2
3
4
Total

OF

PERFORMANCE TRACK FACILITIES336

RSEI Rank by Pounds
27
21%
19
15%
28
22%
55
43%
129

RSEI Rank by Score
26
20%
20
16%
46
36%
37
29%
129

Since Performance Track facilities that reported chemical releases pursuant to TRI protocols were a subset of all TRI facilities, RSEI can be used to
compare the risks associated with releases from a subset of Performance Track
facilities with risks posed by other facilities in the RSEI database.337 Table 2,
above, shows the distribution of 129 Performance Track members based on
their RSEI rankings compared to the RSEI rankings of all other facilities reporting under TRI. Facilities with the lowest relative risk (“best”) ranked in the
first quartile; those with the highest relative risk (“worst”) ranked in the fourth
quartile. The data indicate that only about 20% of active member facilities in
2004 ranked in the first quartile for the lowest relative risk. By contrast, more
than half ranked in the bottom two quartiles (that is, they posed higher risk)
based on pounds of releases and overall score. Overall, this RSEI analysis indicates that Performance Track facilities posed a slightly higher-than-average risk
to public health compared to all facilities subjected to EPA’s TRI requirements.
335

See id.
PERFORMANCE TRACK DATABASE OVERVIEW, supra note 282, at 17–18. Percentages do not
sum to 100% due to rounding.
337
At our direction, a team from Booz Allen Hamilton (“BAH”), a strategy consulting firm, examined the RSEI rankings of Performance Track facilities. BAH generated a list of Performance
Track facilities using EPA’s Facility Registry System (“FRS”). The FRS is EPA’s system for assigning identification numbers to various sites that it regulates, whether permitted facilities, hazardous waste cleanup sites, or other locations falling under the agency’s jurisdiction. Facility
Registry System, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/P82B-VJYG. In February 2004, when BAH collected
information on Performance Track facilities, the FRS included 391 facilities designated as Performance Track members. This number was higher than the number of facilities EPA Performance
Track staff counted as members because in several cases a “facility” that EPA Performance Track
staff members considered to be a single facility was assigned several FRS identification numbers.
For example, the Performance Track website listed the Georgia facility of Collins and Aikman
Floor Covering with one address, but the FRS showed three different Collins and Aikman “facilities” at this same address. PERFORMANCE TRACK DATABASE OVERVIEW, supra note 282, at 11.
The RSEI analysis shown in Table 2 and accompanying text was based on 129 of these 391
facilities (33%) that had risk-ranking information available in RSEI.
336
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Of course, this does not necessarily mean that Performance Track facilities
are less environmentally responsible than non-member facilities. After all,
RSEI only estimates the risks from toxic releases, while Performance Track
explicitly sought to address a much broader range of environmental impacts.338
Moreover, the RSEI model is based on pounds of chemicals released, which
means that larger and more chemical-intensive operations will naturally rank
worse in RSEI relative to smaller operations that use fewer chemicals. RSEI
data are not normalized by facility size, outputs, or sector, nor do the rankings
reported in Table 2 reveal anything about trends in risks over time. Performance
Track facilities in the two higher-risk quartiles could have been extremely wellmanaged facilities that were making significant strides to reduce their risks, but
they may simply have had higher volumes of production, were located in areas
with higher population densities, or were subjected to wind or weather patterns
that led to greater exposure to chemical emissions.
These limitations with the RSEI data underscore the challenges EPA faced
in identifying top performers. The agency was simply never able to demonstrate
that the facilities it recognized and rewarded through Performance Track represented “models of a higher level of environmental achievement.”339 Although
our analysis provides no reason to question any particular Performance Track
facility’s environmental goodwill or its reported achievements,340 we have
plenty of reason to conclude that EPA could never credibly claim to have identified top performers.341 The agency not only never compared Performance
Track members with the rest of their industry peers, but the results of the IG’s
investigation and the Booz Allen Hamilton analysis of RSEI data suggest, at a
minimum, that a significant number of members posed greater public health
risks than their typical non-member peers.
The EPA also could never demonstrate that any of the environmental improvements reported by Performance Track members, and heralded by the
agency as the program’s achievements,342 surpassed improvements that nonmembers made during the same time. Some non-members surely made improvements in their environmental performance, as every facility has some economic incentive to make improvements in environmental aspects like water and
energy use that have direct cost-saving implications for business. Indeed, Performance Track members tended to prefer precisely those kind of bottom-line338

See PERFORMANCE TRACK SIXTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 250 (“Performance
Track takes a holistic approach to environmental improvement.”).
339
Fiorino, supra note 144, at 9.
340
Of course, others have raised questions about specific Performance Track facilities. See, e.g.,
Sullivan & Shiffman, supra note 32 (raising questions about the environmental responsibility of a
Tennessee facility owned by Olin Corp., as well as about other companies with facilities in Performance Track that nevertheless paid fines for environmental regulatory violations).
341
In this regard, we find untenable the following claim made by EPA’s manager in charge of the
Performance Track program: “Performance Track demonstrate[d] that a formal tiering of regulated and other facilities is feasible. Some firms and facilities do better than others, and it is
possible to analytically recognize this, based on the available information.” FIORINO, supra note 2,
at 151. EPA could never show that Performance Track facilities did “better” than other facilities.
342
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text; see also PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL PROGRESS
REPORT, supra note 21, at 2–3.
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driven environmental improvements, with reductions in water use, energy use,
and waste disposal being among the most frequent commitments Performance
Track members made.343
Even if we assume that Performance Track members could have been
shown to have made vastly superior improvements in environmental performance relative to their peers, the fact that they voluntarily participated in Performance Track makes it further challenging, if not impossible, for EPA to
identify the Performance Track program as the cause of its members’ environmental achievements. Facilities that voluntarily applied for membership in Performance Track may well have already made (or planned to make)
environmental improvements for other reasons. Neither EPA nor outside observers should assume that members’ achievements came about because of Performance Track.344
C. Leadership or Public Relations? Why Companies
Joined Performance Track
To understand better the factors that led some facilities around the country
to join Performance Track, we initiated two studies that compared Performance
Track members to facilities that never sought to join the program. The first
study comprised a comparative case study analysis of Performance Track facilities and similar non-participating facilities.345 The second study analyzed responses to a large-scale survey of 3,947 facilities, including those that had
applied to Performance Track, from four of the sectors with the largest Performance Track membership: electronics and other electrical equipment, chemi-

343

See, e.g., LEADING CHANGE, supra note 141, at 16 (tbl. 1). As we have elsewhere noted:

R

[M]ost facilities’ commitments are in one of five areas: waste, energy use, air emissions, water use, and materials use. Of the 1,228 commitments noted in the program’s
fourth annual progress report, about 86% addressed one of these five areas. With perhaps the exception of air emissions commitments, these five areas are ones where improvements to environmental performance can often result in cost savings to companies.
Nash & Coglianese, supra note 10, at 23.
For a discussion of the problems of drawing inferences from data collected by programs like
Performance Track, see Borck, Coglianese & Nash, supra note 25, at 812–15. OSHA faces similar
difficulties in evaluating the impact of its VPP. In response to a recommendation from the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), OSHA contracted with the Gallup Organization to
try to assess the extent to which VPP was bringing about reductions in participants’ injury and
illness rates. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-378, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND
HEALTH, OSHA’S VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES SHOW PROMISING RESULTS, BUT SHOULD
BE FULLY EVALUATED BEFORE THEY ARE EXPANDED (2004); GALLUP ORG., EVALUATION OF THE
VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAM FINDINGS REPORT (2005). However, the GAO ultimately characterized the Gallup study as “not reliable or valid.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 265, at 17.
345
See generally Jennifer Howard-Grenville, Jennifer Nash & Cary Coglianese, Constructing the
License to Operate: Internal Factors and Their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions,
30 LAW & POL’Y. 73 (2008).
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cal products, transportation equipment, and wood products.346 Together, the
findings from these two studies offer important insights about Performance
Track, business decision making, and beyond-compliance behavior.
1. Case Studies: Performance Track Facilities vs. Similar
Non-Members
Our first study compared matched pairs of facilities: five Performance
Track members and five similar facilities that never applied.347 We selected facilities from a single geographical region with a large number of Performance
Track plants. Eighteen of the Performance Track facilities in the region had
joined the program at its inception, and of these eighteen we eliminated those
not subject to the EPA’s TRI reporting requirements as well as facilities that
were owned by Johnson & Johnson.348 Of the remaining plants, we randomly
selected five for study.
We aimed to match facilities as closely as possible so that, within each
matched pair, the major difference remaining between the facilities was that
one had joined Performance Track and the other had not.349 In selecting matches
for these facilities, we took into account all the information we could obtain,
matching the facilities based on their four-digit standard industrial classification (“SIC”) code, regulatory compliance history, number of employees, and
the demographic characteristics of their surrounding communities.350 Of course,
we could not control for every conceivable way the pairs of facilities might
differ.351 But using available data, we identified a match for each Performance
Track facility in our sample and then made every effort to study both the Per346

Jonathan Borck & Cary Coglianese, Beyond Compliance: Explaining Business Participation in
Voluntary Environmental Programs, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 139 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011).
347
Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 75–76.
348
Id. at 87. Although pharmaceutical and medical equipment facilities were heavily represented
in Performance Track, comprising about 14% of members, we did not include facilities from that
sector in our case studies or survey sample. At the time of our analysis, nearly all pharmaceutical
and medical equipment facilities that were Performance Track members were owned and operated
by a single firm, Johnson & Johnson. See id. at 87 n.6. Given this company’s exceptionally heavy
involvement in the program, its facilities would not be representative of Performance Track members generally.
349
No doubt our matching was not perfect; no matching outside of a laboratory can be. We claim
only to have followed a well-accepted research design and to have made the best possible effort to
match facilities based on available information. Although there undoubtedly remained some differences across the matched pairs, we have no reason to expect that these modest differences
explain the variation in the facilities’ decisions. For an example of a research study using a similar
research design but in a different context, see Stuart Shapiro, Speed Bumps and Roadblocks:
Procedural Controls and Regulatory Change, 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 29, 35 (2002).
350
Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 87.
351
For example, facilities can undoubtedly differ in their customer bases depending upon whether,
for example, their products are sold directly to customers rather than through intermediaries. To
the extent that customer base varied by sector, we controlled for this, at least partially, by controlling for sector, but our ability to match on these grounds was limited by externally available data.
In our interviews, we asked about customer pressures — and we found little difference in the
responses from Performance Track and matched facilities.
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formance Track facilities and their matches. Obtaining access to Performance
Track facilities was not difficult. With persistence, we were able to conduct an
interview at each identified matching, non-member facility as well. Table 3,
below, shows how closely we were able to match the size and demographic
characteristics of each of the studied facilities.352
TABLE 3. PERFORMANCE TRACK AND MATCHED FACILITIES: COMPARISON
SIZE AND COMMUNITY DEMOGRAPHICS353

OF

Facility
Pseudonym

Number of
Employees

Annual Sales ($ in
millions)

% Community
Designated
“Urban”354

Aero Inc.
Matched Facility

500
700

75
60

48
82

Chem Co.
Matched Facility

750
620

858
200

98
100

Glue Co.
Matched Facility

63
100

33
33

99
100

Rubber Inc.
Matched Facility

900
700

50
50

99
72

Tech Co.
Matched Facility

6,000
8,000

1,000
5,000

99
98

In matching facilities, we also took into account regulatory and compliance status, seeking to control for external government pressures that might
affect facilities’ beyond-compliance behavior.355 EPA and state environmental
agencies had inspected each of the facilities.356 Each of the ten facilities had a
“clean” compliance history; none had been found in non-compliance with federal or state environmental regulations for at least the past two years. All ten
facilities held hazardous waste permits, while four of the five Performance
Track plants and all five matching plants were designated as large quantity generators of hazardous waste. Just three Performance Track facilities had active
air discharge permits, while all five of the matching plants were subject to air
permitting requirements. Only two of both the Performance Track and matching
facilities held water discharge permits.357 Furthermore, the TRI data we collected on each pair for the period 1987 to 2003 suggested the pairs generally
352

Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 88 tbl.2.
Id.
As a rough indicator of community characteristics, we calculated the percentage of each
facility’s zip code designated as “urban” according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Id.; see also Urban
Area Criteria for the 2010 Census, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,030 (Aug. 24, 2011).
355
See Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 86.
356
Id. at 88. Three of the five Performance Track facilities had been recently inspected (one in
2003 and two in 2004) even though EPA offered “low inspection priority” as a benefit to members. Id. at 102 n.10.
357
Id. at 88.
353
354
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exhibited similar overall trends in the reduction of TRI releases.358 With only
one exception, each of the facilities had made reductions in its TRI releases.
All of the facilities operated some form of an EMS. The Performance
Track facilities all had certified their EMSs to ISO 14001, the international
standard on which Performance Track’s EMS requirements were closely
modeled. In contrast, only one matched facility had an ISO 14001-certified
EMS, but two of the other four matched facilities had independently certified
EMSs and the remaining two operated non-certified EMSs.359 Table 4, below,
summarizes the environmental characteristics of the five matched pairs of
facilities.
TABLE 4. PERFORMANCE TRACK AND MATCHED FACILITIES: COMPARISON
COMPLIANCE, TRI RELEASES, AND PERMITTING360

OF

Facility
Pseudonym

Subject to
Recent
Enforcement
Action

Trend in
TRI
Releases

Hazardous
Waste
Permit

Air
Permits

Recent
Government
Inspection

Aero Inc.
Matched Facility

No
No

Down
Down

Yes
Yes

No
Yes

No
No

Chem Co.
Matched Facility

No
No

Down
Down

Yes
Yes

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Glue Co.
Matched Facility

No
No

Down
Up

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No
Yes

Rubber Inc.
Matched Facility

No
No

Down
Down

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

Tech Co.
Matched Facility

No
No

Down
Down

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

358
To assess overall trends in TRI releases, we did not attempt to normalize releases, but instead
compared each matched pair’s trends in aggregate releases over time.
359
The role of third-party certification in bolstering EMS effectiveness is not clear. EPA’s history
with Performance Track suggests that third-party certification may be important in assuring that an
EMS is fully functioning. EPA added a requirement for third-party EMS certification to Performance Track in 2004 after finding deficiencies in EMSs that lacked such certification. See EPA,
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM REVISION OF EMS ENTRY CRITERION 1 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). However, some academic research questions whether third-party certification makes much difference. See, e.g., Haitao Yin & Peter J.
Schmeidler, Does ISO 14001 Certification Enhance Environmental Performance? — Conditions
Under Which Environmental Performance Improvement Occurs 6, 9 (Wharton Risk Ctr. Working
Paper 07-07, Sept. 2007).
360
Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 89 tbl.3.
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Having matched facilities as best we could, we next interviewed environmental managers at each of the ten plants.361 As expected, given our matching
process, no significant differences emerged in the interviews in terms of managers’ perceptions of the external factors shaping their environmental practices.362 Economic pressures came up only infrequently in both sets of
interviews and did not appear to explain facilities’ environmental practices or
decisions about whether to participate in Performance Track.363 Social pressures
appeared to affect Performance Track members and their matched facilities
similarly, as respondents at both types of facilities claimed to have developed
good relationships with their local communities.364 All of the managers viewed
regulatory requirements as non-negotiable. “It’s basically the rule of the land,”
explained one Performance Track manager. A matching plant manager agreed:
“You just can’t afford not to pay attention to [the regulations].”365 Nevertheless, managers at both types of facilities also expressed frustration with what
they perceived as irrational demands of regulation.366
Despite the lack of significant differences in the ways Performance Track
and non-Performance Track facilities perceived and responded to external factors, the managers did express three types of differences in their responses concerning internal factors.367 The first difference emerged in the reported level of
support that managers received from their superiors in pursuing participation in
voluntary programs like Performance Track.368 Managers of Performance Track
facilities indicated that their bosses strongly supported participation in a voluntary environmental program. One reported that her manager had actually suggested joining, while another noted that when he proposed joining his boss
“backed [him] up.”369 In contrast, managers of the matching facilities reported
that their bosses had little enthusiasm for joining a voluntary program. When
asked whether agency recognition would matter to their bosses, their responses
were, at best, measured. As one respondent said: “Sure [management] would
care, but it’s a matter of degree. How much would they care?”370
Not surprisingly, these differing perceptions of management support translated into different calculations about the costs and benefits of participating in
361
These interviews were taped and later transcribed. Id. at 89. Transcripts were reviewed and
carefully coded for both external factors and internal factors that interviewees perceived to have
influenced their environmental management decisions in general, and their facilities’ participation
or non-participation in Performance Track specifically. External factors included customer preferences, community pressures, and regulatory demands. Internal factors included management incentives, organizational identity, and self-monitoring behavior. A research assistant unaware of
which facilities were Performance Track plants also coded the interviews and helped in their analysis. See id. at 90 for a more complete discussion of the interviews.
362
Id. at 91.
363
Id.
364
Id. at 91–92.
365
Id.
366
Id.
367
Id. at 92.
368
This was despite the fact that the formal structures within each company were largely similar.
A majority of the matching plants were part of larger corporations. Id. at 93.
369
Id.
370
Id. at 94.
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Performance Track. For the managers at Performance Track facilities, joining
the program was often an “easy decision” because they were already fulfilling
most of the requirements and had an EMS in place.371 The matching facilities
also appeared eligible, but in contrast, their managers viewed joining as more
costly. “You just can’t do everything,” one matching facility manager explained.372 Given that their bosses appeared to find little value in Performance
Track, this perception was probably reasonable. Relative to other priorities,
these managers saw the requirements of Performance Track and other voluntary
programs as distracting from their main focus, which they described as running
their businesses as efficiently and safely as possible.
The second difference suggested by the interviews came in managers’ expressions of their facilities’ organizational identity with environmental protection. Performance Track managers portrayed their businesses as giving high
priority to environmental issues. One Performance Track facility’s manager
spoke of a “mindset of [environmental] excellence” at her plant.373 She and
other Performance Track interviewees sought out opportunities to engage with
their communities in ways that communicated an environmental ethic.374 Another Performance Track facility’s manager sought to recover from a “tainted
past” beset by environmental problems: “We just thought that this would be
another good way to promote ourselves as being environmentally aware and
conscious.”375
By contrast, matching facility managers’ statements were less effusive
about environmental protection and were more pragmatic, treating environmental performance as only one of many important priorities. They emphasized
“doing the right thing” in terms of regulatory compliance, making good business decisions, and avoiding accidents.376 Environmental management was, for
their organization, just an important facet of sound business management practices.377 They noted that an environmental problem at the facility would be
costly and time-consuming; it was important from a business perspective to
stay attuned to environmental concerns and avoid problems that could result in
fines or jeopardize sales or production schedules. Considered from such a practical perspective, joining a voluntary environmental program was not worth
doing. It was better simply to make sure everything was in order when it came
to environmental matters. For the matching plants, their identity was tied to
achieving tangible results rather than seeking external recognition and validation for a strong environmental ethos.378
The third striking difference between the Performance Track and matched
facilities lay in the Performance Track facilities’ propensity to make outward

371

Id.
Id.
373
Id. at 95.
374
Id.
375
Id.
376
Id.
377
Id.
378
Id. at 95–96.
372
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displays of their behavior in ways that would be appealing to others — a characteristic called “self-monitoring of expressive behavior”379 but which might
also be called “organizational extroversion.” Performance Track facility managers were eager to interact with regulators and community groups, and they
spoke about how much these relationships meant to them. They talked about
Performance Track membership as “advertising” that would appeal to a variety
of constituencies. They saw a direct benefit from what they perceived as their
ability to use Performance Track participation to build more trusting relationships with regulators and community leaders. If a minor compliance issue
should ever arise, they reasoned that they could deal with it openly and amicably since they had taken steps to build trusting external relationships.380
In contrast, matched facility managers sought recognition from customers
but displayed little interest in convincing regulators, environmental groups, or
community organizations of their environmental friendliness.381 In general,
these managers disparaged efforts to appear environmentally conscious to external interest groups, viewing such an undertaking as costly in terms of opportunities to get other business done.382 While Performance Track facility
managers spoke of an open attitude toward regulators, matching facility managers were much more circumspect and viewed EPA’s expressed desire to forge a
“partnership” as misguided. Matching facility managers looked to government
to offer a clear set of minimum standards for their environmental operations,
not gestures of cooperation.383
The findings that emerged from the matched facility study suggest that,
more than anything else, Performance Track facilities differed from non-participating organizations in their internal organizational dispositions toward environmental rhetoric as well as outward and voluntary participation in public
programs. In other words, what made the Performance Track facilities stand
apart, it seemed, had more to do with factors inside these facilities. Of course,
the matched case study could by no means prove to be definitive, nor was it
exhaustive in testing all the factors that could explain beyond-compliance behavior. But its research design, distinctive in the literature in its matching of
participants with nonparticipants, provides a basis for surmising that internal
factors help explain businesses’ willingness to participate in voluntary programs.384 When it comes to joining Performance Track, these salient internal
factors included the internal rewards managers reaped, the importance of environmental excellence to their organizations’ identities, and their organizations’
propensity toward outward engagement.385
379
Mark Snyder, Self-Monitoring of Expressive Behavior, 30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
526, 526 (1974). For a development of the self-monitoring concept in organizational settings, see
Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 83–84.
380
See Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 96.
381
See id.
382
See id.
383
Id. at 97.
384
This conclusion is consistent with other research on firms’ compliance and beyond-compliance
behavior. See, e.g., GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 53; Kagan, supra note 55, at 31.
385
See infra Part II.D.
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To the question of what Performance Track truly tracked, then, the findings from the matched case studies suggest that EPA drew into its program
those facilities that sought out government recognition and emphasized the importance of maintaining good public relations. These were the more extroverted
facilities, not necessarily the top environmental performers. Indeed the research
underlying the matched facility study uncovered no significant differences in
these facilities’ environmental performance or their commitment to responsible
environmental management. Instead, the matched case studies revealed that
Performance Track facilities saw value in telling others (including us, when we
sought to interview them) about their good environmental citizenship, while the
non-participating plants were more inward-focused and cautious in their interactions with outsiders.
2. Survey of Performance Track Members and Non-Members
The matched facility study provided an in-depth look at a small but carefully controlled sample of facilities. To examine the characteristics that distinguished Performance Track facilities more generally, we developed an in-depth
survey and sent it to a sample of 3,346 facilities.386 The sample included every
facility that had applied to Performance Track since the program’s inception in
2000, as well as a random selection of facilities from the chemical, pulp and
paper, transportation, and electronics sectors — four sectors with large numbers of Performance Track members.387 The survey findings support what we
learned from the matched facility study, namely that Performance Track facilities are distinctive by virtue of their interest in reaching out to and engaging
with others.
When comparing survey responses from Performance Track facilities with
responses from facilities that did not apply, several differences emerged.388
More Performance Track applicants sold their products directly to consumers
(and fewer sold to intermediary organizations), making them more likely to be
connected with and visible to the public.389 Performance Track applicants also

386
See Jonathan Borck, Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Why Do They Join? An Exploration of
Business Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programs, in BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra
note 10, at 79.
387
See id. at 55–60.
388
See id. at 55–56. The Performance Track sample included all facilities that had applied to
Performance Track, not merely those that were accepted. We received completed responses from
678 facilities: 153 from Performance Track applicants and 525 from the random sample from four
SIC codes, which included some Performance Track facilities. Of the Performance Track sample,
14% of the surveys were returned by the post office as undeliverable. Of the random sample, 26%
of the surveys were undeliverable. Thus, the response rate from surveys that were delivered was
33% for the Performance Track sample and 21% for the random sample. These response rates are
consistent with much academic survey research, and, based on several tests, the respondents did
not differ substantially from what is known about facilities in these sectors overall. Id. at 59.
389
Results reported here are differences in means that proved statistically significant using standard tests.
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tended to have more employees, but fewer environmental permits and legal
obligations.390 These characteristics are summarized in Table 5, below.
TABLE 5. CHARACTERISTICS

OF

SURVEYED FACILITIES391

PT facilities

Non-PT facilities

n

Value

Value

n

p-value
of t-test

Percent publicly traded

182

50.0

45.8

491

0.336

Percent privately held

182

40.1

53.6

491

0.002

Percent government

182

9.3

0.6

491

0.000

Percent non-profit

182

0.6

0.0

491

0.000

Age of facility (mean)

177

46.9

39.0

486

0.260

Age of facility (median)

177

30.0

30.0

486

n.a.

Annual sales (mean)

88

1.7E+09

8.91E+08

293

0.246

Annual sales (median)

88

1.0E+08

8.00E+07

293

n.a.

Total Full-Time Equivalent employees
(“FTEs”) (mean)

177

956.0

592.9

488

0.000

Total FTEs (median)

177

450.0

252.2

488

n.a.

FTEs in environment (mean)

174

6.7

3.2

488

0.065

FTEs in environment (median)

174

2.0

1.5

488

n.a.

Percent of facilities that sell product
directly to consumers

157

22.9

10.0

468

0.000

Percent of facilities that sell product
to intermediaries

157

36.9

62.4

468

0.000

Percent of facilities that sell product
to both

157

40.1

27.6

468

0.003

Percent of facilities owned by a
parent company

178

86.5

84.9

490

0.602

Number of permits and legal
obligations (maximum of 5)

179

3.2

3.6

495

0.000

390

See Borck, Coglianese & Nash, supra note 386, at 60.
Id. at 61 tbl.3.1. This Table compares means of the variables between Performance Track
applicants and facilities that never applied, reporting the results of t-tests of the equality of these
means by showing the probability that the means are equal (the p-value of the test). Id. at 60.
391
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AND

PERCEPTIONS

PT facilities

OF
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FACILITIES392

Non-PT facilities

n

Value

Value

n

p-value
of t-test

Top-level management support for
voluntary programs

181

4.6

3.7

492

0.000

Level of human resources compared to
other facilities

179

2.9

2.5

483

0.000

Frequency of seeking opinions from
community or environmental advocacy
groups

180

3.1

2.3

491

0.000

Importance of government recognition

181

3.8

3.0

491

0.000

Percent aware of new, proposed
environmental regulation

179

63.1

60.7

489

0.575

Likelihood of stringent regulation in
the future

181

3.5

3.6

493

0.218

Consistent with the findings from the matched case studies, the survey
revealed that Performance Track applicants were substantially more likely to
report top-level management support for participating in voluntary programs as
well as higher overall levels of human resources available in the Performance
Track plants (see Table 6, above). Also consistent with the findings from the
matched facilities, Performance Track applicants reported that they sought out
the opinions of community and environmental advocacy groups more frequently and placed significantly greater importance on recognition from
government.
Performance Track applicants also reported being more highly influenced
by corporate headquarters than those that had not applied to the program, as
shown in Table 7, below. They also reported being more influenced by environmental advocacy groups. Somewhat surprisingly, non-Performance Track plants
perceived government as being more influential than those that had applied to
the program. However, Performance Track applicants and facilities showed no
significant differences in their awareness of new or impending environmental
regulations that would affect their operations.
Additionally, the survey asked respondents to rate the importance of benefits from participating in Performance Track and other voluntary programs. For
the most part, Performance Track applicants and those that had never applied to
the program ranked these benefits about the same. However, perceptions diverged with respect to two benefits. The Performance Track applicants ranked

392

Id. at 61 tbl.3.1.
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TABLE 7. IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS INFLUENCES ON
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF FACILITIES393
PT facilities

Non-PT facilities

n

Value

Value

n

p-value
of t-test

Headquarters

180

4.14

3.86

489

0.003

Competitors

179

2.54

2.47

490

0.493

Customers

179

3.78

3.72

491

0.532

Suppliers

177

2.80

2.83

491

0.757

Shareholders

164

3.32

3.21

446

0.389

Government agencies

178

4.20

4.40

491

0.011

Environmental advocacy groups

175

2.91

2.55

489

0.000

Community groups

178

3.15

2.99

490

0.107

TABLE 8. IMPORTANCE OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF
PARTICIPATING IN VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS394
PT facilities

Non-PT facilities

n

Value

Value

n

p-value
of t-test

Exempt from inspections

182

3.23

3.22

488

0.885

Report information less frequently

182

3.42

3.51

489

0.269

Flexibility to manage environmental
issues

181

3.86

3.77

487

0.243

Recognition as top performer

180

4.19

3.58

488

0.000

Shortens time for permit approval

180

3.70

3.80

488

0.352

Helps if compliance problem

181

3.88

3.96

485

0.270

Single point of contact with regulator

181

3.58

3.45

488

0.162

Boosts employee morale

180

3.50

3.00

483

0.032

recognition as a top performer and employee morale as much more important
than the non-Performance Track facilities (see Table 8, above). As for perceptions of costs, Performance Track applicants viewed different types of costs as
much less important than did the non-Performance Track plants. As shown in
Table 9, below, Performance Track applicants were much less concerned about
the costs associated with completing the paperwork required to join or the fact
that membership might take away from time available for other work.

393
394

Id. at 62 tbl.3.3.
Id. at 62 tbl.3.4.
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As shown in Table 10, below, Performance Track applicants rated their
own environmental performance more highly than non-participants and reported engaging in more beyond-compliance behavior. Non-applicants also
tended to rate their environmental performance as above average (4.2 on a 5point scale), but not to the same degree as program applicants (who scored 4.6).
Those that had applied to Performance Track were also dramatically more
likely to be members of other voluntary programs.
TABLE 9. IMPORTANCE OF POTENTIAL COSTS OF
PARTICIPATING IN VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS395
PT facilities

Non-PT facilities

n

Value

Value

n

p-value
of t-test

Paperwork takes time

180

3.02

3.44

489

0.000

Takes time away from other work

180

3.09

3.49

489

0.000

Information available to others

181

2.61

3.12

489

0.000

Government scrutinizes more closely

179

2.55

3.24

488

0.000

Top management has other priorities

179

2.85

3.34

486

0.000

Benefits do not outweigh costs

178

3.27

3.78

483

0.000

TABLE 10. PARTICIPATION IN OTHER VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS
PERCEPTIONS OF BEYOND-COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR396
PT facilities

Non-PT facilities

AND

n

Value

Value

n

p-value
of t-test

Percent active in one of six listed
voluntary programs other than
Performance Track

175

57.7

15.5

484

0.000

Percent active in any voluntary
program other than Performance Track

182

75.3

31.3

496

0.000

Total areas beyond compliance
(maximum of nine)

181

4.7

3.4

495

0.000

Environmental performance compared
to others

181

4.6

4.2

495

0.000

395
396

Id. at 63 tbl.3.5.
Id.
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D. Summary and Implications
In the past, researchers have tended to emphasize pressures from outside
the firm — such as community, economic, and legal pressures — to explain
why businesses comply with the law or, more notably, go beyond compliance
with the law.397 We find support for these outside factors, but more significantly, we find considerable support for the proposition that internal factors and
dispositions are also important variables.
Managers at facilities that joined Performance Track appear to have enjoyed substantial top-level support for participation in this voluntary program.
They perceived that participating would complement their organization’s identity in that, to quote Performance Track facility managers, joining was “easy”
and they were already doing what the program expected.398 The higher level of
internal support for environmental activities among Performance Track applicants, and the perception that top management was less likely to have other
priorities, showed up both in the matched pairs of case studies and in the survey
results. Performance Track facilities were also more likely to report a tendency
to seek outside opinions from community and environmental groups than were
non-member facilities. Performance Track plants appeared more connected to
the public and placed greater importance on the views of external groups.
While it is difficult to show direct causation, based on our survey and case
studies, we have found that organizations with some reason to “seek out” the
opinions of outsiders were also more attracted to the idea of participating in
some kind of voluntary environmental effort.399
Performance Track facilities valued government recognition and were
much less concerned about the costs of participating in voluntary initiatives.
These organizational “extroverts” tended to take part in a spectrum of voluntary activities. However, they simply could not be shown to be “models of a
higher level of environmental achievement” as professed by EPA.400 While Performance Track members are not necessarily the strongest environmental performers, they appear to have been generally strongest in their desire for public
recognition. Of course, if it were not for opportunity costs and scarcity of governmental resources, there would presumably be nothing inherently wrong with
EPA engaging with firms that value the agency’s attention and appreciation.
Yet, if the experience with Performance Track is true with respect to other EPA
programs, additional effort to recognize and reward beyond-compliance behavior through a program structured like Performance Track would seem to be on
the wrong track, at least if the aim is to identify and reward “top” performers.

397

Id. at 53; GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 53, at 20–22.
BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 10, at 5–6.
399
Id.
400
Fiorino, supra note 144, at 9 (quoting former EPA Administrator Carol Browner).
398
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PERFORMANCE TRACK’S IMPACT

We have shown that Performance Track did not necessarily attract the
types of facilities that EPA had in mind when it launched the program. The
businesses that participated in Performance Track could not be shown to be
“environmental leaders.” Indeed, nothing in the design or EPA’s evaluation of
the program enabled the agency to determine that the program in fact recognized top environmental performers within any industrial sector.401 We now
turn to consider another aspect of the Performance Track model. In contrast
with our focus in Part II on understanding which businesses decided to join
Performance Track and why, we now focus in Part III on the extent of the
program’s appeal and, by extension, its impact on industrial practices and environmental quality.
Recall that EPA set as its goal to have Performance Track shift the environmental “performance curve” throughout the nation.402 Both EPA and states
that have developed similar Performance Track programs have maintained that
these programs contribute uniquely and significantly to environmental protection — e.g., by “stretching the boundaries of innovation and performance”403 at
EPA, creating “a healthier, cleaner environment,”404 “transform[ing] the way
that government and industry address environmental issues and solve
problems,”405 and “delivering measureable results.”406 If these programs do encourage firms to improve their environmental performance in order to reap the
recognition and rewards the programs offer, do they really deliver on the promise of substantial, if not pervasive, change in the nation’s environmental
quality?
In order to change behavior and affect environmental conditions in a significant way, EPA officials recognized that Performance Track’s membership
needed to grow.407 Indeed, having heard EPA officials who oversaw Performance Track speak at numerous public meetings over the years, we think it is fair
to say that they fixated on increasing membership throughout the program’s
history. Performance Track had to engage or at least affect significant numbers
of regulated entities if it were to become anything other than a marginal environmental program.408 Continuous, rapid growth was always an objective of
Performance Track’s managers, who set a goal of increasing the ratio of pro401

See supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
403
Browner Remarks, supra note 138.
404
Id.
405
TODAY’S COMMITMENTS, supra note 152, at 31.
406
BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, supra note 141, at 3.
407
See EPA, 2005 RECRUITMENT STRATEGY: NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK 1
(Feb. 9, 2005 Draft) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (stating that in 2004, Performance Track sent “letters from [Administrator] Leavitt to CEO’s [sic] of 18 major companies,
urging them to encourage their facilities to join the program”).
408
See David W. Case, The EPA’s HPV Challenge Program: A Tort Liability Trap?, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 147, 198 (2005) (“Minimal participation rates are among explanations offered as to
why past EPA voluntary programs disappoint both in terms of results and impact.”).
402
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gram applicants to program members by 25% each year — all while increasing
overall membership.409 Membership growth was essential, they claimed, because “[t]he more organizations that are engaged in the search for continuous
improvement, the more [that can be achieved] in terms of environmental results and effective partnerships.”410 Indeed, consistently low participation rates
in similar initiatives are a fundamental concern about voluntary environmental
programs more generally, because they contribute to a “perception that EPA
voluntary programs are largely insignificant and ultimately ineffectual.”411 Voluntary initiatives with few members are viewed as “suspect” and “likely [to]
have no more than a marginal impact on basic environmental problems.”412
It is difficult to imagine a program like Performance Track leading to a
new generation of environmental protection with only about 500 participating
members at any given time, particularly since a surprising number of these
members were either federal post offices or facilities within just a few major
companies like Johnson & Johnson.413 Compared with all of the facilities generating pollution in the country, Performance Track members represented just the
tiniest fraction of the nation’s environmental footprint.414 Only half of Performance Track’s members were subject to environmental permitting requirements,415 but treating the roughly 700,000 facilities in the United States that are
subject to such permit requirements as an approximate universe of potential
members, Performance Track attracted less than 0.1% of its membership
pool.416 Obviously, the fraction of the true universe of potential members — all
facilities impacting the environment including those without any permits —
would be even smaller.
Even among businesses that took a systematically proactive environmental
posture, Performance Track facilities still constituted only a small percentage.
For example, in 2007 about 5,460 facilities in the United States were certified
to ISO 14001’s EMS standards.417 Performance Track membership amounted to
less than 10% of that group, notwithstanding the fact that Performance Track’s
409

RAND CORP. ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 20. Rapid growth has also been a fixation of
those responsible for running OSHA’s VPP. GAO reported in 2004 that OSHA planned to increase
the program eight-fold, from 1,000 to 8,000 worksites. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 344, at 3. In 2003, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA gave each OSHA region
a target for new VPP approvals. Membership subsequently doubled in the period from 2003 to
2008. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 265, at 10–11.
410
TODAY’S COMMITMENTS, supra note 152, at 31.
411
Case, supra note 408, at 198.
412
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1286 (1995).
413
PTrack Member Data, supra note 10; see also supra note 10.
414
Cf. Wyeth, supra note 50, at 63 (“Although the number of participants in such programs continues to grow, the programs still enroll only a tiny percentage of regulated organizations.”).
415
See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
416
See Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO), EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.
edu/0g6AUdPUjs5. As a point of comparison, OSHA’s VPP membership of approximately 2,300
worksites represents only about 0.03% of the more than eight million worksites in the United
States. Commonly Used Statistics, OSHA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0DZwiq1L2V2.
417
INT’L ORG. OF STANDARDIZATION, THE ISO SURVEY – 2007 25 (2008), available at http://
perma.cc/D994-LBKW.
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membership requirements overlapped substantially with the ISO 14001’s
standards.418
Despite extensive efforts by EPA officials to recruit new members
throughout the program’s history, membership growth was generally quite
slow. In the next Section, we document that slow growth and explain — by
comparing membership in Performance Track with membership in other federal
and state voluntary environmental programs — why Performance Track was
destined to attract only the most modest level of participation and, by extension, to have only the most modest overall impact on the nation’s environmental
quality.
A. Performance Track Membership
Performance Track started off with a burst of interest, by comparison with
later years: 227 facilities joined Performance Track in the initial “Charter
Round” in December 2000.419 Subsequently, however, membership grew by
less than forty facilities annually through 2009,420 notwithstanding an active
recruitment process on EPA’s part.
When EPA launched Performance Track in 2000, agency officials contacted firms that already participated in other EPA voluntary programs and encouraged them to consider joining Performance Track.421 EPA officials used a
“two-pronged” approach to recruitment: contacting facilities that were already
likely to qualify for membership, and working through various professional
associations to identify facilities that might have an interest in participating.422
They also worked with facilities that expressed interest in joining but did not
meet entry criteria in an effort to understand what these facilities would need to
do to qualify in the future. The program accepted applicants twice yearly, in the
spring and fall.423
Since environmental management systems were a key prerequisite of
membership in Performance Track, EPA staff looked for potential applicants
that had those systems in place.424 Officials routinely contacted facilities that
met ISO 14001 standards for environmental management systems.425 Before

418

See PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 (listing 539 Performance Track members in 2007); QMI-SAI GLOBAL, ISO 14001 AND U.S. EPA PERFORMANCE
TRACK PROGRAM, available at http://perma.cc/4C6G-HNHH (comparing ISO 14001 and Performance Track membership).
419
PTrack Member Data, supra note 10.
420
See PERFORMANCE TRACK FINAL PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 (charting Performance
Track’s membership statistics from 2000–2008).
421
Interview with John Foster, Manager of Performance Track Recruiting, EPA (Aug. 14, 2007).
422
EPA, RECRUITER’S HANDBOOK 12 (2001) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
423
EPA, AIMING HIGH HAS ITS REWARDS: IS YOUR ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE BEING RECOGNIZED? 5 (2008).
424
Interview with John Foster, supra note 421.
425
Id.
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each application round, EPA staff sent each such facility a postcard announcing
the open enrollment period and followed up with a telephone call.426
EPA staff also engaged in outreach through trade associations and visits to
trade shows and conventions, often at the invitation of trade associations seeking to encourage member companies to improve their EMSs.427 For example,
Performance Track managers attended conferences for various groups, such as:
the Air and Waste Management Association; the National Association of Environmental Engineers; the Semiconductor Environment, Safety, and Health Association; and the American Society for Quality.428 They distributed
information about Performance Track at these meetings and subsequently followed up with contacts they met.429
EPA officials offered assistance to potential applicants through several
programs and information sources. For instance, facilities that were interested
in developing and implementing EMSs could also obtain guidance from state
programs listed in EPA’s National Directory of EMS Technical Assistance
Providers.430 Similar technical assistance resources were made available on an
industry-sector basis.431 Finally, several states — such as Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia — developed programs and initiatives
similar to Performance Track through which facilities could obtain assistance in
improving their environmental performance and EMSs.432 EPA saw many of
these state programs as “feeders” for the federal Performance Track program.
Once admitted into Performance Track, a facility’s membership under normal circumstances lasted three years, at which time it had to reapply to remain
in the program.433 Over 200 facilities left the program over the years, whether
as a result of closure or sale, failure to meet program requirements, or voluntary
reasons.434 Table 11 and Figure 2, below, show movement in and out of the
program during the years of its existence.

426

Id.
Id.
428
Id.
429
Id.
430
Technical Assistance, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/U6KU-WV29.
431
Environmental Management Systems, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/3FTL-5RKZ.
432
Borck, Coglianese & Nash, supra note 25, at 785, 798.
433
PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 56, at 9.
434
PTrack Member Data, supra note 10.
427
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TABLE 11. PERFORMANCE TRACK MEMBERSHIP TRENDS435

Year

Applied

Admitted

EPA
Asked to
Leave/Did
Not
Accept
Renewal

2000

254

227

0

2001

33

25

1

0

251

10%

2002

78

55

13

11

282

11%

2003

94

62

15

18

311

9%

2004

95

58

15

56

298

−4%

2005

115

93

7

14

370

19%

2006

115

69

8

14

417

11%

2007

201

152

7

24

538

22%

2008

52

42

16

17

547

2%

Totals

1044

783

82

154

547

Voluntarily
Left

0

FIGURE 2. FACILITIES APPLYING, ADMITTED,

435

Annual
Total
Membership
Membership
Change
227

AND

Id. Note that no application date was given for seven applications.

LEAVING
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The largest membership loss occurred in 2004, when membership terms
expired for the facilities that had joined Performance Track in the initial Charter
Round.436 Of the over 200 charter members, approximately 25% chose not to
reapply.437 While 2004 was the year when the greatest membership loss occurred, the program suffered significant attrition in every year after 2001.438
Although net membership increased in every year except 2004, steady membership loss impeded the program’s overall growth.
The reason cited most frequently by managers for withdrawing from the
program (or simply not renewing) was the closure, sale, or reorganization of
their facility.439 A significant number of departing members also found the program’s reporting requirements burdensome or failed to find that the program
delivered meaningful value to the business.440 Figure 3, below, illustrates the
main reasons facilities gave EPA for leaving Performance Track.
FIGURE 3. REASONS FACILITIES GAVE

436

FOR

LEAVING

OR

NOT RE-ENROLLING441

Nash & Coglianese, supra note 10, at 19.
Id.
438
Id. As a point of comparison, 979 worksites have voluntarily left VPP since its inception.
OSHA, Voluntary Withdrawals – CY 1982–2013 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
439
Nash & Coglianese, supra note 10, at 19.
440
Id. at 19–20.
441
Id. at 20.
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EPA asked forty-nine facilities either to leave or not re-enroll in Performance Track.442 Most often, EPA’s reason for asking a facility to leave or not
continue had to do with the facility manager’s failure to submit an annual report, a program requirement. Deficiency in a facility’s environmental management system was the second most common reason EPA ended a facility’s
membership.443 EPA also asked facilities to leave because they were found in
non-compliance with environmental regulations or had problems with their
commitments.444 Figure 4, below, summarizes the reasons EPA asked facilities
not to continue.
FIGURE 4. REASONS CITED BY EPA FOR ASKING FACILITIES
TO LEAVE OR NOT RE-ENROLL445

442
Id. at 19. Again, for a point of comparison, we note that over its history OSHA has asked only
twenty-two worksites to leave its VPP. See OSHA, Number of Sites Asked to Leave (Terminated)
from VPP – CY 1982–2013 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
443
See OSHA, supra note 442.
444
Nash & Coglianese, supra note 10, at 19, 21.
445
Id. at 21.
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EPA surveyed Performance Track members in 2004 and 2006 to gauge
members’ satisfaction with the program.446 In both cases, the survey received
strong response rates: 73% and 76%, respectively.447 In the 2004 survey, members’ most important reason for joining and staying in the program was to enjoy
“a collaborative/amicable relationship with EPA and State agencies.”448 While
members wanted to see the program’s regulatory incentives expanded, those
incentives were not their primary reason for joining.449 Overall, members said
that they wanted EPA to publicize their Performance Track memberships more
robustly so that local communities were more aware of their status as environmental leaders.450
The 2006 survey found that most members were “generally satisfied”
with Performance Track, believing that they “receive[d] as much or more business value than the costs of the program.”451 According to the respondents, the
program’s greatest value derived from “public awareness, opportunities to improve environmental performance, and an improved, more collaborative relationship” with EPA.452 In 2006, as in 2004, survey respondents generally said
that they did not join Performance Track on account of the incentives EPA
offered.453 However, members indicated that they would have liked in the future
to see membership benefits increase and the transaction costs associated with
membership decrease.454
B. Why Performance Track Membership Was Destined to Remain Small
As noted, Performance Track’s membership represented only a small fraction of eligible facilities.455 In this respect, Performance Track was little different from many of EPA’s voluntary programs. However, participation levels
across different programs have varied, with some garnering higher membership
levels than Performance Track and some garnering lower levels. Although the
total number of EPA voluntary programs is too small for econometric analysis,
we can still take a closer look at the variation in membership across programs
to see what might explain different membership levels. In this Section, we explore the relationships between the design of voluntary environmental programs and levels of participation, with the aim of developing an explanation for
why EPA struggled to make Performance Track larger. We first consider how
Performance Track membership compared with participation in the 33/50 Pro446

ABT ASSOC. INC., RESULTS OF 2004 PERFORMANCE TRACK CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY
(2005) [hereinafter 2004 SURVEY] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); 2006 SURVEY,
supra note 209.
447
See 2004 SURVEY, supra note 446, at 1; 2006 SURVEY, supra note 209, at 5.
448
2004 SURVEY, supra note 446, at 1.
449
Id.
450
Id.
451
2006 SURVEY, supra note 209, at 2.
452
Id.
453
Id.
454
Id.
455
See supra notes 416–422 and accompanying text.
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gram and Project XL, EPA’s most-studied voluntary environmental programs.
We then compare the design of twenty-nine additional voluntary partnership
programs run by EPA with their corresponding rates of participation. Finally,
we consider the relationship between program design and participation levels
by reviewing state programs similar to Performance Track.
1. The Participation Paradox: The Inverse Relationship Between
Rewards and Participation
Like Performance Track, all the programs we examine in this Section were
voluntary partnership programs, a distinct type of voluntary environmental program. In a voluntary partnership program, the regulatory agency develops
membership criteria and a process for firms to apply to be members.456 Members receive some benefit in exchange for committing to a certain course of
action.457 Across all of the voluntary partnership programs of which we are
aware, we find a clear, inverse relationship between participation and program
rewards. That is, membership levels decline as program rewards increase. Why
would this be so? After all, should not greater rewards induce still greater levels
of participation?
The inverse relationship between rewards and participation may seem paradoxical at first glance. However, the explanation for this relationship is actually quite simple. As agencies move to increase rewards they also increase the
stringency of entry criteria and membership requirements, effectively chilling
facilities’ interest in participating. The evidence we present in this Section suggests that businesses are much more sensitive to the costs of participation in
voluntary environmental partnerships, and even modest increases in the transaction costs associated with becoming a member will more than offset any increased incentive that additional rewards might provide.
Moreover, the incentives facing government officials lead them to match
any increase in rewards with increases in membership stringency and scrutiny.
When government officials grant a facility a reward, especially when that reward amounts to a “seal of approval” from the government, the relationship
between government and business becomes similar to that between any principal and its agent. Just as principals worry that agents will shirk or otherwise
abuse the authority that principals have granted them, government officials also
must worry that the businesses they reward will come to shirk or otherwise
retreat from their commitment to act in an environmentally responsible manner.
They must worry because government officials work in a political environment
in which they face pressures both from Congress and from interest group representatives who stand ready, in turn, to pressure members of Congress.
In the context of environmental policy, the existence of a cadre of wellorganized environmental groups in Washington, D.C. means that government
456
Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Paradox of Voluntary Environmental Partnerships: Information and Incentives for Participation, in BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 10, at 107.
457
Id.
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officials who seek to “reward” the businesses they are charged with regulating
can expect to be watched carefully. An example from Performance Track
reveals the kind of interest group scrutiny government officials can and do expect in developing voluntary programs. In 2005, EPA published a notice in the
Federal Register requesting public comment on its proposal to expand the benefits offered to Performance Track members.458 In comments to EPA, an attorney from the NRDC objected to proposed benefits that would reduce
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting for Performance Track members and
shrink the level of EPA and state environmental agency oversight.459 The Environmental Integrity Project (“EIP”), a non-profit organization dedicated to
stronger enforcement of federal and state environmental laws, similarly called
on EPA to step back from “ever more ambitious regulatory breaks” for Performance Track members.460 Both NRDC and EIP raised the concern that Performance Track entry criteria failed to ensure that members demonstrated
sufficiently superior environmental performance to warrant regulatory benefits.461 In short, EPA’s attempt to increase benefits was met by calls from environmental advocacy groups to tighten program entry criteria.
The environmental groups largely succeeded in dissuading EPA from increasing Performance Track’s benefits. Before the program’s termination in
2009, EPA had finalized only modest changes in the benefits for Performance
Track members. Its most notable such effort occurred in April 2006, when the
agency published a rule allowing Performance Track facilities with secondary
containment facilities to apply for permission to self-inspect their hazardous
waste tanks only once a month, compared with mandatory daily or weekly inspections for non-Performance Track facilities.462 This benefit was relatively
meager, however, compared to those EPA originally outlined in its August 2005
request for comments.
2. Design and Participation in 33/50 and Project XL
To see how the participation paradox plays out, it is instructive to compare
Performance Track’s membership with the levels of participation in the agency’s
two widely studied voluntary initiatives: the 33/50 Program and Project XL.
Nearly 1,300 firms participated in 33/50 in the 1990s,463 while only about fifty

458
Description of Collaboration with the Environmental Council of the States Regarding National
Environmental Performance Track and State Performance-Based Environmental Leadership Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,921 (Aug. 4, 2005).
459
Letter from John Walke, supra note 27, at 3, 12.
460
Patricia Ware, Enforcement: Benefits of ‘Performance Track’ Program in Question, Environmental Group Says, 37 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 309 (Feb. 10, 2006).
461
Letter from John Walke, supra note 27, at 8–9; Letter from Eric Schaeffer, supra note 27, at
1–2.
462
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Burden Reduction Initiative, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,862,
16,881 (Apr. 4, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260, 261, 264, 265, 266, 268, 270, and 271).
463
EPA, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 4 (1999) [hereinafter 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL
RECORD], available at http://perma.cc/8E6V-V4ZH.
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facilities joined Project XL.464 Performance Track’s membership size falls between these two numbers. What might explain these different levels of participation? All three programs exhibited striking differences in their design that
had important implications for levels of participation.
EPA launched the 33/50 Program in early 1991.465 The program challenged
industry to achieve a 33% reduction in overall releases of seventeen toxic
chemicals by the end of 1992 and a 50% reduction by 1995 (compared to 1988
levels).466 To participate in the program, companies simply had to write EPA a
letter committing to reduce any amount of one or all of the seventeen targeted
chemicals against companies’ 1988 level of releases.467 Upon receipt of such a
letter, EPA sent the company a certificate of appreciation signed by the
Administrator.468
Commitments were in no way legally binding, and EPA encouraged companies to set their own goals and timeframes. Indeed, a notable proportion of
companies — up to 40% according to a 1995 evaluation commissioned by EPA
— received certificates even though EPA could not quantify any specific level
of reductions stated in their commitment letters.469 Furthermore, EPA made no
effort to ascertain whether individual companies followed through on the commitments they made. EPA actively invited companies to join the program, and
nearly 1,300 companies “participated” by sending in a commitment letter.470
In 1995, the Clinton Administration’s EPA launched a “reinventing regulation” initiative that went beyond the 33/50 program to create other voluntary
initiatives, such as Project XL, which sought to encourage “eXcellence and
Leadership” in environmental management.471 Through Project XL, EPA would
consider waiving virtually any regulatory requirement if a company could
demonstrate that doing so would enable it to achieve superior environmental
performance.472A team from EPA’s regional offices and headquarters was set up
to review proposals for such waivers. Successful proposals were required to
demonstrate improvements in environmental performance, reduce paperwork
and cost, involve outside constituencies, prevent pollution in multiple media,
establish measurable objectives, and broadly disseminate information.473 If EPA
deemed that a proposal met these criteria, then the applicant, regulators, and
participating community groups would negotiate a Final Project Agreement

464

EPA, PROJECT XL 2000 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT VOL. 2: DIRECTORY OF PROJECT EXPERIRESULTS 2 (2000), available at http://perma.cc/VVQ6-SDYS (noting that by the year
2000, a total of fifty-three projects were at various stages of development).
465
33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD, supra note 463, at 3.
466
Id. at 1.
467
EPA, THE 33/50 PROGRAM: FORGING AN ALLIANCE FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 1 (1992),
available at http://perma.cc/C6J-BKS4.
468
Id. at 4.
469
EPA, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD, supra note 463, at 7.
470
Id. at 4.
471
EPA, PROJECT XL 1999 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 1 (1999).
472
See EPA, PROJECT XL: FROM PILOT TO PRACTICE, A JOURNEY TO SYSTEM CHANGE 2–3, 10
(1999), available at http://perma.cc/R6P5-35G9.
473
Coglianese & Nash, supra note 456, at 105.
MENTS AND
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(“FPA”). EPA reserved the right to reject any agreement, even after all the
parties had agreed to the terms.474
Negotiation of final agreements often required thousands of hours.475 Developing Intel’s XL agreement, for example, required 100 meetings each lasting
four to six hours. EPA insisted that an essential component of any XL agreement was active engagement of community and environmental advocacy
groups, but involving these groups often raised new issues that required more
time to resolve. Only after EPA obtained approval of the agreement from a long
list of community and environmental groups would it begin the formal process
of waiving requirements: that is, issuing a site-specific rulemaking following
normal notice-and-comment procedures, including publication in the Federal
Register.476 EPA stopped receiving applications for XL projects in 2003. By that
time, only about fifty regulated entities were fully participating in Project
XL,477 considerably fewer than anticipated when the program was announced
eight years earlier.
Comparing the stringency of the requirements for entry into 33/50 and
Project XL with those for Performance Track suggests how the level of participation responds to the costs of entry. The entry requirements for all three programs varied considerably. They ranged from the minimal letter of general
commitment for 33/50, to the twenty-nine page application for Performance
Track,478 to an application process followed by an intensive multi-party negotiation followed by a site-specific rulemaking for Project XL. As the entry costs
increased across these programs, participation levels declined from over 1,300
companies in 33/50 to about 550 facilities in Performance Track to only about
fifty companies in Project XL.
3. Evidence from Other EPA Voluntary Partnership Programs
Although they are among the most prominent of EPA’s voluntary programs, the 33/50 Program, Project XL, and Performance Track are only three
such programs. EPA has run over sixty voluntary programs, ranging from educational programs, grants, competitive awards, product certifications, and voluntary partnerships.479 To investigate further the relationship between program
design and participation, we focused on EPA’s twenty-nine voluntary partnership programs. As described earlier, a partnership program involves some element of exchange or agreement between the applicant and the government.
When the applying member meets specified standards, the agency will provide
something in return. A full list of EPA’s voluntary partnership programs we
examined is provided in Table 12, below. Notwithstanding the actual names
EPA gave to these programs, each is a partnership program in the sense we
474

Id.
Id.
See Caballero, supra note 44, at 404–05.
477
Coglianese & Nash, supra note 456, at 105; MARCUS ET AL., supra note 44, at 195.
478
See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text (describing EPA’s sample application).
479
See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text; see also Coglianese & Nash, supra note 3, at 251.
475
476
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mean. Even the two programs in Table 12 labeled as “awards” programs were
also partnership programs as the “awards” were available to any qualified applicant and not limited or competitive.480
In late 2005, at the midpoint of Performance Track’s history, we gathered
official program documentation for each of the programs listed in Table 12.
Using these materials, we coded each program in terms of three characteristics:
stringency, benefits, and number of members. For the first two characteristics,
we separately coded every program and had a research assistant do the same.
On those occasions where we had differences in coding, we resolved them by
gathering more information and, in some cases, by contacting an EPA staff
person responsible for running that program.
The programs were coded on a three-point scale according to their entry
stringency. A rating of “1” (low stringency) only required submitting a brief
application and committing generally to voluntary action. A rating of “2” (medium stringency) required more of the applicant, such as submitting a description of a project or otherwise demonstrating a commitment. Programs rated “3”
(high stringency) also required such commitments and demonstrations, but also
involved EPA or a third party in screening and sometimes training applicants.
An example of a level “3” program is Performance Track.481
TABLE 12. NATIONAL EPA VOLUNTARY PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS482
Best Workplaces for Commuters
Climate Leaders
Coal Combustion Products Partnership
Combined Heat and Power Partnership
ENERGY STAR Business Improvement
Green Power Partnership
GreenScapes
High Production Volume Challenge
Indoor Air Quality Tools for Schools - Great Start Awards Program
Indoor Air Quality Tools for Schools - Leadership Awards Program
Labs 21
Landfill Methane Outreach Program
Methane to Markets Partnership
Mobile Air Conditioning Climate Protection Partnership
National Environmental Performance Track
National Partnership for Environmental Priorities
Natural Gas STAR Program
Partnership for Safe Water
Pesticide Environmental Stewardship Program
PFC Emission Reduction Partnerships
Plug-In to eCycling
SF-6 Emission Reduction Partnership for Electric Power Systems
SF-6 Emission Reduction Partnership for Magnesium Industry
SmartWay Transport Partnership
Sunwise School Program
Sustainable Futures
Voluntary Aluminum Industrial Partnership
Voluntary Children’s Chemical Evaluation Program
WasteWise

480

Coglianese & Nash, supra note 3, at 251.
Id. at 251, 253.
Id. at 252; Coglianese & Nash, supra note 456, at 109; see also List of Partnership Programs,
EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Ns1sBATeuU (including links for the Combined Health
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In addition to coding the programs based on their membership stringency,
we also coded them based on their benefits, again using the “1” (low), “2”
(medium), or “3” (high) rating system. Most voluntary programs have as their
primary benefit some type of public recognition. EPA lists members’ names on
its website, provides them with a plaque, logo, or certificate, grants them access
to technical assistance or educational materials, or offers a point of contact with
EPA. Since public recognition is the most common form of benefit, programs
that offered only public recognition were coded at the level of “2” or “medium.” Only one program offered no public recognition — the SunWise program, which does not even list participants on EPA’s website — so we rated it a
“1” or “low” for its level of benefits. A handful of programs (including Performance Track and Sustainable Futures) offered benefits exceeding the basic
package, in particular offering some form of regulatory relief. These programs
we rated a “3” (high) for the level of benefits.
Finally, we collected information on how many members participated in
each of these partnership programs. EPA’s website provided a list of participating members for most programs as of the end of October 2005.483 For those
programs that distinguished members based on their organization or sector
type, we aggregated members from across all categories and used the total
membership numbers.
We found, not surprisingly, a rough correlation between program stringency and benefits. A program like SunWise, for example, only required prospective members to complete a form indicating a desire to learn more about
protection from the sun’s ultraviolet rays. That completed form in turn entitled
the member to the most minimal of benefits: a packet of information from
EPA.484 By contrast, a program such as Sustainable Futures required days of
training and a significant commitment from product engineers to deviate from
familiar methods of product development. In return, it provided members with
expedited regulatory relief from testing protocols called for under the Toxic
Substances Control Act (“TSCA”).485 As Figure 5 shows, below, a few programs that appeared only to require a statement of commitment (low entry
stringency) offered medium benefits, but none offered a high level of benefits.
Similarly, the programs with high stringency also provided high levels of
benefits.

and Power Partnership program; ENERGY STAR Business Improvement program; Green Power
Partnership program; Indoor Air Quality Tools for Schools programs; Labs 21 program; Landfill
Methane Outreach Program; Mobile Air Conditioning Climate Protection Partnership program;
Natural Gas STAR program; SmartWay Transport Partnership program; Sunwise School Program;
and the Voluntary Aluminum Industrial Partnership program).
483
Coglianese & Nash, supra note 3, at 254.
484
See Join Sunwise, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0URE4GVKtnN.
485
Sustainable Futures: Voluntary Pilot Project Under the TSCA New Chemicals Program, 67
Fed. Reg. 76,284–90 (Dec. 11, 2002). Of course, as Figure 5 shows, the variation between entryrequirement stringency and program benefits was not great. More than half of the programs provided the “standard” package of program benefits and also provided a typical level of entry stringency (requiring both a commitment and some action on the part of members).
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PROGRAM BENEFITS486

In addition to the correspondence between entry stringency and program
benefits, we found that the degree of entry stringency appeared to be inversely
related to the number of members (see Figure 6, below).487 This finding was not
surprising given that one would expect fewer facilities to join a program that
imposed substantial requirements upon members. Even taking into account the
fact that some programs were older than others, we found a slightly downward
trend in the number of members in programs with greater entry stringency (see
Figure 6).488
Programs with high levels of benefits had few members, illustrating the
participation paradox described in Part III.B.1. SunWise, which offered virtually no benefits to members, boasted about 13,000 members.489 At the other
extreme, the Sustainable Futures program offered the potential for substantial
regulatory relief to qualifying firms, yet only eight firms had joined at the time
of our study.490
Between these extremes, the bulk of the programs were mostly middle of
the road in terms of both entry stringency and benefits. Program membership
also appeared to be mediocre. The median program had only about thirty-four
members per year (mean = 157, standard deviation = 495). Putting programs
with the largest and smallest memberships aside, the average program attracted
seventy-two members per year (standard deviation = 96).491
Admittedly, our measures of entry stringency and program benefits are not
very precise and, given the small sample size, we cannot control for other fac486

Coglianese & Nash, supra note 456, at 109.
Coglianese & Nash, supra note 3, at 254–55.
Id.
489
Id. at 255.
490
Benefits to Sustainable Futures Graduates, EPA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0PMesxp
T3MD. EPA considers two additional firms as graduates based on their participation in Project
XL. See also Coglianese & Nash, supra note 456, at 109–10 (describing the status of program
participation at the three-year mark).
491
Coglianese & Nash, supra note 3, at 255; see also Coglianese & Nash, supra note 456, at 110.
487
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tors that seem likely to affect variation in membership levels across partnership
programs. These factors include the size of the population of facilities that
could potentially meet membership criteria, potential members’ perceptions of
how federal or state regulatory actions might make participation more or less
advantageous, the degree to which other drivers such as liability might encourage (or discourage) the activities required by the program, the costs and
benefits of the actions required to join the program, and the degree to which
EPA has promoted the program and recruited members.492 However, the evidence collected appears consistent with the survey responses discussed in the
previous Part, which indicate that businesses are sensitive to the costs of entry
in voluntary programs — perhaps because they do not see the benefits of these
programs as being significant.493
4. State “Performance Track” Programs
We also looked to state environmental partnership programs for additional
evidence about the connection between program design features and membership. Over the past two decades, approximately twenty states have developed

492
493

Coglianese & Nash, supra note 3, at 256.
See supra notes 449–453 and accompanying text.
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programs with features very similar to Performance Track.494 We considered
what the patterns of membership across these programs could tell us about the
underlying prospects for making a program like Performance Track attractive to
many facilities nationwide.
Even though EPA terminated Performance Track, at least fifteen state programs remain currently active.495 These state programs offer a variety of benefits to facilities that meet explicit entry requirements, such as public
recognition, limited regulatory flexibility, or less frequent inspections.496 In order to qualify for these benefits, facilities typically must demonstrate compliance with environmental regulations, implement some form of an EMS, set
environmental performance goals that go beyond compliance, and agree to report progress toward those goals to agencies.497 In some cases, facilities must
also share performance information with surrounding communities.498
In eight states, these partnership programs consist of multiple “tiers” or
levels of participation, each with its own separate requirements and rewards.499
These state programs exhibit a membership pattern similar to what we have
observed across EPA’s voluntary programs. Program tiers that are the easiest to
join and offer minimal levels of benefits generally have the most members,
while program tiers that require the most action by facilities and offer the greatest rewards have the fewest members. For example, North Carolina’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative has three program tiers: Environmental Partner,
Rising Environmental Steward, and Environmental Steward.500
To join the Environmental Partner tier, a facility must establish environmental goals and commit to implementing an EMS. It must also agree to report
its progress in achieving its environmental goals to North Carolina’s Department of Environment and Natural Resources (“NCDENR”). In return, North
Carolina offers its Environmental Partners various kinds of recognition,
networking opportunities, help developing their EMSs, a single point of contact
within NCDENR, and the opportunity to be paired with an Environmental
Steward facility as a mentor.501
Requirements for joining the Rising Environmental Steward tier are more
demanding. These facilities must establish environmental performance targets,
make annual improvements in their environmental performance, and have an
494

See CARY COGLIANESE, JENNIFER NASH & JONATHAN BORCK, STATE AND FEDERAL PERFORMENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS: ASSESSING GOALS, ACTIVITIES, COMMUNICATION, AND
DATA COLLECTION 1 (2008).
495
See supra note 34.
496
COGLIANESE, NASH & BORCK, supra note 494, at 11.
497
Id.
498
Id.
499
States with active tiered programs are: Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. at 73, 76, 78. Several of these tiered programs
pre-date EPA’s Performance Track — e.g., Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Vermont initiated
their programs in 1998. For sources of further information about these programs, see supra note
34.
500
NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP INITIATIVE, ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP
ANNUAL REPORT 16–17 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/S3AV-94EP.
501
Id. at 17.
ANCE-BASED
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EMS already in place that has been certified by a third party or member of the
NCDENR staff. In addition to all of the benefits of Environmental Partners,
NCDENR provides Rising Environmental Stewards with further recognition.
The third program tier is the most challenging and most rewarding. Environmental Stewards must put in place a mature EMS that “is integrated into
core business functions,” sets “aggressive environmental performance goals,”
and communicates “with the local community” about “progress toward performance goals.”502 North Carolina rewards Environmental Stewards with recognition from the Secretary of the NCDENR and offers the opportunity to
participate in two high-level groups: a stewardship forum chaired by the Secretary and an Environmental Stewardship Initiative advisory board.503 But these
greater rewards do not necessarily lead to greater levels of participation. In
2011, ninety-seven facilities participated in the Environmental Partner tier,
while only a little more than a dozen facilities participated in each of the Rising
Environmental Steward and the Environmental Steward tiers.504
This paradox of participation — where fewer facilities tend to join tiers
that offer greater benefits — is found in almost every tiered state program. For
example, in fiscal year 2012, Virginia’s least demanding (and least rewarding)
tier had 150 members (including two facilities with multiple offices),505 while
its most demanding (and most rewarding) tier had thirty-eight.506 Similarly,
Wisconsin’s least demanding (and least rewarding) tier had eighty-two members while its most demanding (and most rewarding) tier had six.507 The general
pattern observed with EPA’s voluntary partnership programs is consistent with
the general pattern across state voluntary partnership programs.
5. Summary
This review of EPA and state voluntary partnership programs confirms
how the design of a voluntary program like Performance Track can affect businesses’ willingness to join. As agencies offer more significant rewards for participation in their voluntary programs, they also raise the stringency of the
programs’ entry requirements.508 Of course, agencies’ propensity to link heightened program benefits to heightened entry requirements may well be entirely
appropriate, both normatively and politically. As we have seen, government

502

Id.
Id.
504
Id. at 3.
505
Environmental Enterprise (E2) Members, VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://perma.law.
harvard.edu/0Bo9dQbLrrC.
506
Extraordinary Environmental Enterprise (E4) Members, VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/03iXk74aGZG?type=image.
507
Green Tier Charters, Tiers, and Applicants, WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://perma.law.
harvard.edu/032FaY7BATA?type=image.
508
See supra Part III.B.1 (detailing the inverse relationship between the rewards from and participation in agency programs). Of course, it is also possible that agencies first decide to impose
stringent entry requirements and then seek to offer greater rewards to compensate. These additional rewards, though, do not appear to be sufficient to induce high levels of participation.
503
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agencies face the prospect of criticism and controversy if businesses they are
rewarding turn out to be undeserving of those rewards.509
The problem is that businesses do not find the additional rewards sufficient to offset the additional entry requirements that accompany these rewards.
In practice, this linkage has created a paradox of participation.510 Because the
level of business participation varies inversely with the stringency of entry requirements, at the same time that an agency increases rewards in order to boost
participation in a program, it paradoxically decreases participation by increasing the costs of business participation. Fewer firms are willing to assume the
increased costs associated with gaining entry to programs with higher stringency, even when they promise greater rewards.
Rather than increasing benefits, as Performance Track’s managers repeatedly tried to do, the most effective way to have increased participation in Performance Track would have been to reduce program stringency. But a program
with weak requirements will demand weak environmental performance improvements from its members. Despite lofty aspirations at the outset, Performance Track eventually found itself confronting an inescapable impediment to
becoming a major driver of environmental improvement in the United States.
Even when the program offered rewards that included relief from the kind of
regulatory requirements that many businesses often complain about, businesses
were simply not interested in jumping through the agency’s hoops to receive the
promised relief.
Such a trap lies in store for other voluntary programs. If “[p]oorly subscribed voluntary programs are suspect,” as Professor Eric Orts has noted,511
then programs like Performance Track appear destined to be suspect. When
they demand more of each member, they can expect to see fewer members.
Promising greater rewards simply does not help. Governments that reward private companies become vulnerable to criticism if those companies turn out not
to be worthy512 — hence, officials can be expected to screen entry into their
programs even more stringently when rewards are greater, thereby further discouraging participation.513
509

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.B.1.
Orts, supra note 412, at 1286.
512
See supra Part III.B.1.
513
OSHA’s experience with VPP does not diminish our conclusions. Although EPA modeled Performance Track on VPP and the two programs bore many similarities, we do not take the fact that
OSHA currently has more members in VPP than EPA had in Performance Track to undercut in
any way the core constraints we have explained. Despite their similarities, OSHA’s VPP and
EPA’s Performance Track did have some differences in entry requirements and rewards that make
direct comparison challenging. The most striking difference between the two programs lies in their
age: VPP is over thirty years old, while Performance Track came to an end after nine years. When
OSHA’s VPP was nine years old, it had only seventy-one worksites in the federal VPP — vastly
fewer members than Performance Track when it ended. Growth of VPP – Federal Only – As of 01/
31/04, OSHA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0L1dhrj4eey. Even ignoring differences in program longevity, the ratio of program members to the total population of potential members is
incredibly small in both the EPA and OSHA programs. See supra notes 416–418 and accompanying text. Moreover, when rough estimates of the combined membership in the federal Performance
Track and state-based environmental leadership programs (2,389) are compared with the total
510
511
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED
Our study of Performance Track has been based on a variety of research
methods: a review of publicly available information about Performance Track
and other voluntary programs, semi-structured interviews with managers of
participating and non-participating facilities, and a large-scale survey of facility
managers in several industry sectors. By using such a multifaceted research
approach, we have been able to test our analyses against one another, comparing findings from interviews with findings from survey research. Moreover, in
contrast with other research on voluntary environmental programs more generally, we approached our inquiry not only by collecting data on the joiners but
also by considering the views of non-participants. Our three major findings,
summarized here, not only speak to Performance Track and what it achieved,
but they also contribute to an improved understanding of voluntary programs
more generally.
A. Claims About Recognizing “Top Performers” Should Be Verifiable
EPA called Performance Track members the best of the best.514 Yet EPA’s
entry criteria for Performance Track never addressed performance directly, and
it never compared facilities that applied with facilities that did not apply. Although the Performance Track application asked for a large amount of information about a facility’s characteristics — its EMS, past achievements, future
commitments, and public outreach initiatives515 — EPA never gathered information about other facilities’ environmental practices. Thus, it had no way of
knowing where applicants fell along the performance spectrum.
Those who have examined the environmental performance of Performance
Track members have concluded that at least some members failed to perform
better than their peers.516 A 2007 study by EPA’s Office of Inspector General
found that some Performance Track facilities emitted more toxic pollutants than
the average for their sectors and that some had non-trivial compliance

number of worksites in both the federal VPP and similar state-based programs (2,339), the differences between the two types of programs seem to disappear altogether. Borck et al., supra note
25, at 817–18 (reporting Performance Track and state environmental leadership program data as of
July 2007, although this may include some unknown double-counting of facilities in both federal
and state programs); Current Federal and State-Plan Sites As of 10/31/2013, OSHA.GOV, http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/09gYZhUA6uJ. It is also worth noting that EPA has had more than sixty
voluntary programs in operation compared with OSHA’s five programs; to some degree, EPA’s
other programs may have diverted interest away from Performance Track. See Coglianese & Nash,
supra note 456, at 107 (noting more than sixty voluntary programs listed on EPA’s website in
2005); OSHA’s Cooperative Programs, OSHA.GOV, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0Smka58qvBP
(describing OSHA’s five “cooperative programs”).
514
See GROWTH & RENEWAL, supra note 142, at 3; see also supra Part II.A.
515
EPA, EPA DOC. NO. 240B01006, PERFORMANCE TRACK APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS 2 (2002)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
516
See P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 24, 26; PERFORMANCE
TRACK DATABASE OVERVIEW, supra note 282, at 17–18.
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problems.517 An analysis undertaken by consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton at
our request found that Performance Track facilities presented slightly higherthan-average risk to public health compared to all facilities subject to EPA toxic
reporting requirements.518
In addition to calling Performance Track members “top performers,” EPA
frequently spoke of the program as “delivering results.”519 EPA required members to track progress toward their goals and report improvements to EPA on an
annual basis.520 But at least some of the facilities that joined Performance Track
undertook those activities and made those improvements without any regard to
the program. Managers we interviewed did not speak of Performance Track as a
vehicle for inducing them to improve their environmental performance; they
largely saw it as “easy” to join because they were already doing many of the
things that the program required.521 Recall that EMS implementation was a prerequisite to program admission. It would not be appropriate, therefore, for EPA
to claim credit for the environmental benefits that were pursued as part of the
EMSs that managers put into place before they joined. Nevertheless, EPA routinely claimed such improvements as Performance Track “results.”
B. Voluntary Programs Attract “Extroverts” — Not Necessarily “Leaders”
What made Performance Track facilities stand out was the value they
placed on external engagement as opposed to any measurable tendency toward
environmental excellence.522 Performance Track facility managers cultivated an
image of environmental responsibility and environmental leadership.523 They
valued recognition and actively sought to engage regulators and communities,
and their corporate and facility bosses voiced strong support for such efforts.524
A large number of facility managers working at Performance Track facilities
also reported that they more frequently sought out the opinions of community
members and environmental advocacy organizations.525
The managers we spoke with at facilities that did not participate in Performance Track, in contrast, preferred to keep a low profile and achieve environmental results without fanfare.526 Our research indicated that facilities
differed markedly in their degree of organizational extroversion. Some sought
to call attention to their accomplishments, while others preferred to stay out of
the spotlight. This extroversion, rather than superior environmental performance, was the chief characteristic distinguishing joiners from others.527
517

See P-TRACK TO IMPROVE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, supra note 29, at 24–25.
See PERFORMANCE TRACK DATABASE OVERVIEW, supra note 282, at 17–18.
See, e.g., FY2006 NATIONAL PROGRAM GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 1.
520
See, e.g., TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 4, 6.
521
See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
522
Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, supra note 345, at 96.
523
Id. at 95.
524
Id. at 96–97.
525
Id.
526
Id. at 95.
527
Id. at 100.
518
519
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C. Voluntary Partnership Programs Face Limits to Growth
When Performance Track ended in 2009, it had 547 members. While that
number was significantly more than the number that participated in Project XL
and StarTrack, it still represented only a tiny fraction of regulated facilities.
From the perspective of facility managers, the cost of applying for and maintaining their Performance Track membership was significant, while the benefits
EPA provided were modest. EPA initially promised regulatory relief to firms
participating in Performance Track, but it took several years before the agency
was even able to offer a short extension of the time period for on-site hazardous
waste storage. From EPA’s perspective, however, the benefits it offered were
still quite significant — they were, after all, exemptions from law. Relinquishing even a very small degree of regulatory authority was a major concession
and political risk for EPA.
The different ways that EPA and facility managers value the costs and
benefits of voluntary programs necessarily limits the potential of voluntary
partnership programs to impose meaningful incentives on a large number of
businesses. Programs that are easy to join and offer small benefits can attract
relatively large numbers of members, but ambitious programs that set stringent
entrance requirements and offer more significant rewards attract relatively few
members. Ironically, fewer firms want to join the programs that offer the
greater benefits. This paradox of participation generally holds true across EPA
partnership programs as well as those offered by states. For most facilities,
joining a relatively inconsequential voluntary program may be attractive, but
joining a voluntary program that sets high goals and standards is simply not
worth the cost.
CONCLUSION
Although Performance Track, EPA’s “flagship” voluntary program, has
now been disbanded, government agencies, including EPA, continue to operate
a significant number of voluntary programs like it. With little prospect for ending gridlock in Congress, voluntary programs like Performance Track are likely
to become increasingly attractive avenues for seeking environmental improvement in the absence of new legislative authority. Yet public officials should
take heed of the lessons from EPA’s experience with Performance Track.
Public leaders should keep the contributions of voluntary programs in perspective. These efforts will likely always be modest additions to core regulatory
activities. For those who seek to encourage businesses to undertake greater pollution prevention and control efforts, voluntary programs may well be the only
available option in the face of the “logjam” that has impeded environmental
lawmaking in recent decades — but they are also likely to prove very unsatisfying alternatives. These programs tend to be gap-fillers, not inducers of a paradigm shift or an “alternative path” toward new environmental regulation.
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We recognize, of course, that traditional regulation is hardly perfect. Substantial rates of non-compliance with traditional regulation have persisted even
after decades of regulatory control.528 Yet even rules that experience some of
the lowest-known compliance rates still encompass and affect many more facilities than Performance Track ever reached.529
In crafting voluntary programs, government officials should refrain from
calling program participants “top performers” — especially if the agency collects no data with which to compare member facilities to non-member facilities.
Our research suggests that those who shun the spotlight of recognition by a
federal or state regulatory agency do not always have something to hide. Instead, the organizational introversion that characterizes these facilities leads
their managers to emphasize getting work done without fanfare.
As a result, environmental officials should not equate the participation in a
voluntary program, even one that requires adoption of a management system
and the setting of improvement goals, as the achievement of a superior level of
performance. After all, goals may be ambitious or modest. They may address
problems that are important or trivial. They may reflect plans made earlier or
may be implemented for reasons having nothing to do with the voluntary program, and once managers set environmental performance goals, they may strive
to meet them with varying degrees of determination. Simply having goals or
having a management system in place says relatively little about a facility’s
environmental impacts, now or in the future.
We have seen that facilities that participate in voluntary programs are indeed different from their non-participating peers. The crux of that difference
528
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 304–05 (1999) (describing significant
noncompliance rates even twenty years after the passage of the Clean Water Act); Mary E. Deily
& Wayne B. Gray, Agency Structure and Firm Culture: OSHA, EPA, and the Steel Industry, 23
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 685, 705–06 (2007).
529
For a similar conclusion about EPA’s Strategic Goals Program (“SGP”), which was part of the
agency’s Common Sense Initiative in the 1990s, see Cary Coglianese & Laurie Allen, Building
Sector-Based Consensus: A Review of the US EPA’s Common Sense Initiative, in INDUSTRIAL
TRANSFORMATION 65, 84 (Theo de Bruijn & Vicki Norberg-Bohm eds., 2005) (“If the limited
voluntary efforts associated with SGP are compared with the likely impact of a new environmental regulation that would have covered all 3,000 firms, instead of just the small fraction who
participated in SGP, the environmental impacts of SGP can hardly seem all that significant.”). Of
course, we do recognize the theoretical possibility that voluntary programs like Performance Track
might have “spillover” effects, potentially inducing some changes in the management of facilities
that do not participate in the program, either by enticing these non-members to improve their
performance so as to position themselves to join the voluntary program in the future or by somehow engendering the diffusion of best environmental practices. Borck & Coglianese, supra note
45, at 317. Neither our research nor anything EPA reported has identified any significant spillover
effects from Performance Track. We surmise that if there were any such effects, they would probably not be large. Our survey of facilities described in Part II.C.2 included a question designed to
gauge managers’ awareness of Performance Track. After taking out those who responded as members of Performance Track, 52% of the respondents indicated that they had never even heard of
Performance Track, while another 26% only knew a little about it. If the environmental managers
of so many non-member facilities had so little awareness of Performance Track, it is hard to
imagine that the program exerted any substantial indirect effects on their businesses’ environmental performance.
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lies in their organizational extroversion — the value their managers place on
engaging with external constituencies and seeking government recognition. We
have explained that these characteristics are not the same as top environmental
performance, but we should conclude by duly noting that such characteristics
could be valuable, at least to some degree, to EPA when acting in its role as a
traditional regulator.
In other words, there might actually be a meaningful contribution that can
be reasonably expected from a program like Performance Track because facilities that engage with EPA and state environmental officials might prove to be
useful sources of information for regulatory decision-making.530 Facilities that
participate in these programs make themselves open to regulators to learn about
their industrial operations and how they can be made cleaner and safer. Members give access to regulators, offering windows into what goes on inside industrial facilities that presumably can only help inform future regulatory
decision-making. When the time is ripe for statutory change or new regulations,
what EPA learns from its engagement with extroverted facilities could prove
useful.
In this way, Performance Track might help by acting as a magnet, drawing
out managers from more extroverted facilities to engage with EPA. To at least
some degree, Performance Track apparently did help EPA officials better understand the role of environmental management systems in environmental protection. After visiting Performance Track facilities and observing how EMSs
worked in practice, EPA learned that EMSs that were not externally certified
tended to diminish in quality. Hence, the agency added a requirement for facilities participating in Performance Track to have their EMSs certified by a third
party.531 Performance Track also provided an opportunity for EPA to learn about
performance reporting. As the agency gathered information from members
about their progress toward achieving their goals, it learned much more about
the challenges of performance measurement, normalization, and communication. The models for community engagement that EPA officials thought would
help to ensure that facilities met their goals were also tested through experience
— although in light of the sharp criticisms of the program from environmental
organizations, these can probably be said to have fallen short.
Ultimately, agency officials learned — or should have learned — that the
“alternative path” articulated in its visionary Aiming for Excellence report was
much more difficult to achieve than many environmental policy innovators had
anticipated at that time. Indeed, the biggest lesson for government officials to
take away from Performance Track is almost certainly not the one that the program’s founders had in mind when they emphasized that they were seeking
“measurable results.”532 We have indicated that EPA never implemented Per530
Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 310 (2004).
531
See supra Part I.C.
532
See TOP PERFORMERS, supra note 124, at 3 (“Through these early initiatives, EPA learned the
importance of keeping program design simple, keeping transaction costs low, and delivering measurable results.”). See also Jonathan C. Borck, Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Evaluating the
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formance Track in a way that enabled the agency to generate any meaningful
measurements of the program’s results. On the contrary, the data we have marshaled through a series of studies reveal significant design weaknesses in voluntary environmental programs like Performance Track. To achieve the true
learning potential from these programs, government officials must be prepared
to accept that innovations can sometimes fail — or at least not live up to the
grand expectations that their founders may proclaim. That is what our research
shows, and true policy learning requires going where the evidence leads.533

Social Effects of Environmental Leadership Programs, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10697, 10697 (2008);
Borck, Coglianese & Nash, supra note 25, at 775–76.
533
Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111–12 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009);
Coglianese & Snyder Bennear, supra note 244, at 246–73.
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